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ABSTRACT
OPTIMIZING LINEAR QUERIES UNDER
DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY
SEPTEMBER, 2013
CHAO LI
B.Sc., PEKING UNIVERSITY
M.Math, UNIVERSITY OF WATERLOO
M.Sc., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Gerome Miklau
Private data analysis on statistical data has been addressed by many recent lit-
eratures. The goal of such analysis is to measure statistical properties of a database
without revealing information of individuals who participate in the database. Dif-
ferential privacy is a rigorous privacy definition that protects individual information
using output perturbation: a differentially private algorithm produces statistically
indistinguishable outputs no matter whether the database contains a tuple corre-
sponding to an individual or not.
It is straightforward to construct differentially private algorithms for many com-
mon tasks and there are published algorithms to support various tasks under differen-
tial privacy. However methods to design error-optimal algorithms for most non-trivial
tasks are still unknown. In particular, we are interested in error-optimal algorithms
iv
for sets of linear queries. A linear query is a sum of counts of tuples that satisfy a cer-
tain condition, which covers the scope of many aggregation tasks including count, sum
and histogram. We present the matrix mechanism, a novel mechanism for answering
sets of linear queries under differential privacy. The matrix mechanism makes a clear
distinction between a set of queries submitted by users, called the query workload,
and an alternative set of queries to be answered under differential privacy, called the
query strategy. The answer to the query workload can then be computed using the
answer to the query strategy. Given a query workload, the query strategy determines
the distribution of the output noise and the power of the matrix mechanism comes
from adaptively choosing a query strategy that minimizes the output noise.
Our analyses also provide a theoretical measure to the quality of different strate-
gies for a given workload. This measure is then used in accurate and approximate
formulations to the optimization problem that outputs the error-optimal strategy. We
present a lower bound of error to answer each workload under the matrix mechanism.
The bound reveals that the hardness of a query workload is related to the spectral
properties of the workload when it is represented in matrix form. In addition, we
design an approximate algorithm, which generates strategies generated by our a out
perform state-of-art mechanisms over (, δ)-differential privacy. Those strategies lead
to more accurate data analysis while preserving a rigorous privacy guarantee. More-
over, we also combine the matrix mechanism with a novel data-dependent algorithm,
which achieves differential privacy by adding noise that is adapted to the input data
and to the given query workload.
v
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Private data analysis on statistical databases
Statistical data is widely collected and analyzed in various fields such as statis-
tics, computer science, economics, psychology and so on. Many statistical databases
involve sensitive personal information which should not be revealed during data an-
alyzing and publishing. The naive approach, which simply removes identifiers from
the database, can not protect personal information and is vulnerable when partial
information is publicly available [10, 55].
Sophisticated private query answering techniques have been developed to reduce
potential privacy breaches. Though there are different privacy models that define
the behavior of adversaries and basic privacy requirements, those techniques can be
categorized into three groups [58]: local perturbation, in which the information has
been modified before being submitted to the statistical database; data publishing, in
which a synthetic database that is based on the original database is published; output
perturbation, in which the query answers are modified before returned to users.
Local perturbation has been studied in [7, 28]. The problem of local perturbation is
that there is no fine grained control on privacy and the noise from different individuals
accumulates when the analysis relates to multiple individuals.
One famous data publishing approach in privacy data analysis is k-anonymity
introduced by Sweeney et al. [63]. K-anonymity is a syntactically private mechanism
that has been widely accepted by data publishers and analyzers. In k-anonymity,
the attributes of a table are separated into two groups: quasi identifiers and sensitive
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attributes. The idea of k-anonymity is to group the values of quasi identifiers so that
each group of quasi identifiers is associated with at least k different tuples. Several
papers discussed and improved the theory of k-anonymity [50, 48, 66, 68]. However,
there are still three major drawbacks in k-anonymity. First, in practice, there is
no clear distinction between quasi identifiers and sensitive attributes. For example,
the address attribute can be a quasi identifier in a database of patients but may be
sensitive in a location tracking database. In addition, with k-anonymity, it is difficult
to prevent an adversary from indicating whether a user participates in the database.
Such information sometimes is highly sensitive (e.g. a database of certain diseases).
Lastly, there is actually no theoretical guarantee on the effect of k-anonymity and
later literatures [48, 50, 31] demonstrated several attacks under which k-anonymity
and its variations are vulnerable.
Dwork et al. [25, 26] introduced differential privacy, which is a rigorous privacy
definition that protects individual information using output perturbation: a differ-
entially private algorithm produces statistically indistinguishable outputs no matter
whether the database contains a tuple corresponding to an individual or not. Further-
more, differential privacy makes no assumption on the prior knowledge of adversaries
and provides privacy guarantee even if the adversary knows all but one tuple in the
table. It is straightforward to construct differentially private algorithms for many
common tasks and there are published algorithms to support various tasks under
differential privacy, as summarized in [22, 23, 24]. Systems that answer queries un-
der differential privacy have also been designed, such as PINQ[53], Airavat[61] and
GUPT[54]. However methods to design error-optimal algorithms for most non-trivial
tasks are still unknown. In many cases, the optimal error to answer a set of queries
with a certain privacy guarantee under differential privacy can be greatly impacted
by the choices of the mechanisms to answer those queries.
2
1.2 Answering linear queries under differential privacy
One of the most widely studied categories of queries under differential privacy
is linear queries. A linear query is a sum of counts of tuples that satisfy a certain
condition, which covers the scope of many aggregation tasks including count, sum
and histogram. To answer one single linear counting query under differential privacy,
the Laplace mechanism has been proved [32] to be the mechanism that introduces
the least amount of noise. However, the best mechanism that answers multiple linear
counting queries simultaneously is remain unknown. Many have pointed out that
using the Laplace mechanism to answer each query in a set independently introduces
more noise than it is needed in many scenarios. It hence calls for more sophisticated
mechanisms to answer set of linear counting queries under differential privacy with
low noise.
Recently, a number of related approaches have been proposed which improve on
the Laplace mechanism, sometimes allowing for low error where only unacceptably
high error was possible before. They each embody a basic (but perhaps counter-
intuitive) principle: better results are possible when you don’t ask for what you want.
The earliest example of this approach focuses on workloads consisting of sets of
k-way marginals, for which Barak et al. answer a set of Fourier basis queries using
the Laplace mechanism, and then derive the desired marginals [9]. For workloads
consisting of all range-count queries over an ordered domain, two approaches have
been proposed. Xiao et al. [70] first answer a set of wavelet basis queries, while Hay
et al. [40] use a hierarchical set of counting queries which recursively decompose the
domain. For workloads consisting of sets of marginals, Ding et al. [19] propose a
method for selecting an alternative set of marginals, from which the desired counts
can be derived. However, those approaches only support one type of query sets and
can not be generalized to arbitrary set of linear counting queries.
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All approaches mentioned above, as well as the Laplace mechanism, share one
important property: the queries they answer only depend on the domain properties
and the input queries, and are independent of the concrete tuples in the database.
Those approaches are hence called data-independent approaches. Meanwhile, another
research trend in answering linear counting queries under differential privacy is data-
aware approaches, which take the underlying database into consideration. Early works
either synthesizes a database [14] or maintain samples of possible databases [60],
which may not be applicable in practice. More practical algorithms are emerging
most recently [38, 73, 6, 17, 72, 67, 37]. Compared with other data-independent
works related with the matrix mechanism, the amount of noise introduced by those
data-aware algorithms either largely depend on the underlying database: they can
sometimes do much better than data-independent works while do much worse in other
cases. or do not take significant advantage of the properties of underlying databases.
Furthermore, many of those works just aim to generate a database and the input
query sets are largely ignored.
1.3 Contributions
We present the matrix mechanism, a novel mechanism for answering sets of lin-
ear queries under differential privacy. Our mechanism works as an improvement to
any differentially privacy mechanism. In general, the matrix mechanism builds an
alternative set of queries and uses the answer to the alternative query set to derive
the answer to the input query set. The matrix mechanism makes a clear distinc-
tion between a set of queries submitted by users, called the query workload, and an
alternative set of queries to be answered under differential privacy, called the query
strategy. The answer to the query workload can then be computed using the answer
to the query strategy. The power of the mechanism then yields to the flexibility
in the choice of query strategies that leads to low noisy answers to different query
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workloads. The matrix mechanism covers those approaches that improve the Laplace
mechanism [9, 70, 40, 19], as well as mechanisms that work on other differentially
private mechanisms [39]. To avoid the limitation of previous approaches, we present
an efficient algorithm that creates a truly adaptive solution to answer any set of linear
counting queries with low error, relieving the user of the burden of choosing among
mechanisms or carefully analyzing their query workloads. The strategies generated
by our approximate algorithm out perform state-of-art mechanisms [9, 70, 40, 19]
over (, δ)-differential privacy.
In addition, we provide a thorough error analysis under the matrix mechanism, and
formulate the noise of the matrix mechanism in a closed form. The analytic formula of
noise leads to a much easier comparison among many algorithms: it is not necessary
to run repeated experiments on concrete databases. It can also be used in accurate
and approximate formulations to the optimization problem that outputs the error-
optimal strategy. Furthermore, with the analyses in the matrix mechanism, we also
characterize the “hardness” of a query workload by lower bounding the minimum noise
of the workload under the matrix mechanism. Our bound is tight or almost tight on
many commonly interested sets of queries and serves as a more comprehensive measure
on the “hardness” of a query workload than the basic differential privacy measurement
on the query workload [25, 26] or the information theoretical measurement of it [14].
To take the advantage of both the input query set and the underlying database, we
further design a mechanism by combining the matrix mechanism with a novel data-
dependent algorithm. To our knowledge, our mechanism is the first data-dependent
mechanism that provides significant improvement on databases with easy-to-exploit
properties yet does not break-down on databases with complex distributions.
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CHAPTER 2
BACKGROUND
The content of this chapter serves as the foundation of all our discussions in the
remaining chapters of this dissertation. In this chapter, we first formally define the
concept of linear queries and workloads we are working on, as well as the vector
or matrix representation of the query or query set. An introduction to differential
privacy is also included in the chapter, consisting of basic definitions and mechanisms
in differential privacy. We also cover the linear algebra fundamentals at the end of
this chapter.
2.1 Background: linear queries and query workloads
The matrix mechanism is designed to answer a set of linear queries. A linear
query is an aggregation query over a single relation that can be expressed as a linear
combination of a set of database counts . In this section, we first describe the repre-
sentation of a relational table as a vector of counts. We then describe linear queries,
represented as a vector of coefficients, and a workload of linear queries, represented
as a matrix. Lastly, we show that the matrix representation of a set of linear queries
is not unique.
2.1.1 Data domain and cell lists
We consider a database instance I of a single-table relational schema R(A) with
attributes A = {A1,A2, . . . ,Am}. The domain dom(Ai) of an attribute Ai may be
discrete or continuous, finite or infinite, ordered or unordered. The set of all tuples
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that may exist in I is the cross-product of the domains of attributes in A: dom(A) =
dom(A1) × dom(A2) × ⋯ × dom(Am). The database instance is encoded as a vector
of cell counts, each counting the number of tuples included in a distinct subset of the
domain.
Definition 2.1 (Cell and Cell List). A cell is a non-empty subset of dom(A). A cell
list Φ = φ1, φ2 . . . φn is an ordered list of mutually-exclusive cells: ∀i, j φi ∩ φj = ∅.
We do not require that the cells in a cell list cover dom(A). For a specified cell
list, a relational table can be represented in the form of a data vector consisting of a
non-negative integer for each cell.
Definition 2.2 (Data vector). Given instance I and cell list Φ = φ1, φ2 . . . φn, the
vector representation of I using Φ, denoted x(I,Φ), is the length-n column vector
consisting of a non-negative integer for each cell, i.e the ith entry in x(I,Φ) is ∣I ∩φi∣.
When I and Φ are clear from the context, we denote the data vector simply by x.
Example 2.1. Consider a relational schema R = (name, gradyear, gender, gpa) de-
scribing students. Fig. 2.1(a) shows a sample instance of this relation. Fig. 2.1(b)
shows a cell list based on gender (Male or Female), and gradyear (2011,2012,2013
or 2014). Fig. 2.1(c) shows the data vector that results from the instance and the
cell list. Note that the sum of the counts in the data vector does not equal the total
number of tuples in the instance because the cells happen not to cover the entire active
domain of gradyear.
A common case is to define a cell list by partitioning dom(A) according to a single
ordered attribute. In this case, the data vector would describe a one-dimensional
histogram. The main criterion for selecting a cell list for a given schema is that the
cells can be used to express the queries of the intended workload. This can be done
in multiple ways and we return to the choice of cell lists later in this section.
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Name Gradyear Gender Gpa
Alice 2012 F 3.8
Bob 2011 M 3.1
Charlie 2014 M 3.6
Dave 2014 M 3.3
Evelyn 2013 F 3.9
Frank 2011 M 3.2
Gary 2015 M 3.5
(a) Instance of relation R
φ1 ∶ - R(∗,2011,M,∗)
φ2 ∶ - R(∗,2011, F,∗)
φ3 ∶ - R(∗,2012,M,∗)
φ4 ∶ - R(∗,2012, F,∗)
φ5 ∶ - R(∗,2013,M,∗)
φ6 ∶ - R(∗,2013, F,∗)
φ7 ∶ - R(∗,2014,M,∗)
φ8 ∶ - R(∗,2014, F,∗)
(b) Cell list Φ
x1: 2
x2: 0
x3: 0
x4: 1
x5: 0
x6: 1
x7: 2
x8: 0
(c) x
Figure 2.1. For schema R = (name, gradyear, gender, gpa) (a) shows a sample
instance. A cell list consisting of 8 cells described in terms of the tuples that match
conditions on gradyear and gender is shown in (b). The database vector, shown in
(c), accordingly consists of 8 counts.
⎡
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎣
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0
1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 1 -1 -1
⎤
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎦
(a) Query matrix W
w1: Students of any gender with gradyear ∈ [2011,2014]
w2: Students with gradyear ∈ [2011,2012]
w3: Female students with gradyear ∈ [2011,2012]
w4: Male students with gradyear ∈ [2011,2012]
w5: Difference between 2013 grads and 2014 grads
(b) Five linear queries
w1x = x1 + x2 + x3 + x4 + x5 + x6 + x7 + x8 = 6
w2x = x1 + x2 + x3 + x4 = 3
w3x = x2 + x4 = 1
w4x = x1 + x3 = 2
w5x = x5 + x6 − x7 − x8 = -1
(c) The evaluation of Wx
⎡
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎣
1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 0 0 0
0 1 0 1 0 0 0
1 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 -1 -1
⎤
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎦
(d) Query matrix W′
Figure 2.2. (a) A query matrix W consisting of five linear queries; (b) The
description of the queries in W using the cell list Φ in Fig 2.1; (c) The evaluation of
W on x; (d) A semantically equivalent query matrix W′ expressed w.r.t. a reduced
cell list (columns 5 and 6 in W have been combined to get W′).
8
2.1.2 Linear queries
A linear query computes a linear combination of the counts in the data vector x.
Definition 2.3 (Linear query). A linear query is a length-n row vector w = [w1 . . . wn]
with each wi ∈ R. The answer to a linear query w on x is the dot product wx =
w1x1 + ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ +wnxn.
Linear queries can express a variety of common aggregation queries. We refer to
a linear query whose coefficients are exclusively zero or one as a predicate counting
query, since it computes the number of tuples satisfying a predicate defined by the
disjunction of the cells corresponding to query coefficients of one. For an ordered
attribute domain, a range-count query is a special case of a predicate counting query
whose non-zero coefficients form a contiguous range. Range count queries have a
natural extension to multi-dimensional range count queries. Multi-dimensional range
count queries are a versatile class: histograms, data cubes, marginal queries, and
group-by queries are all sets of one-dimensional or multi-dimensional range count
queries.
Even so, we do not restrict our attention only to linear queries with zero or
one coefficients. With other coefficients, linear queries can compute differences (e.g.
query w5 in Fig. 2.2(b)) and can express aggregate queries that are not, strictly
speaking, counting queries. For example, referring to the cell list in Fig. 2.1, the
average graduation year of male students graduating between 2011 and 2014 can be
computed as (2011x1 + 2012x3 + 2013x5 + 2014x7)/4.
We will consider query workloads that consist of sets of linear queries, organized
into the rows of a query matrix.
Definition 2.4 (Query matrix). A query matrix is a collection of m linear queries,
arranged by rows to form an m × n matrix.
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If W is an m×n query matrix, the evaluation of W results in a length-m column
vector of query answers, which can be computed as the matrix product Wx.
Example 2.2. Fig. 2.2 shows a query matrix representing a workload of five linear
queries, along with the meaning of the queries using the cell list in Fig. 2.1(b). The
queries are evaluated by computing Wx, as shown in Fig. 2.2(c).
2.1.3 Representing query workloads in matrix form
Later in the paper we will assume that an analyst has decided on a workload of
queries of interest, selected a cell list, and represented the workload as a query matrix.
The workload query matrix is the main input to our algorithms. We describe next
a few guidelines and subtleties involved in representing a query workload in matrix
form.
The matrix mechanism can be seen as automatically optimizing the workload to
reduce error. As a result, the analyst does not have to think carefully about the
workings of the privacy mechanism when representing the workload. In particular,
the analyst need not try to reduce the sensitivity of the workload or avoid redundancy
of queries. In fact, the analyst should include in the workload all queries of interest,
even if some queries could be computed from others in the workload. As a concrete
example, in Fig. 2.2(b), w4 can be computed as (w2 − w3), but it is nevertheless
included in the workload. This reflects our assumption that we wish to simultane-
ously answer all given workload queries with minimum aggregate error, treating each
equally. The analyst may, however, choose to scale individual rows of the workload
by a positive scalar value. This has the effect of increasing the importance of the
query and reducing the error of that query relative to total error of the workload.
After deciding on the workload queries, the next step is to select an appropriate
cell list that can support the workload queries. If each attribute domain is finite,
then it is possible to fully represent instance I by defining the (finite) vector x with
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one cell for every element of dom(A). Then x is a bit vector of size ∣dom(A)∣ with
nonzero counts for each tuple present in I. This is also a vector representation of
the full contingency table built from I. (Note that if the schema contains infinite
attribute domains, they would typically be partitioned into finite regions of sufficient
granularity to support the desired queries.)
Selecting the cell list in this manner allows a wide range of desired queries to be
supported. But it is often inefficient, since the size x vector grows exponentially with
the sizes of the attribute domains, and ineffective, since the base counts are typically
too small to be estimated very accurately. Alternatively, it may be sufficient to
partially represent I by the cell counts in x, for example by focusing on a subset of
the attributes of A that are relevant to a specialized set of queries and/or a subset of
the attribute domains (as in Example 2.1).
When representing a workload as a matrix, the order of workload queries are deter-
mined by the order of rows of the matrix. However, semantically, a workload means a
set of queries, in which there is no specific orders amount those queries. Therefore the
order of rows in a matrix does not semantically change its corresponding workload. In
addition, there will always be many feasible choices for the cell list supporting a given
workload. We formalize this using a notion of semantically equivalent workloads.
Definition 2.5 (Workload semantic equivalence). Workload W over cell list Φ is
semantically equivalent to workload W′ over cell list Φ′, denoted (W,Φ) ≡ (W′,Φ′),
if there is a permutation matrix P such that for every instance I, Wx(I,Φ) =
PW′x(I,Φ′).
Example 2.3. Observe in Fig. 2.2 that columns 5 and 6 of workloadW are identical.
With respect to the example workload, positions 5 and 6 of the data vector are either
both ignored, or are summed together. It follows that cells φ5 and φ6 can be combined
and the query matrix altered by dropping one of the columns and that these operations
will not modify the semantics of the workload. More precisely, (W,Φ) ≡ (W′,Φ′)
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where Φ′ is derived from Φ as follows. The first four cells in Φ′ are equal to those of
Φ, cell φ′5 = φ5 ∨ φ6, φ′6 = φ7, and φ′7 = φ8. Observe that W′ results from removing
column 6 from W.
The following proposition shows that semantic equivalence can be characterized by
considering a small set of semantic-preserving operations over cell lists and workload
matrices.
Proposition 2.1. For workload W over cell list Φ and a workload W′ over cell list
Φ′, (W,Φ) ≡ (W′,Φ′) if and only if W′ and Φ′ result from a sequence of one or more
of the following operations:
1. Permutation: apply permutation µ to the rows of W, or the cells of Φ and the
columns of W.
2. Cell union: if W contains two columns with identical coefficients, form W′ by
removing one of the columns and replacing the cells by their union.
3. Cell division: for any column Wi ofW and corresponding cell φi of Φ, construct
Φ′ by replacing condition φi with φi1 and φi2 where φi1∪φi2 = φi and φi1∩φi2 = ∅.
Then associate cell φi1 and φi2 with the column of coefficientsWi (i.e., two copies
of Wi will appear in W′).
4. Add irrelevant cells: add a new cell to Φ and a corresponding column to W
whose coefficients are all zeros.
5. Remove irrelevant cells: if W contains a column of zeros, remove it along with
its associated cell in Φ.
The definition below is introduced to prove Proposition 2.1.
Definition 2.6 (Minimized workload). Given a workloadW, the minimized workload
of W is defined as the workload W′ that combines all duplicate columns in W and
removes all zero columns from W.
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Proof. The adequacy of the conditions in Proposition 2.1 is easy to be verified. Here
we prove the necessity of those conditions.
Given W1 over Φ1 and W2 over Φ2 such that (W1,Φ1) ≡ (W2,Φ2). As it is
defined in Definition 2.5, there exists a permutation matrix P such thatW1x(I,Φ1) =
PW2x(I,Φ2) for any instance I. Noticing the row permutation is a part of the
Permutation operation in Proposition 2.1, it is sufficient to consider the case that
P = I.
Consider the minimized workload W′1 of W1 and its corresponding cell condition
Φ′1 such that (W′1,Φ′1) ≡ (W1,Φ1). Apply the same process to W2 to get its min-
imized workload W′2 such that (W′2,Φ′2) ≡ (W2,Φ2). According to Definition 2.5,
(W′1,Φ′1) must be semantically equivalent to (W′2,Φ′2).
First of all, ⋁φ∈Φ′
1
φ = ⋁φ∈Φ′
2
φ. Otherwise, without loss of generality, assume
⋁φ∈Φ′
1
φ is not a subset of ⋁φ∈Φ′
2
φ and let
I0 = {t∣φ(t) ∧ (¬φ′(t)) is True, ∀φ ∈ Φ′1, ∀φ′ ∈ Φ′2}.
Then I0 ≠ ∅ and W′1x(I0,Φ′1) ≠ W′2x(I0,Φ′2) = 0, which contradicts with the fact
that (W′1,Φ′1) ≡ (W′2,Φ′2).
In addition, for any i, j such that φi ∈ Φ′1 and φ′j ∈ Φ′2 such that φi ∧ φ′j ≠ ∅. Let
Wi be the column of W′1 corresponding to φi and W
′
j be the column of W
′
2 corre-
sponding to φ′j. Wi must be equal to W
′
j . Otherwise, let I1 = {t∣φi(t)∧φ′j(t) is True}
and W′1x(I1,Φ′1) = ∣I1∣Wi ≠ W′2x(I1,Φ′2) = ∣I1∣W ′j , which leads to a contradiction.
Moreover, since neither W′1 nor W
′
2 contains duplicate columns, any cell conditions
in Φ′1 other than φi is disjoint with φ
′
j and any cell conditions in Φ
′
2 other than φ
′
j is
disjoint with φi. Therefore φi = φ′j, otherwise ⋁φ∈Φ′1 φ ≠ ⋁φ∈Φ′2 φ.
Above all, we know there must exist a permutation µ to the cells of Φ′1 and
the columns of W′1 that gets us (W′2,Φ′2). Thus (W1,Φ1) can be transformed into
(W2,Φ2) with the operations in Prop 2.1.
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We will show later in the paper that many aspects of the performance of our
algorithms are independent of the cell list used and the particular query matrix that
results. Most importantly, the optimal error achievable for a workload is the same
for any semantically-equivalent workload matrix. However, in terms of efficiency, it is
beneficial to represent a workload with the smallest possible set of cells. The number
of cells in the cell list, n, (which is also the number of columns in the workload
matrix) is a key parameter in the computational complexity of the algorithms to
come. Fortunately, using Prop. 2.1, it is straightforward to create the smallest cell
list for a given workload of interest. After starting with any feasible representation
of the workload, we can repeatedly apply steps (2) and (5), in any order.
2.2 Differential privacy
Informally, a randomized algorithm is differentially private if it produces statis-
tically close outputs whether or not any one individual’s record is present in the
database. Two instances I and I ′ are neighbors, denoted nbrs(I, I ′) if they differ by
at most one record, i.e., if ∣(I − I ′) ∪ (I ′ − I)∣ = 1.
Definition 2.7 (Differential privacy). A randomized algorithm K is (, δ)-differ-
entially private if for any instances I, I ′ such that nbrs(I, I ′), and any subset of
outputs S ⊆ Range(K), the following holds:
Pr[K(I) ∈ S] ≤ exp() × Pr[K(I ′) ∈ S] + δ,
where the probability is taken over the randomness of the K.
If an algorithm satisfies the definition above for δ = 0, then it is -differentially
private. When δ > 0 the privacy standard is sometimes referred to as approximate
differential privacy.
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Both  and (, δ)-differential privacy can be satisfied by algorithms that add ran-
dom noise to query answers. The magnitude of the required noise is determined by
the privacy parameters,  and/or δ, and the sensitivity of the set of queries: the
maximum change in a vector of query answers over any two neighboring databases.
The two privacy definitions differ, however, in the measurement of sensitivity and in
their noise distributions. Standard -differential privacy can be achieved by adding
Laplace noise calibrated to the L1 sensitivity of the queries [26]. Approximate (, δ)-
differential privacy can be achieved by adding Gaussian noise calibrated to the L2
sensitivity of the queries [25, 51].
Since our query workloads are represented as matrices, we describe the sensitivity
of a workload matrix as a matrix norm. Recall that, for any cell list Φ, cells are
always disjoint and x(I,Φ) is the vector representation of I using Φ. Since neighboring
databases I and I ′ differ in exactly one tuple, it follows that the corresponding vectors
x(I,Φ) and x(I ′,Φ) differ in at most one component, by at most one.
In the propositions below, cols(W) is the set of column vectors Wi of W. For a
query matrix W, the L1 sensitivity is the maximum L1 norm of the columns of W,
which is defined as the sum of absolute values of entries in one column.
Proposition 2.2 (L1 Query matrix sensitivity). For any cell list Φ, the L1 sensitivity
of a query matrix W using cell list Φ is denoted ∥W∥1 and defined as:
∆¯W
def= max
I,I′∈nbrs(I,I′)
∥Wx(I,Φ) −Wx(I ′,Φ)∥1 = max
Wi∈cols(W)
∥Wi∥1
Similarly, the L2 sensitivity ofW is equal to the maximum L2 norm of the columns
of W, which is defined as the square root of sum of squares of entries in one column.
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Proposition 2.3 (L2 Query matrix sensitivity). For any cell list Φ, the L2 sensitivity
of a query matrix W using cell list Φ is denoted ∣∣W∣∣2 and defined as:
∆¯W
def= max
I,I′∈nbrs(I,I′)
∣∣Wx(I,Φ) −Wx(I ′,Φ)∣∣2 = max
Wi∈cols(W)
∣∣Wi∣∣2
It is clear from the above propositions that the sensitivity of a query matrix is in
fact independent of any cell list that accompanies it and our notation reflects this.
Further, we occasionally use ∆W to represent the sensitivity when the context does
not specify whether it is L1 or L2 sensitivity.
Example 2.4. Figure 2.3 shows three query matrices, over an unspecified cell list of
size four, which we use as a running example. I4 is the identity matrix of size four.
This matrix consists of four queries, each asking for an individual element of the data
vector x. H4 contains seven queries, which represent a binary hierarchy of sums: the
first row is the sum of the elements of x, the second and third rows each sum one half
of x, and the last four rows return individual elements of x. Y4 is the matrix of the
Haar wavelet. It can also be seen as a hierarchical set of queries: the first row is the
total sum, the second row computes the difference between sums in two halves of x,
and the last two rows return differences between smaller partitions of x.
The sensitivity of each of the query matrices in Figure 2.3 is: ∆¯I4 = 1 and ∆¯H4 =
∆¯Y4 = 3; ∆¯I4 = 1 and ∆¯H4 = ∆¯Y4 = √3. A change by one in any component xi will
change the query answer I4x by exactly one under both L1 and L2, but will change
H4x and Y4x by 3 under L1 and
√
3 under L2 since each xi contributes to three
predicate queries in both H4 and Y4.
The following propositions describe, in vector form, the standard mechanisms for
answering a set of queries under -differential privacy and (, δ)-differential privacy.
The Laplace mechanism [25, 22] achieves -differential privacy by adding Laplace
noise calibrated to the L1 sensitivity of the input queries. We use Laplace(b)m to
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⎡
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎣
1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1
⎤
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎦
⎡
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎣
1 1 1 1
1 1 0 0
0 0 1 1
1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1
⎤
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎦
⎡
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎣
1 1 1 1
1 1 -1 -1
1 -1 0 0
0 0 1 -1
⎤
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎦
I4 H4 Y4
Figure 2.3. Query matrices with dom = {1,2,3,4}. Each is full rank. I4 returns
each unit count. H4 computes seven sums, hierarchically partitioning the domain.
W4 is based on the Haar wavelet.
denote a column vector consisting of m independent samples drawn from a Laplace
distribution with mean 0 and scale b.
Proposition 2.4 (Laplace mechanism). Given an m × n query matrix W, the ran-
domized algorithm L that outputs the following vector is -differentially private:
L(W,x) =Wx + Laplace(b)m
where b = ∆¯W/.
The Gaussian mechanism [51] achieves (, δ)-differential privacy by adding Gaus-
sian noise calibrated to the L2 sensitivity. We use Normal(σ)m to denote a column
vector consisting of m independent samples drawn from a Gaussian distribution with
mean 0 and scale σ.
Proposition 2.5. (Gaussian mechanism [25, 51]) Given an m × n query matrix
W, the randomized algorithm G that outputs the following vector is (, δ)-differentially
private:
G(W,x) =Wx +Normal(σ)m
where σ = ∆¯W√2 ln(2/δ)/.
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Recall thatWx is a vector consisting of the true answers to each query inW. The
algorithms above add independent Laplace noise (scaled by ∆¯W and ) or Gaussian
noise (scaled by ∆¯W, , and δ) to each query answer. Thus both L(W,x) and
G(W,x) are length-m column vectors containing a noisy answer for each linear query
in W.
2.3 Linear algebra fundamentals
Most of our discussions and analyses base on linear algebra operations. In this sec-
tion, we summarize the concepts and results in linear algebra that are used throughout
the dissertation.
In the dissertation, we use the standard notation of linear algebra and employ
standard techniques of matrix analysis. We use diag(d1, . . . dn) to indicate the n × n
diagonal matrix with scalars di on the diagonal and 0m×n to indicate a matrix of zeroes
with m rows and n columns. Recall that for a matrix A, AT is its transpose, A−1 is
its inverse. We say A is symmetric if AT =A and orthogonal if AT =A−1. The rank
of a matrix A, rank(A), is defined as the size of the largest set of linearly independent
rows (or equivalently columns) of A. We say a matrix is full row (column) rank if
its rank is equal to the number of its rows (columns). In particular A−1 exists if and
only if A is a square matrix with full rank.
If matrix A is a square matrix, the trace of A, denoted as trace(A), is the sum
of entries on the main diagonal if A. The trace of a matrix has a very important
property: it is invariant under cyclic permutations, i.e, if matrix A1 has m columns
and matrix A3 has m rows,
trace(A1A2A3) = trace(A3A1A2).
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Another concept that is related with trace is the Frobenius norm. The Frobenius
norm of A is denoted as ∣∣A∣∣F and defined as √trace(ATA), or, equivalently, the
square root of the squared sum of all entries in A.
As a powerful tool in matrix analysis, matrix decomposition is extensively used
in the dissertation. We focus on two decompositions: eigenvalue decomposition and
singular value decomposition. Given a matrix A, the eigenvalue decomposition of A
always exists when A is symmetric. It can be written as the form of A = QDQT
where Q is an orthogonal matrix whose columns are eigenvectors of A and D is
a diagonal matrix whose diagonal entries are eigenvalues of A. The singular value
decomposition of A always exists and is in form of A = QDPT where Q and P are
orthogonal matrices and D is a diagonal matrix padding with columns or rows of 0s.
We will also rely on the notion of the positive semidefinite matrix. A symmetric
square matrix A is called positive semidefinite, denoted as A ⪰ 0, if for any vector x,
xTAx ≥ 0. In particular, for any matrix A, ATA ⪰ 0. Here we present two equivalent
conditions to positive semidefinite.
Proposition 2.6. Given an n × n symmetric matrix A, both of the following condi-
tions are equivalent with A ⪰ 0.
(i) All the eigenvalues of A are non-negative.
(ii) For any 1 ≤ i1 < . . . < ik ≤ n, the determinant of the matrix that consists of
the intersection of the ith1 , . . . , i
th
k rows and i
th
1 , . . . , i
th
k columns of matrix A is
non-negative.
In addition, we consider a generalization of matrix inverse, called the Moore-
Penrose pseudoinverse, which is defined as following.
Definition 2.8. (Moore-Penrose Pseudoinverse [11]) Given a m × n matrix
A, a matrix A+ is the Moore-Penrose pseudoinverse of A if it satisfies each of the
following:
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AA+A =A, A+AA+ =A+, (AA+)T =AA+, (A+A)T =A+A.
The Moore-Penrose pseudoinverse is unique and can be computed with the singu-
lar value decomposition of a matrix.
Proposition 2.7 ([11]). Given an n × n diagonal matrix D0, D+0 = {d′ij} is an n × n
diagonal matrix such that
d′ij =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
0 dij = 0
1
dij
dij ≠ 0
For an m×n matrix D consists of a diagonal matrix D0 padding with columns (rows)
of 0s, D+ is an n ×m consists of the diagonal matrix D+0 with rows (columns) of 0s.
Given a matrix A with singular value decomposition A =QDPT , A+ = PD+QT .
When A has full column rank, A+ = (ATA)−1AT . We include some important
properties of the Moore-Penrose pseudoinverse in the following proposition.
Proposition 2.8. ([11]) The Moore-Penrose pseudoinverse satisfies the following
properties:
1. Given any matrix A, there exists a unique matrix that is the Moore-Penrose
pseudoinverse of A.
2. Given a vector y, we have ∣∣y −Ax∣∣2 ≥ ∣∣y −AA+y∣∣2 for any vector x.
3. For any satisfiable linear system BA = W, WA+ is a solution to the linear
system and ∣∣WA+∣∣F ≤ ∣∣B∣∣F for any solution B to the linear system.
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CHAPTER 3
MATRIX MECHANISM
This chapter covers the matrix mechanism, a novel mechanism that answers a
group of linear queries under differential privacy. Central to our approach is the idea
that “what you ask is different from what you want”, which relies on the distinction
between a query strategy and a query workload, both of which are sets of linear
queries. A query workload is a set of queries that is originally submitted to the
mechanism. Though a query workload can be answered directly with Laplace or
Gaussian mechanism, the noise required may be more than necessary due to the
linear dependency among the queries in the query workload. The matrix mechanism,
instead, submits an alternative set of linear queries, called query strategy, whose
answer can later be used to derive the answer to the query workload with linear
combinations.
The matrix mechanism is a general framework that can applied to any differentially
private mechanism. It is particularly powerful when the underlying differentially
private mechanisms add i.i.d noise that is independent of the input database. Many
works in differential privacy before or parallel with the matrix mechanism can actually
be viewed as special instances of the matrix mechanism [19, 40, 70, 39, 9].
In this chapter, we formally define the matrix mechanism, and follow with a thor-
ough error analysis that provides analytic formula of error under the matrix mecha-
nism. Our error formula theoretically explains the experimental results in many of
works above and show that many those experimental results can be acquired theo-
retically independent of any concrete database. As an example, a case study that
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analyzes algorithms in [40, 70] using the matrix mechanism is also included in this
chapter. Furthermore, we formulate the corresponding optimization problems to find
the strategy that minimize the error of a given workload. The matrix mechanism
with non-negativity constraint is briefly discussed at the end of this chapter.
3.1 The matrix mechanism
A linear query w can be answered directly with the Laplace or Gaussian mech-
anism. Under -differential privacy, it has also been proven [32] that the amount of
noise added by the Laplace mechanism is optimal. However, when answering a batch
of linear queries simultaneously, the noise required by either the Laplace or Gaussian
mechanism may be more than necessary due to the linear dependency among the
queries in the query workload. Alternatively, previous works derive the answer for
the workload from the noisy answer of a selected subset [40, 19]. In addition, other
works [9, 70] apply manually designed linear transformations to the data vector, and
add Laplace or Gaussian noise on the transformed domain. An estimated data vec-
tor can be generated by the inverse transformation and the workload queries can be
answered by the estimated data vector.
The idea of the matrix mechanism is more general compared with past works.
The matrix mechanism submits an alternative set of linear queries, called the query
strategy, whose answer can later be used to derive the answer to the query workload
using linear combinations. Such a query strategy can be a subset of the query work-
load, queries of linear transformation, or an arbitrary set of linear queries that can
represent the query workload using linear combinations.
In this section we present the formal basis for the derivation process. We define the
set of queries whose estimates can be derived and we provide optimal mechanisms
for deriving estimates. In the remainder of this dissertation, we use W and A to
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denote the query workload and query strategy as well as their representation matrices,
respectively.
Given a query strategy A and its noisy answer from any differentially private
algorithm, in order to answer a query workload W with the answer to A, each query
w in W should be expressible as a linear combination of queries in A:
Definition 3.1 (A workload supported by a strategy). Given a query workload W
and a query strategy A, we say A supports W if each query in W can be expressed as
a linear combination of queries in A. In other words, there exists a solution matrix
X to the linear system W =XA.
To derive the answer to W, one needs to solve linear system W = XA. Noticing
that there maybe multiple solutions to the linear system, we take the advantage of the
uniqueness of the Moore-penrose pseudoinverse of matrix A and express the answer
to W as following:
Definition 3.2 (Estimate the answer ofW using A). Let A be a query strategy that
supports W and yˆ be the noise answers to A. Then the noisy answer to W is defined
as WA+yˆ, where A+ is the Moore-penrose pseudoinverse of matrix A.
Example 3.1. Recall the cell conditions and queries in Figure 2.1. Let the query
workload be W1 = {q2,q3,q4}. Then query strategy A1 = {q1,q5} does not support
W since it can not represent q2, q3 or q4. A2 = {q3,q4} supports W1 and
WA+2 = ⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
1 1
1 0
0 1
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ .
In such case, the answer to W1 can be uniquely computed from the answer to A2,
without any further assumption to the data vector x.
Now we introduce the matrix mechanism. Given any differentially private algo-
rithm K that answers linear queries, the matrix mechanism can be considered as an
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Figure 3.1. Query answering using the matrix mechanismMK,A.
enhancement mechanism to K. With the supporting query strategy A, the matrix
mechanism is denoted asMK,A.
Definition 3.3 (Matrix Mechanism). Given an m × n workload matrix W, a p × n
strategy matrix A that supportsW and a differentially private algorithm K(A,x) that
answers A with a given database instance x. The matrix mechanism MK,A outputs
the following vector:
MK,A(W,x) =WA+K(A,x). (3.1)
Figure 3.1 illustrates the process of query answering using the matrix mechanism
MK,A. When it comes a query workload W, the matrix mechanism chooses a query
strategy A that supports W, answers A with the differentially private algorithm K
and outputs the derived answer to W using the answer to A. The power of the
matrix mechanism comes from the potential that the query strategy A can be more
carefully designed to be answered under differential privacy. In addition, the matrix
mechanism inherits the privacy and unbiased property of K.
Proposition 3.1. The matrix mechanism MK,A shares the same privacy guarantee
with K and is unbiased if K is unbiased.
Proof. According to Eqn (3.1), the matrix mechanism can be considered as a post
process on K(A,x) and hence share the same privacy guarantee with K(A,x). In
addition, noticing WA+A =W,
E[MK,A(A,x)] = E[WA+K(A,x)] =WA+E[K(A,x)] =WA+Ax =Wx.
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In general, Eqn. (3.1) is valid with any differentially private mechanism K. The
choice of K impatcs the hardness of error analysis and the complexity of find a query
strategy A to minimize error on a given workload W. Here we are interested in a
differentially private algorithm K that satisfies three properties: 1) K(W,x) achieves
differential privacy by adding noise to Wx; 2) the distribution of noise added is
independent with W and x; 3) the standard deviation of noise added is linearly
scaled up with ∆W and is independent with x. Analytically, such mechanism K can
be represented into the following form:
K(W,x) =Wx +∆Wb˜, (3.2)
where b˜ is a vector of i.i.d random variables that does not depend on W or x. Many
data independent differentially private mechanisms based on adding noise can be rep-
resented in the form of Eqn. (3.2), such as the Laplace mechanism [25, 26], Gaussian
mechanism[51, 26], the Geometric mechanism [32], and the K-Norm mechanism [39].
Proposition 3.2. When K has the form of Eqn (3.2), the matrix mechanism can be
presented as:.
MK,A(W,x) =Wx +WA+∆Ab˜. (3.3)
In the rest of this dissertation, we focus on the matrix mechanism with the form
of Eqn. (3.3). In particular, we use -matrix mechanism to denote the case in which K
is the Laplace mechanism, and (, δ)-matrix mechanism to denote the case in which
K is the Gaussian mechanism.
According to Proposition 2.8, since entries of ∆Ab˜ are generated from i.i.d random
distributions, WA+ is the min-variance estimation to the noisy answer of A.
Proposition 3.3. When K has the form of Eqn (3.2), the matrix mechanismMK,A
produces the min-variance estimator to Wx given K(A,x).
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Given the noisy answer toA, there are multiple ways to estimate the answer toW.
[76] applies matrix decomposition on W and claims to solve a matrix B to minimize
the square error of answeringW. As Prop. 3.3 indicates, their solution matrix B must
be exactly the same as WA+. On the other hand, in [75], a fixed “recovery” matrix
R is used regardless of the noisy distribution of b˜A, which, according to Prop. 3.3, is
suboptimal.
3.2 Analyzing the error of the matrix mechanism
The error introduced using the matrix mechanism is impacted by two factors: the
noise from the differentially private mechanism K and the linear combinations that
generate the answer to the query workload W from the answer to the query strategy
A. We analyze the error of the matrix mechanism in this section and further derive
a closed form expression with given K, W and A. We also studied the equivalent
query workloads and query strategies under the matrix mechanism.
3.2.1 Error of the matrix mechanism
Given a query w and a query strategy A that supports w, the error of answering
w using the matrix mechanismMK,A is defined as the mean square error (variance)
of the estimated answer to w.
Definition 3.4 (Error of a single query). Let x be the database instance and A be a
query strategy. Given a single query w that A supports, the error of answer w using
the matrix mechanism MK,A is:
ErrorK,A(w) = E[(wx −wK(A,x))2].
For a query workload W that A supports, the total error of answering W using the
matrix mechanism MK,A is:
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TotalErrorK,A(W) = ∑
w∈W
E[(wx −wA+K(A,x))2].
With a query strategy A, the following proposition describes how to compute the
error of answering a query w or a query workload W that is supported by A using
the matrix mechanismMK,A.
Proposition 3.4. Let A be a query strategy. Given a query w that A supports, the
error of answering w using the matrix mechanism MK,A is:
ErrorK,A(w) = P (K)∆2A∣∣wA+∣∣2F . (3.4)
For a query workload W that A supports, the total error of answering W using the
matrix mechanism MK,A is:
TotalErrorK,A(W) = P (K)∆2A∣∣WA+∣∣2F . (3.5)
Here P (K) is a constant determined by K and independent with W, A and x.
Proof. Recall that K(A,x) =Ax+∆Ab˜ and the entires of b˜ are i.i.d random variables.
Let b˜ = (b1, . . . , bn). According to Definition 3.4, the error of answer w using the
matrix mechanismMK,A is:
ErrorK,A(w) = E[(wx −wA+K(A,x))2] = E[(wx −wA+(Ax +∆Ab˜))2]
= E[(wA+∆Ab˜)2]
= Var(wA+∆Ab˜)
= Var(b1)∆2A∣∣wA+∣∣2F .
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Therefore, for a given query workload W,
TotalErrorK,A(W) = ∑
w∈W
E[(wx −wA+K(A,x))2
= Var(b1) ∑
w∈W
∆2A∣∣wA+∣∣22
= Var(b1)∆2A∣∣WA+∣∣2F .
Let P (K) = Var(b1), and recall that b˜ only depends on K. P (K) is dependent with
W, A and x.
Since we only consider the matrix mechanism based on the data independent differ-
entially private algorithm, the results in Proposition 3.4 do not contain the database
instance x as well. Recall the parameter P (K) is a constant that determined by the
specific private algorithm K. In particular, P (K) = 2/2 and P (K) = 2 log(1/δ)/2
when K is Laplace mechanism and Gaussian mechanism, respectively. Moreover, the
computation of ∆A is also determined by the choice of K: it can either be the max-
imum L1 or L2 norm of the columns of A depending on whether K satisfies - or
(, δ)-differential privacy, respectively.
Notice that a query strategy A impacts both Eqn. (3.4) and (3.5) in two ways:
through ∆A and ∣∣WA+∣∣F . The former determines the cost of querying A using K
and the later reflects the difficulty of computing the answer to W from the answer
to A. To lower the error, an ideal query strategy A should have low sensitivity while
being as similar to W as possible. Here let us consider two extreme cases to those
requirements. The first case is A = I, in which the sensitivity is as low as 1. However,
if the queries in W are biased towards some cells or some of their combinations, the
value of ∣∣WA+∣∣F can be very large and hence lead to large noise. The other case is
A =W, in which A and W are exactly the same. In such case ∣∣WA+∣∣F = rank(W),
which is small, but the strategy performs badly if ∆W is high. In many practical cases,
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the best strategy is the one that achieves a proper balance between the sensitivity
and the similarity to W.
3.2.2 Total error equivalent workloads
For two distinct queries w1 and w2, one can verify that the query strategy A =
[ w12w2 ] supports w1 and w2 and guarantees ErrorA(w1) ≠ ErrorA(w2). Therefore,
there are no two queries that have the same error on all query strategies that support
both of them. However, there exist pairs of query workloads whose total error are
the same for all of their commonly supporting query strategies. Such workloads are
defined as total error equivalent workloads.
Definition 3.5. Two query workloads W1 and W2 are called total error equivalent,
if for any query strategy A that supports both W1 and W2,TotalErrorA(W1) =
TotalErrorA(W2).
Analysing Eqn. (3.5) leads to the following condition of total error equivalent.
Proposition 3.5. Given two query workloads W1 and W2 where W1 has at least
as naby queries as W1. W1 and W2 are total error equivalent, if and only if there
exists an orthogonal matrix Q such thatW1 =QW2 orW1 =Q [W20 ] ifW1 has more
queries than W2.
Proof. (⇐): When W1 = QW2 or W1 = Q [W20 ] if W1 has more queries than W2,
we have WT1W1 =WT2W2. Notice that
∣∣WA+∣∣2F = trace(WT (ATA)+W) = trace(WTW(ATA)+),
for any query strategy A that supports both W1 and W2, TotalErrorA(W1) =
TotalErrorA(W2).
(⇒): IfWT1W1 ≠WT2W2, consider the eigenvalue decomposition ofWT1W1−WT2W2 =
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QDQT and d1, . . . , dn be the diagonal entries of D. Without loss of generality, as-
sume d1 ≠ 0 and let D′ = diag(d′1, . . . , d′n) where d′1 = √∣d1∣/√∣d2∣ + . . . + ∣dn∣ + 1 and
d′2 = . . . = d′n = 1. Let query strategy A = D′QT . A supports W1 and W2 since it is
full rank. Moreover,
∣∣W1A+∣∣2F − ∣∣W2A+∣∣2F = trace(WT1 (ATA)+W1) − trace(WT2 (ATA)+W2)
= trace(WT1W1(ATA)+) − trace(WT2W2(ATA)+)
= trace((WT1W1 −WT2W2)(ATA)+)
= d1∣d1∣ (∣d2∣ + . . . + ∣dn∣ + 1) + d2 + . . . + dn ≠ 0.
When WT1W1 =WT2W2, there exists singular value decompositions W1 = Q1D1PT
and Q2D2PT , where the non-zero entries of D1 and D2 are the same. Thus, let
Q0 =Q1QT2 orQ0 =Q1 [Q2 00 I ] ifW1 has more queries thanW2, andW1 =Q0W2.
Noticing that any query strategy that supportsW will supportQW for any matrix
Q, the conclusion of Proposition 3.5 also indicates that the total error equivalent
workloads share the same set of supporting strategies.
3.2.3 Equivalence between query strategies
In both Eqn. (3.4) and (3.5), the error is computed by ∆A and a Frobenius norm
term ∣∣wA+∣∣2F and ∣∣WA+∣∣2F , respectively. According to the definition of the Frobenius
norm,
∣∣wA+∣∣2F = trace(wA+(wA+)T ) = trace(w(ATA)+w),
∣∣WA+∣∣2F = trace(WA+(WA+)T ) = trace(W(ATA)+WT ).
The righthand side of both equations above share a common term (ATA)+, which we
call an error profile.
30
Definition 3.6. Given a query strategy A, the matrix (ATA)+ is called the error
profile of the query strategy A.
When the matrix mechanism is instantiated with A, its error profile characterizes
the distribution of the error of answering queries under the matrix mechanism: the
diagonal entries contains the variance of error for each cell and the off-diagonal en-
tries encodes the covariance of error between cells. We hence define the equivalence
between query strategies according to their error profiles and the error of answering
different workloads using those strategies.
Definition 3.7 (Profile Equivalence between query strategies). Given two query
strategies A1 and A2. We say that A1 and A2 are profile equivalent if there exists a
non-zero constant c such that
(AT1A1)+ = c(AT2A2)+.
The profile equivalent strategies are independent og the choice of K. We also
consider strategies equivalence, which depends on whether K satisfies - or (, δ)-
differential privacy.
Definition 3.8 (Equivalence between strategies). Given two query strategies A1 and
A2, We say that A1 and A2 are equivalent under K if they support the same sets of
queries and for any query w that their support, ErrorK,A1(w) = ErrorK,A2(w).
Example 3.2. Figure 3.2 contains three query strategies H′4, H
′′
4 and Y4 that are
profile equivalent. In particular, under -differentially private mechanisms (e.g. the
Laplace mechanism), H′4 and Y4 are equivalent but not equivalent with H
′′
4 .
Besides the definition, there are other equivalent conditions for the profile equiv-
alence, based on strategy matrices and their transformations.
31
⎡
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎣
1 1 0 0
0 0 1 1
1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1
1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1
⎤
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎦
⎡
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎣
1 1 0 0
0 0 1 1
√
2 0 0 0
0
√
2 0 0
0 0
√
2 0
0 0 0
√
2
⎤
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎦
⎡
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎣
1 1 1 1
1 1 -1 -1
1 -1 0 0
0 0 1 -1
⎤
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎦
H′4 H
′′
4 Y4
Figure 3.2. Profile equivalent strategies with dom = {1,2,3,4}.
Proposition 3.6. Given two query strategies A1 and A2, where A1 has at least as
many rows as A2. All of the following conditions are equivalent:
(i) A1 and A2 are profile equivalent;
(ii) There exists a non-zero constant c such that AT1A1 = c ⋅AT2A2;
(iii) There exists a non-zero constant c and an orthogonal matrix Q such that A1 =
c ⋅QA2 or A1 = c ⋅Q [A20 ] if A1 has more rows than A2;
Proof. (i) ⇔ (ii): According to the definition of the profile equivalent, (AT1A1)+ =
c ⋅AT2A2)+. Take the Moore-Penrose pseudoinverse to both sides of the equation and
we have AT1A1 = 1c ⋅AT2A2.
(ii) ⇒ (iii): Since AT1A1 = c ⋅AT2A2, there exists singular value decompositions of
A1 = Q1D1PT1 and A2 = Q2D2PT2 such that P1 = P2 and the diagonal entries of D1
is equal to
√
c times the diagonal entries of D2. If A1 has more rows than A2, the
matrix Q =Q1 [QT2 00 I ] is the orthogonal matrix such that A1 =√c ⋅Q [A20 ].
(iii) ⇒ (ii): AT1A1 = c2 ⋅AT2QTQA2 = c2 ⋅AT2A2.
The conditions in Proposition 3.6 imply that the profile equivalent strategies sup-
port the same set of queries. In addition, for each query they support, the ratio
between the error introduced by those strategies is consistent.
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Corollary 3.1. Given two query strategies A1 and A2 that are profile equivalent.
For any query W, A1 supports W if and only if A2 supports W. Furthermore,
there exists a non-zero constant c such that given a differentially private algorithm
K, for any workload query W that A1 and A2 support, TotalErrorK,A1(W) =
c ⋅TotalErrorK,A2(W).
Proof. Given a query workload W, if A1 supports W, there exists a matrix X such
that W = XA1. According to Proposition 3.6(iii), A1 and A2 are profile equivalent
if and only if there exists a non-zero constant c and a orthogonal matrix Q such that
A1 = c ⋅QA2. Then c ⋅XQ satisfies W = c ⋅XQA2 and therefore A2 supports W as
well.
The definition of profile equivalent indicates that there is a constant c′ such that
(AT1A1)+ = c′ ⋅ (AT2A2)+. Thus for any query workload that A1 supports:
TotalErrorK,A1(W )
TotalErrorK,A2(W ) =
∆2A1 ∣∣WA+1∣∣2F
∆2A2 ∣∣WA+2∣∣2F
= ∆2A1trace(W(AT1A1)+WT )
∆2A2trace(W(AT2A2)+WT ) = c′
∆2A1
∆2A2
,
where the ratio is a value that is independent with W.
The following proposition reveals that the strategy equivalence is a special case of
profile equivalence with an extra constraint.
Proposition 3.7. Two query strategies A1 and A2 are equivalent if they are profile
equivalent and
∆2A1(AT1A1)+ =∆2A2(AT2A2)+,
In particular, A1 and c ⋅A1 are equivalent for any non-zero scalar c.
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Proof. (⇐): If A1 and A2 are profile equivalent, Corollary 3.1 indicates that they
support the same set of query workloads. Furthermore, one can verify that for any
workload query that A1 and A2 support,
∆2A1 ∣∣WA+1∣∣2F =∆2A1trace(WT (AT1A1)+W)
=∆2A2trace(WT (AT2A2)+W)
=∆2A2 ∣∣WA+2∣∣2F .
(⇒): First we prove that AT1A1 and AT2A2 have same eigenvectors. Otherwise, let Q0
be the matrix whose rows are orthogonal eigenvectors that are shared by A1 and A2,
Q1 be the matrix whose rows are orthogonal eigenvectors of A1 that are supported
by A1 and not eigenvectors of A2 and Q2 be the matrix whose rows are orthogonal
eigenvectors of A2 that are supported by A2 and are not eigenvectors of A1. In
addition, let D1 be the diagonal matrix whose diagonal entries are the eigenvalues
of AT1A1 corresponding to the rows of Q1 and let D2 be the diagonal matrix whose
diagonal entries are the eigenvalues of AT2A2 corresponding to the rows of Q2.
Noticing that the spanning space of Q1 contains all vectors that are supported
by A1 and are orthogonal to all vectors in Q0 and so does the spanning space of Q2.
Recall the equivalent query strategies support the same set of queries, the rows in Q1
and Q2 are actually two orthogonal basis to the same subspace. There hence exists
an orthogonal matrix Q such that Q1 =QQ2. For any vector v, vQ1 is a query that
A1 supports and
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ErrorK,A1(vQ1) = P (K)∆2A1 ∣∣vQ1A+1∣∣2F
= P (K)∆2A1trace(vQ1(AT1A1)+QT1 vT )
= P (K)∆2A1vD−11 vT ,
ErrorK,A2(vQ1) = P (K)∆2A2 ∣∣vQ1A+2∣∣2F
= P (K)∆2A2trace(vQQ2(AT2A2)+QT2QTvT )
= P (K)∆2A2vQD−12 QTvT .
Since A1 and A2 are equivalent, ErrorK,A1(vQ1) = ErrorK,A2(vQ1) for any v,
which is equivalent to for any v,
ErrorK,A1(vQ1) −ErrorK,A2(vQ1) = P (K)v(∆2A1D−11 −∆2A2QD−12 QT )vT = 0.
Thus ∆2A1D
−1
1 = ∆2A2QD−12 QT and we can consider Q(∆2A2D−12 )QT is an eigenvalue
decomposition of matrix ∆2A1D
−1
1 . Recall Q1 = QQ2 and none of the rows of Q1
belongs to Q2. Therefore there is no columns in Q that consists one entry equal to
1 and all other entries equal to 0, which indicates all diagonal entries of D−12 should
be equal. However, in such case, the rows of Q1 will be eigenvectors of AT2A2, which
leads to a contradiction and we knownAT1A1 andA
T
2A2 must have same eigenvectors.
In addition, given an eigenvector u of AT1A1 and A
T
2A2 that A1 and A2 support.
Let AT1A1u
T = ξ1uT and AT2A2uT = ξ2uT . Since A1 and A2 support u, ξ1 ≠ 0 and
ξ2 ≠ 0. Furthermore,
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ErrorA1(u) = P (K)∆2A1 ∣∣uA+1∣∣2F
=∆2A1trace(u(AT1A1)+uT ) = ∆2A1 ∣∣u∣∣22ξ1 ,
ErrorA2(u) = P (K)∆2A2 ∣∣uA+2∣∣2F
=∆2A2trace(u(AT2A2)+uT ) = ∆2A2 ∣∣u∣∣22ξ2 ,
Since ErrorA1(u) = ErrorA2(u), ∆2A1ξ2 = ∆2A2ξ1. Noticing it is true for all pairs
of corresponding eigenvalues of AT1A1 and A
T
2A2, we have
∆2A2(AT1A1) =∆2A1(AT2A2).
According to Corollary 3.1, A1 and A2 are profile equivalent and
∆2A1(AT1A1)+ =∆2A2(AT2A2)+.
Proposition 3.8. Given a differentially private algorithm K, If ∆A = ∆¯A, all profile
equivalent query strategies are equivalent.
Proof. Noticing that ∆¯2A is equal to the largest diagonal entry of matrix A
TA, given
two query strategies A1 and A2 that are profile equivalent, by definition there exists
a constant c such that (AT1A1)+ = c ⋅ (AT2A2)+. Then c ⋅AT1A1 =AT2A2 and c ⋅ ∆¯2A1 =
∆¯2A2 . Substitute those values into Eqn. (3.5) and we know TotalErrorK,A1(W) =
TotalErrorK,A2(W) for any query workload W that A1 and A2 support.
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3.3 Application: analyzing Hn and Yn using the matrix mech-
anism
In this section we use our techniques to analyze and improve existing approaches.
We analyze two techniques proposed recently [70, 40]. Both strategies can be seen
as instances of the matrix mechanism, each using different query strategies designed
to support a workload consisting of all range queries. Although both techniques can
support multidimensional range queries, we focus our analysis on one dimensional
range queries, i.e. interval queries with respect to a total order over dom(B).
We will show that the seemingly distinct approaches have remarkably similar
behavior: they have low (but not minimal) sensitivity, and they are highly accurate for
range queries but much worse for other types of queries. We describe these techniques
briefly and how they can each be represented in matrix form.
In the hierarchical scheme proposed in [40], the query strategy can be envisioned
as a recursive partitioning of the domain. We consider the simple case of a binary
partitioning, although higher branching factors were considered in [40]. First we ask
for the total sum over the whole domain, and then ask for the count of each half of
the domain, and so on, terminating with counts of individual elements of the domain.
For a domain of size n (assumed for simplicity to be a power of 2), this results in a
query strategy consisting of 2n − 1 rows. We represent this strategy as matrix Hn,
and H4 in Fig. 2.3 is a small instance of it.
In the wavelet scheme, proposed in [70], query strategies are based on the Haar
wavelet. For one dimensional range queries, the technique can also be envisioned as a
hierarchical scheme, asking the total query, then asking for the difference between the
left half and right half of the domain, continuing to recurse, asking for the difference in
counts between each binary partition of the domain at each step. Though presented
differently in [70], we prove later in this section the equivalence of that construction
with our formulation Yn. This results in n queries—fewer than the hierarchical
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scheme of [40]. The matrix corresponding to this strategy is the matrix of the Haar
wavelet transform, denoted Yn, and Y4 in Fig. 2.3 is a small instance of it.
Thus Hn is a rectangular (2n − 1) × n strategy, with answers derived using the
linear regression technique, and Yn is an n × n strategy with answers derived by
inverting the strategy matrix. As suggested by the examples in earlier sections, these
seemingly different techniques exhibit similar behavior. We analyze them in detail
below, proving new bounds on the error for each technique, and proving new results
about their relationship to one another. We also include In in the analysis, which
is the strategy represented by the dimension n identity matrix, which asks for each
individual count.
3.3.1 Representing the Haar wavelet technique
The representationYn is different from the original presentation in Xiao et al. [70].
The following theorem shows the equivalence of both representations.
Proposition 3.9 (Equivalence of Haar wavelet representations). Let xˆHaar denote the
estimate derived from the Haar wavelet approach of Xiao et al. [70]. Let xˆYn denote
the estimate from asking query Wn. Then xˆHaar and xˆYn are equal in distribution,
i.e., Pr[xˆHaar ≤ x] = Pr[xˆYn ≤ x] for any vector x.
Proof. Given vector x, the Haar wavelet is defined in terms of a binary tree over x
such that the leaves of the tree are x.
Each node in the tree is associated with a coefficient. Coefficient ci is defined as
ci = (aL−aR)/2 where aL (aR) is the average of the leaves in the left (right) subtree of
ci. Each ci is associated with a weight W(ci) which is equal to the number of leaves
in subtree rooted at ci. (In addition, there is a coefficient c0 that is the equal to the
average of x and W(c0) = n).
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An equivalent definition for ci is ci = ∑nj=1 xjzi(j) where for i > 0,
zi(j) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
1/W(ci), if j is in the left subtree of ci
−1/W(ci), if j is in the right subtree of ci
0, otherwise
For i = 0, then zi(j) is equal to 1/W(c0) for all j.
Let A be a matrix where aij = zi(j). The ith row of A corresponds to coefficient
ci. Since there are n coefficients, A is an n × n matrix.
The approach of [70] computes the following yHaar = Ax + E where E is an n × 1
vector such that each Ei is an independent sample from a Laplace distribution with
scale bi = 1+lognW(ci) . Observe that E can be equivalently represented as:
E =R−1 (1 + logn

) b˜
where R is an n × n diagonal matrix with rii = W(ci). The estimate for x is then
equal to:
xˆHaar =A−1yHaar = x +A−1E
= x +A−1R−1 (1 + logn

) b˜
= x + (RA)−1 (1 + logn

) b˜
We now describe an equivalent approach based on the matrix Yn. Observe that
Yn =RA. The sensitivity of Yn is ∆Yn = 1+ logn. Using the matrix mechanism, the
estimate xˆYn is:
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xˆYn =Yn−1 (Ynx + (∆Yn )b˜))
= x +Yn−1∆Yn

b˜
= x + (RA)−1 (1 + logn

) b˜
3.3.2 Similarity between Hn and Yn
Though represented differently, Hn and Yn are actually very similar strategies
under the matrix mechanism. In particular, a strategy matrix that is equivalent to
Yn can be achieved by removing the query of total sum and adding identity queries
on each cell.
Theorem 3.1. Let n be a power of 2, denoted as n = 2k. Let H′n be the matrix that
remove the row of all 1s from matrix [HnIn ]. Then H′n and W are equivalent strategies
under both - and (, δ)-differential privacy.
Proof. Noticing H′n has the same L1 and L2 sensitivity with Yn, it is sufficient to
proof H′n
TH′n =YTnYn, which is equivalent to prove HTnHn =YTnYn + 1n×n − In.
Recall n = 2k, and we will prove the conclusion by induction on k. When k = 1,
HT2H2 =
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
2 1
1 2
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
,
YT2Y2 =
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
2 0
0 2
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
.
Assume the conclusion is correct for k − 1. Since
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⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
1 1 1 1
1 1 0 0
0 0 1 1
1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
(a) H4
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
3 2 1 1
2 3 1 1
1 1 3 2
1 1 2 3
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
(b) HT
4
H4
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
1 1 0 0
0 0 1 1
1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1
1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
(c) H′
4
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
1 1 1 1
1 1 −1 −1
1 −1 0 0
0 0 1 −1
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
(d) Y4
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
3 1 0 0
1 3 0 0
0 0 3 1
0 0 1 3
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
(e) H′
4
T
H′
4
,
YT
4
Y4
Figure 3.3. The strategy matrices H4, H′4 and Y4.
H2k =
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
11×2k−1 11×2k−1
H2k−1 0
0 H2k−1
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
,
Y2k =
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
Y2k−1
11×2k−1
0
−11×2k−1
Y2k−1
0
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
,
one can verify that HT
2k
H2k =YT2kY2k + 12k×2k − I2k .
Example 3.3. Figure 3.3 contains the strategy matrices H4, H′4 and Y4, which
reveals the relationship among those matrices. Adding I4 to H4 and removing the row
of all 1s yields H′4. In addition, we can see that H
′
4 and Y4 are equivalent strategies
under both - and (, δ)- differentially private mechanisms.
It follows from the similarity of Hn and Yn that the error profiles are asymptoti-
cally equivalent to one another. We thus prove a close equivalence between the error
of the two techniques:
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Corollary 3.2. For any linear counting query w and differentially private mechanism
K,
1
2
ErrorK,Y(w) ≤ ErrorK,H(w) ≤ 2ErrorK,Y(w).
Proof. According to Theorem 3.1, let H′n be the matrix that remove the row of all
1s from matrix [HnIn ]. Since H′n and Yn are equivalent strategies under both - and
(, δ)- differentially private mechanisms, it is sufficient to prove that for any linear
counting query w,
1
2
ErrorK,H′n(w) ≤ ErrorK,Hn(w) ≤ 2ErrorK,H′n(w).
Let v =wH+n, and v′ be a vector such that
v′i =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
v1 1 ≤ i ≤ 2
vi−1 3 ≤ i ≤ 2n
0 2n + 1 ≤ i ≤ 3n
.
One can verify that v′H′n = vHn =w. Since
∣∣wH′n+∣∣F ≤ ∣∣v′∣∣F ≤ 2∣∣v∣∣F = ∣∣wH+n∣∣F ,
noticing that ∆¯Hn = ∆¯H′n and ∆¯Hn = ∆¯H′n , ErrorK,H′n(w) ≤ 2ErrorK,Hn(w).
On the other hand, H′n contains two copies of queries In, which is equivalent to
reduce the error on those queries by a factor of 2. Noticing all other queries in H′n
are contained in Hn, we have ErrorK,Hn(w) ≤ 2ErrorK,H′n(w).
3.3.3 Error analysis for In,Hn and Yn
In this part we analyze the error for two specific workloads of interest. We focus
on two typical workloads: WR, the set of all range queries, and W01, which includes
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(a) Use Hn as the strategy ma-
trix
(b) Use Yn as the strategy ma-
trix
(c) Use In as the strategy ma-
trix
Figure 3.4. Error of answering queries in WR under the Laplace mechanism with
n = 512,  = 1.
arbitrary predicate queries, since it consists of all linear 0-1 queries. Note that at-
tempting to use either of these workloads as strategies leads to high sensitivity: the
sensitivity ofWR is O(n2) while the sensitivity ofW01 is O(2n). Here we consider the
total error as well as the maximum error under the matrix mechanism, and the later
one is defined as the worst case error of a single query and denoted as MaxError.
In the original papers describing Hn and Yn [40, 70], both techniques are shown
to have worst case error bounded under -differential privacy by O(log3 n) on WR.
Both papers resort to experimental analysis to understand the distribution of total
error across the class of range queries. We note that our results allow the error for
any query to be analyzed analytically.
Example 3.4. Figure 3.4 demonstrates error of answering queries in WR under the
Laplace mechanism with n = 512 and  = 1 using strategy matrices Wn, Yn and In,
respectively.
Next we summarize the total error and the maximum error for these strategies.
The following results tighten known bounds for WR, and establish new bounds for
W01 with the -differential privacy.
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Theorem 3.2 (Error and Maximum Error). The total error and the maximum er-
ror on workloads WR and W01 using strategies Hn,Yn, and In under the -matrix
mechanism is given by:
TotalError Hn Yn In
WR Θ(n2 log3 n/2) Θ(n2 log3 n/2) Θ(n3/2)
W01 Θ(n2n log2 n/2) Θ(n2n log2 n/2) Θ(n2n/2)
MaxError Hn Yn In
WR Θ(log3 n/2) Θ(log3 n/2) Θ(n/2)
W01 Θ(n log2 n/2) Θ(n log2 n/2) Θ(n/2)
Proof. Since Wn and Hn are asymptotically equivalent, we can derive the error
bounds for either. We analyze the error of Wn. Let n = 2k+1, consider the range
query [2k − 1
3
(4⌊k−12 ⌋+1 − 1),2k + 1
3
(4⌊k−12 ⌋+1 − 1)]. The error of this query is Θ(log3 n),
which follows from algebraic manipulation of Equation 3.5, facilitated by knowing the
eigen decomposition of (WTnWn)+. Since Xiao et al. [70] have already shown that the
worst case error of Wn is O(log3 n), we know the maximum error of answering any
query in WR is Θ(log3 n).
Moreover, it follows from algebraic manipulation that the error of answering any
query w where the number of non-zero entries is 1 is O(log2 n). Therefore the error
of any 0-1 query is O(n log2 n). Consider the query (0,1,0,1, . . . ,0,1): it can can
be shown to have error Θ(n log2 n). Therefore the maximum error of answering any
query in W01 is Θ(n log2 n).
Recall that when K is the Laplace mechanism,
TotalErrorA(W) = 2
2
∆¯2A∣∣WA+∣∣2F .
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Total error of workloads WR, W01 can be computed by applying the equation above
to strategies Hn,Wn and In.
Given a strategy matrixA, the only differences in computing the an error of answer
any query w with A under the - and (, δ)-matrix mechanism are the sensitivity and
the constant P (K). Therefore the total error and the maximum error of the strategies
above under the (, δ)-differential privacycan be proved in exactly the same way as
Theorem 3.2.
Theorem 3.3 (Error and Maximum Error). The total error and the maximum error
on workloads WR and W01 using strategies Hn,Yn, and In under the (, δ)-matrix
mechanism is given by:
TotalError Hn Yn In
WR Θ(n2 log2 n log(1/δ)/2) Θ(n2 log2 n log(1/δ)/2) Θ(n3 log(1/δ)/2)
W01 Θ(n2n logn log(1/δ)/2) Θ(n2n logn log(1/δ)/2) Θ(n2n log(1/δ)/2)
MaxError Hn Yn In
WR Θ(log2 n log(1/δ)/2) Θ(log2 n log(1/δ)/2) Θ(n log(1/δ)/2)
W01 Θ(n logn log(1/δ)/2) Θ(n logn log(1/δ)/2) Θ(n log(1/δ)/2)
3.4 Optimization
As it is mentioned above, the matrix mechanism enhances the differentially pri-
vate algorithm K by choosing a fine tuned query strategy A. The core to the matrix
mechanism is to determine an appropriate query strategy A for a given query work-
loadW. In this section, we present techniques that generate optimal or approximate
strategies for given workloads under the matrix mechanism as well as a heuristic that
enhances existing strategies. We first demonstrate our main problem as following.
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Program 3.4.1 Minimizing the Total Error under -Differential Privacy
Given: W ∈ Rm×n
Minimize: u1 + u2 + . . . + um
Subject to: For i ∈ [m] ∶wi is the i-th row of W.
[
X wTi
wi ui
] ⪰ 0 (3.6)
∆¯A ≤ 1 (3.7)
rank([
Im′ A
AT X
]) =m′ (3.8)
Problem 3.1 (MinError). Given a query workload W and a differentially private
algorithm K, find a query strategyA that supportsW and minimizes TotalErrorK,A(W).
Noticing that both W and −W support W but 0 = W + (−W) does not, the
MinError problem is a non-convex problem. In this section, we will formulate the
MinError problem as a semidefinite program with rank constraint, which is a non-
convex variation of the semidefinite program. We then discuss the problem in two
cases corresponding to the differential private guarantee of K. A general technique
that can be used to improve a query strategy is also provided in the later section. We
also show that two semantically equivalent workloads yield the same minimum total
error at the end of this section.
3.4.1 Formulating the MinError Problem
Here we show that MinError problem under -differential privacy can be ex-
pressed as a semidefinite program with rank constraints. While rank constraints
make the semidefinite program non-convex, there are algorithms that can solve such
problems by iteratively solving a pair of related semidefinite programs.
Theorem 3.4. Given an m×n workload W, Program 3.4.1 is a semidefinite program
with rank constraint whose solution is the tuple (A,u,X) and the m′ × n strategy A
minimizes TotalErrorK,A(W) among all m′ × n strategies.
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Proof. To prove that the output strategy A of Program 3.4.1 is an optimal m′ × n
strategy to the MinError problem, one need to show that the solution of Pro-
gram 3.4.1 supportsW and the optimization goal of Program 3.4.1 is equivalent with
the MinError problem.
The semidefinite condition in (3.6) is important, which guarantees that there exists
a matrix A′ such that A′TA′ = X, A′ supports wi and ui ≥ ∣∣wiA′+∣∣2F . According
to the properties of positive semidefinite matrices, its a symmetric matrix with non-
negative eigenvalues. Let X = PΣPT be an eigenvalue decomposition of matrix X.
Consider matrix
Y =
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
PT 0
0 1
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
X wTi
wi ui
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
P 0
0 1
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
=
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
Σ (wiP)T
wiP ui
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
,
(3.6) holds if and only if Y ⪰ 0. Since Σ is a diagonal matrix, if its jth diagonal
entry is 0, the jth entry of wiP must be 0 as well. Otherwise, Y can not be pos-
itive semidefinite no matter what value ui is. Recall the diagonal entries of Σ are
eigenvalues of X and hence be non-negative. Let D be the diagonal matrix whose
diagonal entries are the square roots of diagonal entries of Σ. We know D supports
wiP. Then A′ =DPT supports wi and A′TA′ =X. In addition, let Y′ be the matrix
that is constructed by removing all 0 columns and rows from Y. For any wi that is
supported by A′, Y ⪰ 0 is equivalent to ∣Y′∣ ≥ 0. The expansion of ∣Y′∣ implies that
the determinant non-negative if and only if ui ≥ ∣∣wiA′+∣∣2F . Since the goal of the opti-
mization problem is to minimize the sum of ui, when the optimal case is achieved, we
must have ui = ∣∣wiA′+∣∣2F =wi(A′TA′)+wTi =wiX+wTi . Furthermore, (3.8) guarantees
that X =ATA, and hence ui = ∣∣wiA+∣∣2F .
According to Proposition 3.7, apply a non-zero scalar c to a query strategy A
leads to its equivalent strategy. Therefore the condition (3.7) does not limit the scope
of query strategies to be considered since any query strategy has equivalent strategies
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with sensitivity no more than 1. This constraint is as well a convex constraint since
the sensitivity of A is convex for both - and (, δ)-differential privacy. Noticing
∣∣wi(c ⋅A)+∣∣F = ∣∣wiA+∣∣F /c < ∣∣wiA+∣∣F for any c > 1, ∆¯A must be 1 in the optimal
case.
Above all, any solution to Program 3.4.1 supports W. When the optimal case is
achieved, ∆¯A = 1 and ui = ∣∣wiA+∣∣2F = ∆¯2A∣∣wiA+∣∣2F = P (K)ErrorK,A(wi). There-
fore the goal of the optimization, minimizing ∑mi=1 ui, is equivalent to minimizing
∑mi=1ErrorK,A(wi) = TotalErrorK,A(W).
Theorem 3.4 provides the best strategy to the MinError problem with at most
m′ queries. If the optimal strategy has m′′ < m′ queries, then Program 3.4.1 will
return an m′ × n matrix with m′ −m′′ rows of 0s. In addition, if the workload only
contains queries with coefficients in {−1,0,1}, we can show that n2 is upper bound
on the number of queries in the optimal strategy [45].
In addition, since Program 3.4.1 encodes the error of each query wi in query
workload W, we can actually use other convex function of u1, . . . , um to take the
place of u1 + . . .+um in the optimization goal. One variation to the optimization goal
is maxi ui, under which the result from Program 3.4.1 becomes the query strategy
that minimizes the maximum error of all queries in W.
Dattorro [18] shows that solving a semidefinite program with rank constraints can
be converted into solving two semidefinite programs iteratively. The convergence fol-
lows the widely used trace heuristic for rank minimization. We are not aware of results
that quantify the number of iterations that are required for convergence. However,
notice it takes O(n4) time to solve a semidefinite program with an n×n semidefinite
constraint matrix and in Program 3.4.1, there are m semidefinite constraint matrices
with size m + n, which can be represented as a semidefinite constraint matrix with
size m(m + n). Thus, the complexity of solving our semidefinite program with rank
constraints is at least O(m4(m + n)4).
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Program 3.4.2 Minimizing the Total Error with K under (, δ)-differential privacy
Given: W ∈ Rm×n.
Minimize: u1 + u2 + . . . + um.
Subject to: For i ∈ [m] ∶wi is the i-th row of W.
[ X wTi
wi ui
] ⪰ 0
Xii ≤ 1, i ∈ [n].
The difficulty of Program 3.4.1 comes from the rank constraint (3.8), which is used
to connect ATA and A since we need ATA to compute ∣∣wiA+∣∣2F and A to compute
∆¯A. However, when K bases on (, δ)-differential privacy, ∆¯A can be computed
directly from ATA. In such case, A is not necessary in the optimization problem and
the rank constraint can be removed. The optimization problem can then be reduced
to a semidefinite program, which can be solved in polynomial time.
Theorem 3.5. Given an m×n workload W, Program 3.4.2 is a semidefinite program
whose solution is the tuple (X,u) and any m′ × n strategy A such that X = ATA
minimizes TotalErrorK,A(W) among all strategies.
3.4.2 Approximation to the MinError Problem under -Differential Pri-
vacy
Though theMinError problem can be formulated as Program 3.4.1. Solving the
optimization problem under -differential privacy is intractable. Hence, we demon-
strate two heuristics that can be used to approximate the solution to the MinError
problem. Both of the approaches give a bound to the sensitivity so that the rank
constraint can then be removed from the optimization formulation.
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3.4.2.1 L2 approximation
The first idea is straightforward. Recall that under (, δ)-differential privacy, sen-
sitivity can be computed from ATA directly, which leads to a simpler optimization
problem, Program 3.4.2. If we can bound ∆¯A with ∆¯A, we can take advantage of the
semidefinite programming under (, δ)-differential privacy.
According to the basic property of L norms, for any vector u of dimension n,
∣∣u∣∣2 ≤ ∥u∥1 ≤ √n∣∣u∣∣2. Therefore we can bound the approximation rate of using
Program 3.4.2.
Theorem 3.6. Given a workload W, let A be the optimal solution given by Pro-
gram 3.4.1 and A′ be an optimal solution given by Program 3.4.2. Then with any
differentially private algorithm K under the -matrix mechanism,
TotalErrorK,A′(W) ≤ nTotalErrorK,A(W).
3.4.2.2 Singular value bound approximation
We can also bound ∆¯A using its geometric properties. Recall that the matrix
A can be reperesented by its singular value decomposition A = QADAPTA. Let us
consider the geometry explanation of ∆¯A, which is the radius of the minimum L1
ball that cover all column vectors of A. In such case, the column vectors of A lay on
ellipsoid
ψA ∶ x
T (AAT )+x = 1.
Let ∆¯ψA denote radius of the minimum L1 ball that covers the ellipsoid ψA. Observe
that all column vectors of A are contained in ψA, which indicates ∆¯A ≤ ∆¯ψA . The
minimum sensitivity that can be achieved by the strategies that are profile equivalent
to A can be bounded by:
min
B ∶BTB=ATA
∆¯B ≤ min
B ∶BTB=ATA
∆¯ψB .
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The query strategy B that is profile equivalent to A and has the minimum ∆¯ψB is
given by the theorem below.
Theorem 3.7. Given a strategy matrix A with singular value decomposition A =
QADAPTA.
argmin
B ∶BTB=ATA
∆¯ψB =DAPTA,
min
B ∶BtB=AtA
∆¯ψB = ∣∣A∣∣F ≤√n∆¯A. (3.9)
To prove of Theorem 3.7, tangent hyperplanes of ψA need to be formulated, as it
is in the following lemma.
Lemma 1. Given an ellipsoid defined by xTΨx = 1 and a vector u, uTw =√uTΨ+u
is a tangent hyperplane of the ellipsoid.
Proof. For any point y on the ellipsoid, the tangent hyperplane of the ellipsoid on y
is yTΨx = 1. Consider a tangent hyperplane of the ellipsoid: uTx = c, where c is an
unknown constant, and there exists a point x0 on the ellipsoid such that xT0Ψ = uTc .
Therefore x0 = Ψ+uc . Noticing xT0Ψx0 = 1, we know
1 = xT0Ψx0 = (1cuTΨ+)Ψ(1cΨ+u) = 1c2uTΨ+u.
Therefore c =√uTΨ+u.
Proof. to Theorem. 3.7: According to the definition of sensitivity under -differential
privacy, for any strategy B, the ellipsoid ψB must tangent with the diamond ∣∣x∣∣1 =
∆¯ψB . With out lose of generality, let us assume it is tangent to the hyperplane
(1, . . . ,1)x = ∆¯ψB and (a1, . . . , an)x ≤ ∆¯ψB , here ai = 1,−1. Let B = QBDAPTA be
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the singular value decomposition of B and let Ψ′ = (BBT )+ = {ψ′ij} to simplify the
notation. According to Lemma 1,
(1, . . . ,1)Ψ′(1, . . . ,1)T ≥ (a1, . . . , an)Ψ′(a1, . . . , an)T .
In particular,
(1, . . . ,1)Ψ′(1, . . . ,1)T ≥ (−1,1,1, . . . ,1)Ψ′(−1,1,1, . . . ,1)T ,
which means ψ′12 +ψ
′
13 + . . .+ψ
′
1n = ∑ni=1ψ′1i −ψ′11 ≥ 0. Similarly, we can show for any j
we have ∑ni=1ψ′ji −ψ′jj ≥ 0. Therefore
(1, . . . ,1)Ψ′(1, . . . ,1)T =∑
i
∑
j
ψ′ij =∑
j
ψ′jj +∑
j
(∑
i
ψ′ji −ψ
′
jj)
≥∑
j
ψ′jj = trace(Ψ′) = ∣∣(BBT )+∣∣2F = ∣∣(BTB)+∣∣2F = ∣∣(DTADA)+∣∣2F
The equal sign can be achieved when ψ′ij = 0 for all i ≠ j, which means Ψ′ is a
diagonal matrix and then QB = I. Therefore,
B =DAPTA
∆¯ψB =√(1, . . . ,1)Ψ′+(1, . . . ,1)T =√(1, . . . ,1)DADTA(1, . . . ,1)T
=√trace(ATA) = ∣∣A∣∣F ≤√n∆¯A ≤√n∆¯A
Using the singular value bound in Theorem 3.7 to substitute for the L1 sensitivity,
the minError problem can be converted to the following approximation problem.
Problem 3.2 (Singular value bound approximation). Given a workload matrix W,
find the strategy A that minimizes ∣∣A∣∣2F ∣∣WA+∣∣2F .
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The singular value bound approximation has a closed-form solution.
Theorem 3.8. Let W be the workload matrix with singular value decomposition
W = QWDWPTW and ξ1, . . . , ξn be its singular values. The optimal solution to
the singular value approximation A = c ⋅ QADAPA satisfies PA = PW and DA =
diag(√ξ1, . . . ,√ξn).
Proof. Recall the optimization goal of Problem 3.2:
∣∣A∣∣2F ∣∣WA+∣∣2F = ∣∣DA∣∣2F ∣∣DWPWPTAD+A∣∣2F ≥ n∑
i=1
∣∣Dpi∣∣22 ≥ ∣∣D∣∣2F ,
Here pi is the ith column of matrix PWPTA and two inequality signs base on Cauchy-
Schwardz inequality. In order to have the equal sign satisfied in the first the in-
equalities, we need the diagonal entries D2A to be equal to the diagonal entries of
c ⋅DWPWPTA for a constant c. In addition, PWP
T
A must be I to make the equal sign
of the second inequality. Since PW is an orthogonal matrix, PA = PW. Then we
have D2A =DW and DA = diag(√ξ1, . . . ,√ξn), where ξ1, . . . , ξn are singular values of
W.
The solution of A in Theorem 3.8 is very similar to the idea of matching the shape
ofW, which is equivalent to have PA to PW and DA be DW. Here we use a slightly
different DA so as to find a balance between the shape of A and ∆¯A, which also
provides an guaranteed error bound based on Theorem 3.7.
Theorem 3.9. Given a differentially private algorithm K over -differential privacy
and a workload W, let A be the optimal solution to the minError problem over K
and A′ be the optimal solution to the singular value bound approximation. Then
TotalErrorK,A′(W) ≤ nTotalErrorK,A(W).
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3.4.2.3 Minimizing sensitivity under -differential privacy
Above we presented two approximation approaches to produce heuristic query
strategies under -differential privacy. Noticing both of the approaches bound ∆¯A
with some properties that can be determined by ATA: the L2 approximation relies
on ∆¯A, which is the square root of the largest diagonal entry of ATA, and the sin-
gular value bound uses the squares of singular values of A, which are the eigenvalues
of ATA. Therefore, each of those approximations only determine an error profile
and any query strategies with this error profile satisfies the approximation condi-
tion. A further refinement to those approximations is to find the query strategy with
minimized sensitivity among all query strategies that have the given error profile.
Problem 3.3. Given a error profile M, find the query matrix A whose error profile
is M and has the minimum sensitivity under -differential privacy.
Besides refining the result of the approximations as above, Problem 3.3 is also
important in case that the user has certain error distribution in mind that specifies
an error profile. Unfortunately, similar to the MinError problem, Problem 3.3 is
non-convex as well. Problem 3.3 can also be formulated as a semidefinite program
with rank constraint, as stated below.
Theorem 3.10. Given an error profile M, Program 3.4.3 is a semidefinite program
with rank constraint that outputs an m×n matrix A such that (ATA)+ =M with ∆¯A
minimized.
3.4.3 Augmentation Heuristic
We formalize below the following intuition that applies to the matrix mechanism:
as far as the error profile is concerned, additional noisy query answers can never
detract from query accuracy as they must have some information content useful to
one or more queries. Therefore if A′ is a query strategy obtained by augmenting the
query strategy A with additional rows, ∣∣WA′+∣∣F ≤ ∣∣WA′+∣∣F .
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Program 3.4.3 Minimizing the sensitivity under -differential privacy
Given: M ∈ Rn×n.
Minimize: r.
Subject to: ∆¯A ≤ r;
rank([ In A
AT M+
]) = n.
Theorem 3.11. (Augmenting a strategy) Let A be a query strategy and con-
sider a new strategy A′ obtained from A by adding the additional rows of strategy B,
so that A′ = [AB ]. For any workload W that A supports, A′ supports W and
∣∣WA′+∣∣F ≤ ∣∣WA+∣∣F .
Further, ∣∣WA′+∣∣F = ∣∣WA+∣∣F if and only if WA′+ = [WA+0 ].
Proof. Since A supports W, A′ supports W as well. Noticing padding WA+ with
some 0s gives a solution to equationXA′ =W, according to Proposition 2.8, ∣∣WA′+∣∣F ≤
∣∣WA+∣∣F .
Let w1, . . . ,wm be rows of W. Noticing that
∣∣WA+∣∣F = m∑
i=1
∣∣wiA+∣∣F ;
∣∣WA′+∣∣F = m∑
i=1
∣∣wiA′+∣∣F ;
∣∣wiA′+∣∣F ≤ ∣∣wiA+∣∣F , i = 1, . . . ,m.
Therefore ∣∣WA′+∣∣F = ∣∣WA+∣∣F if and only if ∣∣wiA′+∣∣F = ∣∣wiA+∣∣F for all i = 1, . . . ,m.
Thus it is sufficient to consider the condition that ∣∣wA′+∣∣F = ∣∣wA+∣∣F for a single
query w that A supports.
Given two distinct solutions x1 and x2 to equation xA′ = w. If ∣∣x1∣∣F = ∣∣x2∣∣F ,
noticing Frobenius norm is convex, we have ∣∣(x1 + x2)/2∣∣F < ∣∣x1∣∣F = ∣∣x2∣∣F . Since
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(x1 +x2)/2 is also a solution to equation xA′ =w. Therefore the solution of xA′ =w
with minimized Frobenius norm is unique and ∣∣wA′+∣∣F = ∣∣wA+∣∣F if and only if wA′+
is equal to wA+ padding with 0s.
This improvement in the error profile may have a cost—namely, augmenting A
with strategy Bmay lead to a strategyA′ with greater sensitivity thanA. A heuristic
that follows from Theorem 3.11 is to augment strategy A only by completing deficient
columns, that is, by adding rows with non-zero entries only in columns whose absolute
column sums are less the sensitivity of A. In this case the augmentation does not
increase sensitivity and is guaranteed to strictly improve accuracy for any query with
a non-zero coefficient in an augmented column.
Our techniques could also be used to reason formally about augmentations that
do incur a sensitivity cost. We leave this as future work, as it is relevant primarily to
an interactive differentially private mechanism which is not our focus here.
3.4.4 The MinError Problem over Semantic Equivalent Workloads
Intuitively, since semantic equivalent workloads only differ in their representations,
answering them should introduce exactly the same amount of error. Here we formally
prove that this intuition also holds under the matrix mechanism.
Theorem 3.12. Given a workloadW1 over a list of cell conditions Φ1 and a workload
W2 and a list of cell conditions Φ2 such that (W1,Φ1) = (W2,Φ2), minATotalErrorK,A(W1) =
minATotalErrorK,A(W2) for any differentially private algorithm K.
Proof. By symmetry, it is sufficient to prove that for any strategy A1 that supports
W1, there exists a strategyA2 such thatA2 supportsW2 andTotalErrorK,A1(W1) ≥
TotalErrorK,A2(W2). As it is described in Proposition 2.1, there are five opera-
tions to generate semantic equivalent workloads. Then we can prove that such A2
exists for each of the five operations.
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IfW2 can be get by permute the column ofW1, there exists permutation matrices
P andQ such thatW2 = PW1Q. ThenA1Q supportsW2 andTotalErrorK,A1(W1) =
TotalErrorK,A2(W2) for any K.
If W2 can be get by split one of the columns of W1, without loss of generality,
we assume that W2 is generated by split the last column of W1 in to two columns.
Let A2 be the matrix that is generated by applying the same split to the strategy
matrix A1. Then it is clear that W1A+1A2 = W2.Therefore A2 supports W2 and
TotalErrorK,A1(W1) = TotalErrorK,A2(W2) for any K.
If W2 can be get by combine two of the columns of W1 with the same entries,
we assume that the last two columns of W1 have the same entries and removing one
of them gives us W2. Let A2 be the matrix that is generated by removing the last
column of A2. Then W1A+1A2 = W2 and A2 hence supports W2. Noticing that
∆A2 ≤∆A1 for any K, TotalErrorK,A1(W1) ≥ TotalErrorK,A2(W2) for any K.
If W2 can be get by add columns of 0s to W1, let A2 be the matrix that is
generated by adding corresponding columns of 0s to A1. ThenW1A+1A2 =W2. Thus
A2 supports W2 and TotalErrorK,A1(W1) = TotalErrorK,A2(W2) for any K.
IfW2 can be get by remove columns of 0s toW1, let A2 be the matrix that is gen-
erated by removing corresponding columns of 0s to A1. ThenW1A+1A2 =W2 and A2
hence supports W2. Noticing that ∆A2 ≤ ∆A1 for any K, TotalErrorK,A1(W1) ≥
TotalErrorK,A2(W2) for any K.
Noticing that we actually do not consider cell conditions during the proof of
Theorem 3.12, two workloads W1 and W2 have the minimum total error if they can
be converted to each other with the matrix operations mentioned in Proposition 2.1.
3.5 The matrix mechanism with non-negativity constraints
As stated in Section 3.1, we only consider the matrix mechanismMK,A with data
independent K so that MK,A is independent to the data vector x as well. Conse-
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quently,MK,A has no constraints on its estimated answer to any workloadW. Since
the entries of data vector x count the number of tuples that satisfies certain cell con-
ditions and hence cannot be negative, an answer to W is valid only if there exists a
non-negative data vector xˆ such that Wxˆ agrees with the given answer.
Using the matrix mechanism directly cannot guarantee the non-negative con-
straint on xˆ. In this section, we discuss enhancements to the matrix mechanism
to cope with non-negative constraints. We consider the approach of rounding en-
tries up to 0, non-negative least square estimation as well as a hybrid approach that
takes the advantage of both methods. In addition, we also include some experimental
comparison between those method over real world databases.
3.5.1 The Rounding Up Approach
Given a query strategy A with answer yˆ, recall that the derived solution to a
workload W supported by A is WA+yˆ. This answer further implies that there is an
estimate xˆ to the underlying data vector such thatWxˆ =WA+yˆ. It is clear that A+yˆ
is one possible solution to xˆ.
With an estimate of the underlying data set xˆ, the most straightforward method
to guarantee the non-negativity is to round up the negative results to 0, which can be
applied to either WA+yˆ or A+yˆ. Rounding up the negative entries in A+yˆ actually
gives an non-negative estimate to the underlying data vector, which can then be
used to compute the answer to the query workload W. However, by rounding up
A+yˆ we lose the information contained in the negative estimates of positive query
answers. For example, if an noisy estimate to a non-negative count x1 is −10, there
is a higher probability for x1 to be 0 then the another non-negative count x2 with a
noisy estimate to 0. Such distinction has been lost if both x1 and x2 are rounded up
to 0.
58
Since rounding leads to information loss, to ensure that most information is pre-
served, we should round up the result at the very last step, which means to round up
WA+yˆ. The limitation to this approach is that it only works on queries whose entries
are either all non-negative or non-positive. In addition, even if we round the answers
to those queries to 0, there is no guarantee that there exists a non-negative data
vector xˆ such that Wxˆ is equal our answer to W. In order to deal this problem, we
can publish the α-confidence intervals to each query in W along with their answers.
For queries with all non-negative or non-positive queries, their confidence interval can
also be rounded up. Then with a probability of at least α, the true answer to W is
contained in those confidence intervals.
3.5.2 Non-negative Least Square and a Hybrid Approach
Another approach to satisfy the non-negativity constraint is to add the constraint
into the process of deriving the answer to W from the answer to A. Such a con-
straint can be achieved by considering non-negative least square estimator, a special
constrained form of least square estimator to compute a non-negative estimate xˆ to
the data vector and use it to generate the answer to W, whose optimization formu-
lation is as following.
Given: A ∈ Rm×n,y ∈ Rm.
Minimize: ∣∣Ax − y∣∣22.
Subject to: x ≥ 0.
Though intuitively the non-negative least square estimator should provide a better
estimate towards the true answer toW, it still works poorly when the query strategy
A contains non-overlapping queries. The extreme case is that when A = In, using
non-negative least square estimator is equivalent to rounding up xˆ, which, as stated
above, loss information and leads to a bad estimator to answer to W. Furthermore,
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Figure 3.5. Error comparison between the non-negative least square estimator and
the hybrid estimator.
computing the α-confidence interval for a non-negative least square estimator is not
as straightforward as it is for a least square estimator. [64] demonstrated an algorithm
to compute the α-confidence interval for a non-negative least square estimator, but it
is computationally more complicated and will produce larger confidence interval than
for a least square estimator.
In order to address the weakness of the non-negative least square estimator, recall
that we defer the round up before the output and we can apply the same method
to the non-negative least square estimator. Here we proposed a hybrid approach
that combines the least square and non-negative least square method. The major
idea that instead of applying non-negative least square to estimate an xˆ from yˆ, we
first estimate the answer to W by WA+yˆ, the least square method and then solve
a non-negative least square on WA+yˆ to solve an xˆ. The answer to W can then be
computed with xˆ. Wxˆ and the α-confidence interval of the least square estimator
can be send back to user for further analysis.
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3.5.3 Experimental Results
Here we compare the effect of different estimator experimentally. The experiment
includes the least square estimator, the non-negative least squares (NNLS) estimator
and the hybrid estimator and uses the Adult[8] dataset aggregated to 512 cells. Three
different strategies are considered: the hierarchical (Hn), the wavelet (Yn) and the
identity (In) strategies. The results are shown in Figure 3.5, where the error is
reported as the ratio to the total squared error using the least square estimator. The
K is set to be the Laplace mechanism and  is varied from 0.001 to 1.
The figure demonstrates that, the hybrid estimator has comparable error as the
non-negative least square estimator when the strategy is Hn or Yn, and is much
better than the least square estimator for  < 1. When the strategy is In and the
non-negative least square performs badly, the hybrid estimator can be as good as the
least square estimator.
61
CHAPTER 4
BOUNDING THE ERROR IN THE MATRIX
MECHANISM
As it is analyzed in the previous chapter, it is computationally difficult to find a
strategy that minimize the error, both for - and (, δ)-differential privacy. Therefore
the goal of this chapter is to develop tools that can explain what we informally term
the error complexity of a given workload, which should measure, for fixed privacy
parameters, the accuracy with which we can simultaneously answer all queries in the
workload.
Such tools can help us to answer a number of natural questions that arise in
the context of private synthetic data generation. Why is it possible to answer one
set of queries more accurately than another? What properties of the queries, or of
their relationship to one another, influence this? Can lower error be achieved by
specializing the query set more closely to the task at hand? Does the combination
of multiple users’ workloads severely impact the accuracy possible for the combined
workload?
Naive approaches to understanding the “hardness” of a query workload are unsat-
isfying. For example, one may naturally expect that the larger the number of queries
in the workload, the larger the error in simultaneously answering them. Yet the num-
ber of queries in a workload is usually an inadequate measure of its hardness. Query
workload sensitivity [26] is another natural approach. Sensitivity measures the maxi-
mum change in all query answers due to an insertion or deletion of a single database
record. Basic differentially private mechanisms (e.g. the Laplace mechanism) add
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noise to each query in proportion to sensitivity, and in such cases sensitivity does in
fact determine error rates. But the matrix mechanism can reduce error when answer-
ing multiple queries (with no cost to privacy), so that sensitivity alone fails to be a
reliable measure.
In this chapter we seek a better understanding of workload error complexity by
reasoning formally about the minimum error achievable for a workload, regardless of
the underlying database. We pursue this goal in the context of a class differentially
private algorithms: namely those that are instances of the matrix mechanism. In
particular, to measure the hardness of a query workload, we present a lower bound on
the error of answering this workload under the matrix mechanism. We primarily focus
on the lower bound and its analyses under (, δ)-differential privacy. We demonstrate
that our bound is tight in theory or almost tight empirically on many commonly
considered workloads. The extended analysis on this bound connects the error of the
matrix mechanism with the other error bounds on database-dependent mechanisms.
At the end of this chapter, we also present how our bound will change along with
operations of query workloads.
4.1 Equivalence and containment for workloads
First we develop a notion of equivalence and containment of workloads with respect
to error. We will verify that the error bounds presented in the next section satisfy
these relationships in most cases.
The special form of the expression for total error in Prop. 3.4 means that there are
many workloads that are equivalent from the standpoint of error. For two workloads
W1 andW2, ifWT1W1 =WT2W2, then any strategy A that can represent the queries
of W1 can also represent the queries of W2, and vice versa. In addition, WT1W1 =
WT2W2 implies ∣∣W1A+∣∣2F = ∣∣W2A+∣∣2F for any strategy A. We therefore define the
following notion of equivalence of two workloads:
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Definition 4.1 (Workload Equivalence). An m1 × n1 workload W1 and an m2 × n
workload W2 are equivalent, denoted W1 ≡W2, if WT1W1 =WT2W2.
Note that the concept of equivalent workloads is different from the concept seman-
tic equivalent workloads. The semantic equivalent compares pairs (W,Φ) of a given
workloads and their associated cell conditions and two semantically equivalent pairs
are means that those pairs are different representations of the same set of queries.
Equivalent workloads, however, are not necessarily the same set of queries. We call
them equivalent since they have the same set of supporting strategies and the same
error for any give strategy.
The following conditions on pairs of workloads imply that they have equivalent
minimum error:
Proposition 4.1 (Equivalence Conditions). Given an m1 × n1 workload W1 and an
m2×n2 workloadW2, each of the following conditions implies thatMinErrorK(W1) =
MinErrorK(W2):
(i) W1 ≡W2
(ii) W1 =QW2 for some orthogonal matrix Q.
(iii) W2 results from permuting the rows of W1.
(iv) W2 results from permuting the columns of W1.
(v) W2 results from the column projection of W1 on all of its nonzero columns.
Proof. (i): If W1 ≡W2, for any strategy A,
∣∣W1A+∣∣2F = trace((A+)TWT1W1A+)
= trace((A+)TWT2W2A+) = ∣∣W2A+∣∣2F .
Therefore MinErrorK(W1) =MinErrorK(W2).
(ii): It is equivalent with (i).
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(iii): It is a special case of (ii) where Q is a permutation matrix.
(iv): Let P be the permutation matrix such that W1P =W2. For any strategy A on
W1, AP is a strategy ofW2 and TotalErrorK,A(W1) = TotalErrorK,AP(W2).
(v): Since (iv) is true, we can assume W1 = [W2,0]. For any strategy matrix A2 on
W2, A1 = [A2,0] is a strategy on W1 and
∣∣W1A+1∣∣2F = trace(A+1(A+1)TWT1W1)
= trace([A+2,0]T [A+2,0][W2,0]T [W2,0])
= trace((A+2)TWT2W2A+2) = ∣∣W2A+2∣∣2F .
For any strategy A1 on W1 there is a strategy on W2 with equal or smaller error
formed by deleting corresponding columns from A2.
It follows from this proposition thatMinError is row and column representation
independent, and behaves well under the projection of extraneous columns.
Defining a notion of containment for workload matrices is more complex than
simple inclusion of rows. Even if the rows of W1 are not present in W2, it could be
that W1 is in fact contained in W2 when expressed using an alternate basis. The
following definition considers this possibility:
Definition 4.2 (Workload Containment). An m1 × n workload W1 is contained in
an m2×n workload W2, denoted W1 ⊆W2, if there exists a W′2 ≡W2 where the rows
of W1 are contained in W′2.
The following proposition shows two conditions that imply inequality of error
among workloads:
Proposition 4.2 (Error inequality). Given an m1 ×n1 workload W1 and an m2 ×n2
workload W2, each of the following conditions implies that
MinErrorK(W1) ≤MinErrorK(W2) ∶
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(i) W1 ⊆W2
(ii) W1 is a column projection of W2.
Proof. For (i), let W′2 ≡W2 such that W′2 contains all rows of W1. According to
Prop. 4.1 (iii), we can assumeW′2 = [W1W3 ]. For any strategy A onW2, since A is also
a strategy on W′2, A can represent all queries in W1 as well. Thus A is a strategy
on W1. In addition,
ErrorK,A(W2)
= P (K)∆2A∣∣W2A+∣∣2F
= P (K)∆2A∣∣W′2A+∣∣2F
= P (K)∆2A(∣∣W1A+∣∣2F + ∣∣W3A+∣∣2F )
= ErrorA(W1) +ErrorA(W3) ≥ ErrorA(W1).
Therefore, MinErrorK(W1) ≤MinErrorK(W2).
For (ii), given a strategy A2 onW2, let A1 be a column projection of A2 using the
same projection that generatesW1 fromW2. According to the construction ofA1 and
W1, sinceW2 =W2A+2A2, we haveW2A+2A1 =W1. Therefore according to Prop. 2.8,
∣∣W2A+2∣∣F ≥ ∣∣W1A+1∣∣F . Furthermore, since ∆A2 ≥ ∆A1 , we know ErrorK,A2(W2) ≥
ErrorK,A1(W1).
4.2 The singular value bound
In this section we state and prove our main result: a lower bound onMinError(W),
the optimal error of a workloadW under the matrix mechanism with K satisfies (, δ)-
differential privacy. The bound shows that the hardness of a workload is a function
of its eigenvalues. We describe the measure and its properties in Section 4.2.1 and
prove that it is a lower bound in Section 4.2.2. In Section 4.2.3 we briefly discuss the
challenge of adapting this bound to -differential privacy.
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4.2.1 The singular value bound
We first present the simplest form of our bound, which is based on computing the
square of the sum of eigenvalues of the workload matrix:
Definition 4.3 (Singular Value Bound). Given an m × n workload W, its sin-
gular value bound, denoted svdb(W), is:
svdb(W) = 1
n
(λ1 + . . . + λn)2,
where λ1, . . . , λn are the singular values of W.
The following theorem guarantees that the singular value bound is a valid lower
bound to the minimal error of a workload. The proof is presented in detail in
Sec. 4.2.2.
Theorem 4.1. Given an m × n workload W,
MinError(W) ≥ P (K)svdb(W).
In the rest of dissertation, we refer to svdb(W) as the “SVD bound”. For any
workloadW, the SVD bound is determined byWTW and can be computed directly
from it (which can be more efficient):
Proposition 4.3. Given n × n matrix WTW.
svdb(W) = 1
n
( n∑
i=1
√
di)2.
where d1, . . . , dn are the eigenvalues of WTW.
The SVD bound satisfies equivalence properties analogous to (i), (ii), (iii), and (iv)
in Prop. 4.1 and inequality (i) in Prop. 4.2. However, it does not satisfy properties
related to column projection, as shown in the following counter-example.
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Example 4.1. Consider a 2 × n workload W consisting of queries [1,0, . . . ,0] and
[t, t, . . . , t]. Let µ be the column projection w.r.t. the first cell condition of W. When
n > 8 and t < 1/8, svdb(W) < svdb(µ(W)).
According to Prop 4.2, column projections reduce the minimum error. Therefore,
the SVD bound on any column projection of W also constitutes a lower bound for
the minimum error of W. Because of this we extend the simple SVD bound in the
following way. Recall that Un is the set of all column projections.
Definition 4.4. Given an m×n workload W and U ⊆ Un. The singular value bound
of W w.r.t. U , denoted by svdbU(W) is defined as
svdbU(W) =max
µ∈U
svdb(µ(W)).
In particular, if U = Un, we call this bound the supreme singular value bound, denoted
svdb(W).
According to Prop. 4.2 and Thm. 4.1, for any U ⊆ Un, svdbU(W) provides a lower
bound on MinError(W).
Corollary 4.1. Given an m × n workload W, and for any U ⊆ Un
MinErrorK(W) ≥max
µ∈U
MinErrorK(µ(W))
≥ P (K)svdbU(W).
The supreme SVD bound satisfies all of the error equivalence and containment
properties, analogous to those of Prop. 4.1 and Prop. 4.2, as stated below.
Theorem 4.2. Given an m1 × n1 workload W1 and an m2 × n2 workload W2, the
following conditions imply that svdb(W1) = svdb(W2):
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(i) W1 ≡W2
(ii) W1 =QW2 for some orthogonal matrix Q.
(iii) W2 results from permuting the rows of W1.
(iv) W2 results from permuting the columns of W1.
(v) W2 results from column projection of W1 on all of its nonzero columns.
Proof. (i) (ii) (iii): Since any one of those conditions leads to WT1W1 = WT2W2,
according to Prop. 4.3, svdb(W1) = svdb(W2).
(iv): Given a workload W1, it is sufficient to prove that the singular values of
W1 are column representation independent. Let W2 be a matrix resulting from
a permutation of the columns of W1 and P be the permutation matrix such that
W1P = W2. If a singular value decomposition of W1 is W1 = QWΛWPW, then
the decomposition of W2 is W2 = QWΛWPWP. Since PWP is still an orthogonal
matrix, W2 = QWΛWPWP is a singular value decomposition of W2. Therefore the
singular values of W2 are exactly the same as the singular values of W1.
(v): Since W2 is a column projection of W1, svdb(W1) ≥ svdb(W2) by defi-
nition. In addition, for any matrix with columns of zeroes, removing thse columns
will not impact the non-zero singular values of the matrix. Therefore projecting
those columns out will reduce the total number of singular values but not their sum.
Therefore projecting out all zero columns from W1 will not decrease svdb(W1),
which indicates svdb(W1) = svdb(W2).
Theorem 4.3. Given an m1 × n1 workload W1 and an m2 × n2 workload W2, the
following conditions imply that svdb(W1) ≤ svdb(W2):
(i) W1 ⊆W2
(ii) W1 is a column projection of W2.
To prove Thm. 4.3, the following property of matrices is needed.
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Lemma 2. Let D be a diagonal matrix with non-negative diagonal entries and P be
an orthogonal matrix whose columns are p1,p2, . . . ,pn.
trace(D) ≤ n∑
i=1
∣∣Dpi∣∣2.
Proof. Use di to denote the diagonal entries of D and pij to denote the entries in P.
Noticing that ∑nj=1 p2ji = 1, we have
∣∣Dpi∣∣2 =
;<<= n∑
j=1
p2jid
2
j ≥ n∑
j=1
p2jidj.
Therefore, since ∑nj=1 p2ij = 1,
n
∑
i=1
∣∣Dpi∣∣2 ≥ n∑
i=1
n
∑
j=1
p2jidj = n∑
j=1
( n∑
i=1
p2ji)dj = trace(D).
Proof of Thm. 4.3. Since (ii) is naturally satisfied according to the definition of
svdb(W), it is sufficient to prove (i). Here we prove this is true even for the SVD
bound so that it is also true for the supreme SVD bound.
Given W1 ⊆ W2, according to the definition, there exists a workload W′2 such
that W′2 ≡W2 and W′2 contains all the queries of W1. Then W′2 has the following
form:
W′2 =
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
W1
W3
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
.
Then
WT2W2 −W
T
1W1 = W′2TW′2 −WT1W1
= WT3W3 ⪰ 0
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Let W1 = Q1Λ1P1 and W2 = Q2Λ2P2 be the singular value decomposition of W1
and W2, respectively. Then
WT2W2 −W
T
1W1 ⪰ 0 ⇔ PT2Λ22P2 −PT1Λ21P1 ⪰ 0
⇔ Λ22 −P2PT1Λ21P1PT2 ⪰ 0
⇒ ∀ i, λi ≥ ∣∣Λ1pi∣∣2,
where λi is the i-th diagonal entry of Λ2 and pi is the i-th column vector of P1PT2 .
The inequality in the last row based on the property that the diagonal entries of any
positive semidefinite matrix are non-negative. Therefore, according to Lemma 2,
trace(Λ2) = n∑
i=1
λi ≥ n∑
i=1
∣∣Λ1pi∣∣2 ≥ trace(Λ1). (4.1)
While Theorems 4.2 and 4.3 show that svdb(W) matches all the properties of
MinError(W), we often wish to avoid considering all possible column projections
as required in the computation of svdb(W). In many cases, using svdb(W) as our
lower bound provides good results. In other cases, we can choose an appropriate set
of column projections to get a good approximation to the supreme SVD bound. We
provide empirical evidence for this in the following example, along with an application
of our bound to range and predicate workloads which have been studied in prior
work. The bound allows us to evaluate, for the first time, how well existing solutions
approximate the minimum achievable error under (, δ)-differential privacy.
Example 4.2. In Table 4.1 we consider three workloads, each consisting of all multi-
dimensional range queries for a different dimension set, along with a workload of
all predicate queries. We report svdb(W) and its ratio with svdbU(W) where U
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Example Workload, W svdb(W) svdbU (W)
Error, as ratio to P (K)svdb(W)
Identity Hierarchical Wavelet Eigen Design
AllRange(2048) 3.034 × 107 1.001 47.25 1.776 1.545 1.028
AllRange(64,32) 2.261 × 107 1.000 12.11 2.996 1.899 1.107
AllRange(2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2) 5.242 × 105 1.000 2.000 2.000 2.000 1.000
AllPredicate(1024) 4.885 × 10156 1.000 1.884 3.464 6.292 1.000
Table 4.1. Four example workloads, their singular value bounds, and their error
rates under common strategies and strategies proposed in prior work using Gaussian
mechanism.
contains projections onto all possible ranges over the domain, showing that they are
virtually indistinguishable.
We also compute the actual error introduced by several well-known strategies: the
identity strategy, the hierarchical strategy [40], and the wavelet strategy [70], as well
as a strategy generated by the Eigen-design mechanism [46]. These results reveal the
quality of these approaches by their ratio to svdb(W). For example, from the table we
conclude that the Eigen-design mechanism and wavelet strategies have error at most
1.5 to 3 times the optimal for range workloads, but perform worse on the predicate
queries. The identity strategy is far from optimal on low dimensional range queries,
but better on high dimensional range queries and predicate queries.
4.2.2 Proof of the SVD bound
We now describe the proof of Theorem 4.1. The key to the proof is an important
property of the optimal strategy for the (, δ)-matrix mechanism. As shown in Lemma
3, among the optimal strategies for a workload W, there is always a strategy A that
has the same sensitivity for every cell condition (i.e. in every column). We use AW
to denote the set that contains all strategies that satisfy WA+A =W and have the
same sensitivity for every cell condition.
Recall that the L2 sensitivity of strategy A (Prop. 2.3) is the maximum L2 column
norm of A. The square of the sensitivity is also equal to the maximum diagonal entry
of ATA. By using Lemma 3, the sensitivity of A can instead be computed in terms
of the trace of the matrix ATA and minimizing the error of W with this alternative
72
expression of the sensitivity leads to the SVD bounds. Ultimately, to achieve the
SVD bounds, a strategy A must simultaneously (i) minimize the error of W with
the sensitivity computed in terms of the trace(ATA), and (ii) have A ∈ AW. Such
a strategy may not exist for every possible W and therefore the SVD bounds only
serve as lower bounds to the minimal error of W.
Lemma 3. Given a workloadW, there exists a strategyA ∈ AW such that ErrorK,A(W) =
MinErrorK(W).
Proof. For any workload W, the problem of finding a strategy that minimizes the
total error of W can be formulated as a SDP problem [45]. Therefore the optimal
strategy that minimizes the total error of W always exists. Let A′ be an optimal
strategy on workload W. We now construct a matrix A from A′ such that A ∈ AW.
Let d1, . . . , dn denote the diagonal entries of matrix ∆2AI −A
′TA′, i.e. d1, . . . , dn is
the difference between each diagonal entry of A′TA′ and the maximal diagonal entry
of A′TA′. Since d1, . . . , dn ≥ 0, let D be the diagonal matrix whose diagonal entries
are
√
d1, . . . ,
√
dn, and A = [A′D ]. Then A is a strategy matrix such that the diagonal
entries of ATA are all the same. Let B = [A′+,0]. Then WBA = WA′+A′ = W.
According to Prop. 2.8, ∣∣WA+∣∣F ≤ ∣∣WB∣∣F . Recall ∆¯A = ∆¯A′ , we have,
ErrorK,A(W) = P (K)∆¯2A∣∣WA+∣∣2F
≤ P (K)∆¯2A∣∣WB∣∣2F
= P (K)∆¯2A′ ∣∣WA′+∣∣2F
= ErrorK,A′(W) =MinErrorK(W).
Therefore ErrorK,A(W) =MinErrorK(W) and A is an optimal strategy for work-
load W.
Theorem 4.1 can hence be proved using the Lem. 2 and 3.
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Proof. For a given workload W, according to Lemma 3, it has an optimal strategy
matrix A ∈ AW, whose sensitivity can then be computed as ∆¯2A = 1n ∣∣A∣∣2F .
LetW =QWΛWPW and A =QAΛAPA be the singular decomposition ofW and
A, respectively. We have:
min
A∶WA+A=W
∆¯2A∣∣WA+∣∣2F
= min
A∈AW
1
n
∣∣A∣∣2F ∣∣WA+∣∣2F
= 1
n
min
(ΛAPA)∈AW
∣∣ΛA∣∣2F ∣∣ΛWPWPTAΛ+A∣∣2F
≥ 1
n
min
ΛA,PA
ΛWΛ
+
A
Λ=
A
ΛW
∣∣ΛA∣∣2F ∣∣ΛWPWPTAΛ+A∣∣2F (4.2)
≥ 1
n
min
PA
( n∑
i=1
∣∣ΛWpi∣∣2)2 (4.3)
≥ 1
n
( n∑
i=1
λi)2, (4.4)
where pi is the i-th column of matrix PWPTA, the inequality in (4.3) is based on the
Cauchy-Schwarz inequality and the inequality in (4.4) comes from Lemma 2.
The equal sign in (4.3) is satisfied if and only if ΛA ∝
√
ΛW. Therefore to
achieve equality in (4.3) and (4.4) simultaneously, we need A ∝ Q
√
ΛWPW for any
orthogonal matrix Q. Moreover, (4.2) is true if and only if A ∈ AW, which may not
be satisfied when A ∝ Q
√
ΛWPW, therefore the SVD bound only gives an lower
bound to the minimum total error.
Intuitively, the SVD bound is based on the assumption that the error can be
evenly distributed to all the cells, which may not be achievable in all the cases. The
supreme SVD bound considers only the case that the error can be evenly distributed
to some of the cells and therefore may be tighter than the SVD bound.
74
4.2.3 Bounding MinErrorK(W) under -differential privacy
The SVD bound is defined for K under (, δ)-differential privacy, so it is natural
to consider extending these results to -differential privacy. When K bases on -
differential privacy, the sensitivity of A as the largest L1 norm of the columns of
A. For any vector, its L1 norm is always greater than or equal to its L2 norm.
Given a workload W and a strategy matrix A, P (K)∆¯2A∣∣WA+∣∣2F provides a lower
bound to ErrorK,A(W) under the -differential privacy. Therefore, error under the
-differential privacy is also bounded below by svdb(W).
When the number of queries in a workload is no more than the domain size,
Bhaskara et al. [12] presented the following lower bound of error for any data-
independent -differential privacy mechanism.
Theorem 4.4 ([12]). Given an m × n workload W with m ≤ n, let convex body
K = WBn1 , where Bm1 is the m-dimensional L1 ball. Let P1, . . . ,Pt be projection
operators to a collection of t mutually orthogonal subspaces of Rm of dimension
m1, . . . ,mt respectively. Then the error of answering W under any data-independent
-differentially private mechanism must be at least
max
P1,...,Pt
Ω(∑
i
m3i
2
Volmi(PiK)2/mi) ,
where Volmi(PiK) is the volume of the convex body PiK in mi dimensional space.
In particular, when Pi are the projections to the singular vectors of W, we can
formulate the bound above using singular values of W.
Corollary 4.2. Given an m × n workload W with m ≤ n, the error of answering W
under any data-independent -differentially private mechanism must be at least
Ω( n∑
i
λ2i
2
) ,
where λ1, . . . , λn are singular values of W.
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When m ≤ n, we can compare the lower bound in Corollary 4.2 with the SVD
bound under the -differential privacy. It is clear that the bound in Corollary 4.2
is tighter unless all singular values of W are equal. When m > n, the quality of
the SVD bound under the -differential privacy is not yet known. The discussion on
the tightness and looseness of the SVD bound in the next section is based on the
(, δ)-matrix mechanism and cannot be directly extended to the -differential privacy.
4.3 Analysis of the SVD bound
In this section, we analyze the accuracy of the SVD bound as an approximation of
the minimum error for a workload. We study the sufficient and necessary conditions
under which the SVD bound is tight. In addition, we show the minimum error is equal
to the bound over a specific class of workloads called variable-agnostic workloads and
then generalize the result to the widely-studied class of data cube workloads. For
both classes, strategies that achieve the minimum error can be constructed, as a
by-product of the proof of the SVD bound.
We then show that the bound may be loose, underestimating the minimal error
for some workloads. The worst case of looseness of the SVD bound is presented in
Section 4.3.2, along with a formal estimate of the quality of the bound. We conclude
this section with an example demonstrating empirically that error rates close to the
lower bound can be achieved for workloads consisting of multi-dimensional range
queries.
4.3.1 The tightness of the SVD bound
The circumstances under which the SVD bound is tight arise directly from in-
spection of the proof presented in Sec. 4.2.2. In particular, we noted the conditions
that make the inequalities in equations (4.2), (4.3) and (4.4) actually equal. Those
conditions are equivalent to a straightforward property of WTW:
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Theorem 4.5. Given workload W, svdb(W) is tight if and only if the diagonal
entries of
√
WTW are all equal.
Proof. Recall that the SVD bound is tight if and only if (4.2), (4.3) and (4.4) takes
equal sign simultaneously. The conditions that make all three inequalities to have
equal sign is A ∝ Q
√
ΛWPW and A ∈ AW, which is equivalent to the case that the
diagonal entries of PTWΛWPW are all the same. In addition, P
T
WΛWPW =√WTW
and we have the theorem proved.
The condition in Thm 4.5 can be satisfied by many matrices. In particular, given
a matrix W ∈ Rm×n with singular value decomposition on complex domain W =
QWΛWPW where PW is the matrix of discrete Fourier transformation. The SVD
bound is tight on W.
Definition 4.5. The discrete Fourier transformation (DFT) on a domain with size
n can be represented as the following matrix:
Ωn =
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
1 1 . . . 1
1 ω . . . ωn−1
⋮ ⋮ ⋱ ⋮
1 ωn−1 . . . ω(n−1)
2
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
,
where ω is the primitive nth root of unity.
Theorem 4.6. Given a matrix W ∈ Rm×n. If W = QWΛWΩn is a singular value
decomposition of W in the complex domain. The SVD bound is tight on W.
Proof. Since W ∈ Rm×n, WTW =WHW, where H denotes the conjugate transpose
of a matrix in the complex domain. Hence
WTW =WHW =ΩHn (ΛHWΛW)Ωn
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is an eigenvalue decomposition ofWTW in the complex domain. SinceWTW is also
diagonalizable in the real domain, and according to the uniqueness of the set of the
eigenvalues, we have
WTW = PTW(ΛHWΛW)PW
as an eigenvalue decomposition ofWTW in the real domain. Let P′ be a the unitary
matrix in the complex domain such that P′PW =Ωn. Then
P′H(ΛHWΛW)P′ = ΛHWΛW. (4.5)
Represent ΛHWΛW as
ΛHWΛW =
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
µ1I
µ2I
⋱
µkI
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
,
where µ1 ≠ µ2 ≠ . . . ≠ µk. (4.5) holds if and only if P′ is a block diagonal matrix
P′ =
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
P′1
P′2
⋱
P′k
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
,
where the shape of block P′i and the diagonal block corresponding to µi is the same.
In addition, noticing that whether (4.5) does not depend on the concrete values of
µ1, . . . , µk, (4.5) also implies P′
H
√
ΛHWΛWP
′ = √ΛHWΛW. Therefore, consider the
eigenvalue decomposition of
√
WTW:
√
WTW = PTW√ΛHWΛWPW = PTWP′H√ΛHWΛWP′PW =ΩHn√ΛHWΛWΩn.
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Let λ1, . . . , λn be the diagonal entries of the matrix
√
ΛHWΛW, then the i
th diagonal
entry of the matrix
√
WTW is:
1
n
[1 ω¯i−1 . . . ω¯(i−1)(n−1)]√ΛHWΛW
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
1
ωi−1
⋮
ω(i−1)(n−1)
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
= 1
n
n−1
∑
j=0
λjω¯
(i−1)jω(i−1)j = 1
n
n−1
∑
j=0
λj.
Hence all diagonal entries of
√
WTW are the same and the SVD bound is tight on
W according to Thm. 4.5.
Workloads of convolution queries is a class of commonly interested workloads
whose are Ωn. Supporting such kind of queries and its applications under differential
privacy has been extensively discussed in [29].
Definition 4.6 ([29]). The matrix of circular convolution queries is
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
h0 h1 . . . hn−1
hn−1 h0 . . . hn−2
⋮ ⋮ ⋱ ⋮
h1 h2 . . . h0
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
.
.
The decomposition of the circular convolution matrix has been given in [34], which
guarantees the tightness of the SVD bound on workloads of circular convolutions.
Theorem 4.7 ([34]). Any circular convolution matrix has an eigenvalue decomposi-
tion in the complex domain and the corresponding matrix of eigenvectors is Ωn.
Corollary 4.3. The SVD bound is tight for any circular convolution workload W.
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Another special class of workloads, called variable-agnostic workloads, in which
the queries on each cell are fully symmetric and swapping any two cells does not
change WTW.
Definition 4.7 (Variable-agnostic workload). A workload W is variable-agnostic if
WTW is unchanged when we swap any two columns of W.
For any variable-agnostic workload W, WTW has the following special form: for
some constants a and b such that a > b, all diagonal entries of WTW are equal to a
and the remaining entries of WTW are equal to b.
The following theorem shows that any variable-agnostic workload W satisfies the
condition in Thm 4.5. Furthermore, we also demonstrate the closed form expression
of the SVD bound in case that n is a power of 2.
Theorem 4.8. The SVD bound is tight for any variable-agnostic workload W. In
addition, when n = 2k for any nonnegative integer k, svdb(W) = 1
n
(√a + (n − 1)b +
(n − 1)√a − b)2, where a is the value of diagonal entries of WTW and b is the value
of off-diagonal entries of WTW.
Proof. Noticing that WTW is a circular convolution matrix so that Ωn is a matrix
of eigenvectors of WTW, and hence it is a matrix of singular vectors of W. Thus,
according to Thm. 4.6, the SVD bound is tight on W. Furthermore, WTW has the
following special form:
WTW =
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
a b . . . b
b a . . . b
⋮ ⋮ ⋱ ⋮
b b . . . a
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
,
where a > b. One can verify that a + (n − 1)b is an eigenvalue of WTW with order 1
and a − b is an eigenvalue of WTW with order n − 1.
As a concrete example, the workload AllPredicate(n) is variable-agnostic, and
therefore we can construct its optimal strategy and compute the error rate directly.
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Corollary 4.4. The SVD bound is tight for the workload AllPredicate(n). In
addition, when n = 2k for any nonnegative integer k, svdb(AllPredicate(n)) =
2n−2
n
(n − 1 +√n + 1)2.
For variable-agnostic workloads, using a naive strategy like the identity matrix
or the workload itself results in total error equal to na and the ratio by which the
error is reduced using the strategy in Thm. 4.8 is approximately 1− b
a
. In the case of
AllPredicate(n), the ratio is at least as low as 0.5, which occurs when n is very
large.
Another family of workloads for which the SVD bound is tight are those consisting
of sets of data cube queries [33]. A data cube workload consists of one or more cuboids,
each of which contains all aggregation queries on all possible values of the cross-
product of a set of attributes. It has already been shown in [29] that the workload
of one cuboid is a convolution workload and hence the SVD bound is tight. Here
we consider the case that the data cube contains more than one cuboids and each
cuboid can have its own weight, so that higher weighted queries will be estimated
more accurately than lower weighted ones.
Theorem 4.9. The SVD bound is tight for any weighted data cube workload W.
Proof. Let us induct on the number of attributes d in the database. When d = 1,
there are only two cuboids, the cuboid asks for the sum of all the cells and the cuboid
asks for all the individual cells. Consider the workloadW that weight the first cuboid
w1 and the second cuboid w2, one can compute that
WTW =
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
w21 +w
2
2 w
2
1 . . . w
2
1
w21 w
2
1 +w
2
2 . . . w
2
1
⋮ ⋮ ⋱ ⋮
w21 w
2
1 . . . w
2
1 +w
2
2
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
,
which is a variable agnostic workload. Therefore, according to Thm 4.8, svdb(W)
is tight.
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If the SVD bound is tight when d = d0, consider the case that d = d0 + 1. Given
a data cube workload W. The cuboids in the data cube can be separated into two
groups: the first group is the cuboids that aggregate on the last attribute; the second
group is the cuboids that do not aggregate on the last attribute. Let W1 be the
projection of the cuboids in the first group on the first d0 attributes and W2 be the
projection of the cuboids in the first group on the first d0 attributes. We can represent
W using W1 and W2:
W =
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
W1 W1 . . . W1
W2 0 . . . 0
0 W2 . . . 0
⋮ ⋮ ⋱ ⋮
0 0 . . . W2
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
,
where the number of W1 blocks and W2 blocks are the number of values in the
last attribute, denoted as n0. Let Q1, Q2 be the orthogonal matrices such that
Q1W1 =√WT1W1 and Q2W1 =√WT2W2. Let
Q =
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
Q1 0 . . . 0
0 Q2 . . . 0
⋮ ⋮ ⋱ 0
0 0 . . . Q2
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
,
and then
QW =
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
√
WT1 W1
√
WT1 W1 . . .
√
WT1 W1√
WT2 W2 0 . . . 0
0
√
WT2 W2 . . . 0
⋮ ⋮ ⋱ ⋮
0 0 . . .
√
WT2 W2
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
.
One can verify that
√
WTW =√WTQTQW =
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
W3 W4 . . . W4
W4 W3 . . . W4
⋮ ⋮ ⋱ ⋮
W4 W4 . . . W3
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
,
where
W3 = 1
n0
((n0 − 1)√WT1W1 +√WT1W1 + n0WT2W2),
W4 = 1
n0
(−√WT1W1 +√WT1W1 + n0WT2W2).
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Noticing that both W1 and [ W1√n0W2 ] are data cube workloads on d0 attributes, ac-
cording to the induction assumptions, both
√
WT1W1 and
√
WT1W1 + n0W
T
2W2 are
symmetric matrices whose diagonal entries are all the same, respectively. Thus W3
and W4 are also symmetric matrices whose diagonal entries are all the same, respec-
tively. Then
√
WTW is a symmetric matrices whose diagonal entries are all the same
and then the SVD bound is tight on W.
Data cube workloads (a special case of marginal workloads) have been studied
by the differential privacy community in both theory and practice [9, 19, 42]. Barak
et al. [9] use the Fourier basis as a strategy for workloads consisting of marginals
while Ding et al. [19] proposed an approximation algorithm for data cube workloads.
Thm. 4.9 shows that under (, δ)-differential privacy we can now directly compute the
optimal strategy, obviating the need to use an approximation algorithm or blindly
relying on the Fourier basis for workloads of this type. The result in [42], however,
involves data-dependent techniques and the comparison between [42] to the SVD
bound relies on a thorough analysis of the spectral properties of data cube workloads,
which is a direction of future work.
4.3.2 The looseness of the SVD bound
The SVD bound can also underestimate the minimum error when the workload is
highly skewed. For example, the SVD bound does not work well when the sensitivity
of one column in the workload is overwhelmingly larger than others. Recall the
workload in Example 4.1, when t → 0, the SVD bound will underestimate the total
error by a factor of n. This is caused by the underestimate of the sensitivity of A
considered in equation (4.2) in the proof of Thm. 4.1.
Since the proof of Thm. 4.1 constructs a concrete strategy, one way to measure
the looseness of the SVD bound is to estimate its ratio to the actual error introduced
by this strategy. Note that the sensitivity of the strategy is the only part of the SVD
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bound that is underestimated. The square of the sensitivity is the maximum diagonal
entry of matrix ATA, rather than the estimate given by trace(ATA)/n. The ratio
between the actual sensitivity and the estimated sensitivity bounds the looseness of
the SVD bound, as shown by the following theorem.
Theorem 4.10. Given an m×n workload W. Let d0 be the maximum diagonal entry
of
√
WTW.
MinErrorK(W) ≤ nd0P (K)svdb(W)
trace(√WTW) .
Proof.
MinErrorK(W) ≤ ErrorK,A(W)
= nd0P (K)svdb(W)
Trace(√WTW) .
According to Thm. 4.10, the approximate ratio of the SVD bound corresponds
to the ratio between d0, the largest diagonal entry of
√
WTW and the trace of√
WTW, which is equal to the sum of all singular values of W. This ratio, although
upper-bounded by the ratio between the largest singular value of W and the sum
of all singular values of W, is much closer to 1 than the ratio between singular
values. As a consequence, the skewness in singular values does not always lead to
a bad approximation ratio for the SVD bound. For example, for variable-agnostic
workloads, the largest singular value can be arbitrarily larger than the rest of the
singular values, while the SVD bound is tight. Instead, the cases where the SVD
bound has high approximation ratio, such as the one in Example 4.1, are due to the
skewness of singular value of W and the particular distribution of singular vectors.
The supreme SVD bound can help us to avoid some of these worst cases, but there
is no guarantee of the quality of the bound with more sophisticated cases.
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Nevertheless, for many common workloads, empirical evidence suggests that the
SVD bound is quite close to the minimal error. The following example provides a
comparison between the SVD bound and achievable error for a few common work-
loads.
Example 4.3. Returning to Table 4.1, we observe empirical evidence that for range
and predicate workloads, there are strategies that come quite close to the SVD bound.
The last column of Table 4.1 lists the error for the Eigen-design mechanism [46],
which attempts to find approximately optimal strategies for any given workload by
computing optimal weights for the eigenvectors of the workload. This algorithm is
able to find a strategy whose error is within a factor of 1.028 and 1.107 of optimal for
AllRange(2048) and AllRange(64,32), respectively.
4.4 Comparison of mechanisms
The matrix mechanism is a data-independent mechanism: the noise distribution
(and therefore error) depends only on the workload and not on the particular input
data. This makes it possible to process the workload once and apply the mechanism
efficiently to any dataset. On the other hand, data-independent mechanisms lack the
flexibility to exploit specific properties of individual datasets. In this section, we use
the SVD bound to compare the error bounds of the matrix mechanism with error
bounds of other mechanisms that are data-dependent.
4.4.1 Asymptotic estimation of the SVD bound
Before the comparison, we first convert the SVD bound into an error measure that
can be directly related to other bounds in the literature. We assume all queries in
the workload have sensitivity at most one and estimate the SVD bound as a function
of the domain size n and the number of queries m. Recall that the error in previous
sections is defined as the total mean squared error of the queries. We introduce a new
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measure of error which bounds the maximum absolute error of the workload queries
by α with high probability (controlled by β).
Definition 4.8 ((α,β)-Accurate [35]).Given a workloadW, an algorithm K is (α,β)-
accurate if, for any uniformly drawn data vector x, with a probability of at least 1−β,
maxq∈W ∣K(q,x) − qx∣ ≤ α.
Since the SVD bound measures total error (rather than max error), here we modify
the (α,β)-accuracy by bounding the root mean squared error of the workload.
Definition 4.9 (RMS-(α,β)-Accurate). Given a workload W, an algorithm K is
RMS-(α,β)-accurate if, for any uniformly drawn data vector x, with a probability of
at least 1 − β,
√∑q∈W ∣∣K(q,x) − qx∣∣2/∣W∣ ≤ α.
Theorem 4.11. Given an m × n workload W, if the
svdb(W) is asymptotically tight, then there exists a strategy under which the matrix
mechanism is RMS-(α,β)-accurate, where
α = O⎛⎜⎝
√
min(m,n)√log(2/δ) log(√pi/2/β)

⎞⎟⎠ .
Proof. Given a workload W. Let λ1, . . . , λmin(m,n) be the non-zero singular values of
W.
(λ1 + . . . + λmin(m,n))2 ≤min(m,n)(λ21 + . . . + λ2min(m,n))
=min(m,n)∣∣W∣∣2F
≤min(m,n)mn
Therefore
svdb(W) ≤min(m,n)m.
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Noticing svdb(W) is estimating the L2 error of m queries and the error is Gaussian
random noise. Take the average of the svdb(W), consider the error estimator for
Gaussian random variable with mean m and standard deviation σ:
P(∣X −m∣ > tσ) ≤ √2√
pit
exp(−t2
2
),
and we have the bound proved.
Recall the discussion in Sec. 4.3.1 indicates that the SVD bound is tight or almost
tight for many common workloads. Thus, it is reasonable to compare the asymptotic
estimate of the SVD bound to the error introduced by other mechanisms.
4.4.2 Comparison of error bounds
Here we compare our SVD bound with other error bounds from data-dependent
mechanisms. We include four competitors each representing fundamentally different
mechanisms. The median mechanism [59] discards candidate data vectors that are
inconsistent with historical query answers. The multiplicative weights mechanism
(MW) [37] and the iterative database construction method (IDC) [35] repeatedly up-
date an estimated data vector according to query answers. The boosting method [27]
maintains a distribution of queries according to the quality of their answers and re-
peatedly samples queries from the distribution so as to improve their answers. The
(α,β)-accuracy under (, δ)-differential privacy for the median and the multiplicative
weight mechanism follows the result in [35].
Table 4.2 summarizes error bounds of different data dependent approaches. In
particular, the comparison is over (, exp(−t))-differential privacy and (α, exp(−t))-
accuracy.
The workload W we considered contains m queries with sensitivity no larger than 1.
The database is of size N , which means the sum of all xi’s in the data vector is N .
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Mechanism α
1 Median [59] O (
√
N(logn logm)1/4
√
t(logm+t)
√

)
2 MW [37] O (
√
N(logn)1/4
√
t(logm+t)
√

)
3 IDC [35] O (
(nN)1/4
√
t(logm+t)
√

)
4 Boosting [27] O˜ (
√
N logn⋅t3/2 log3/2m

)
5 SVDB O (
√
min(m,n)⋅t

)
Table 4.2. For t ≥ 2, bounds on the α required to achieve (, exp(−t))-differential
privacy and accuracy measures of: (α, exp(−t))-accuracy (mechanisms 1-4); RMS-(α, exp(−t))-accuracy (mechanism 5).
Observing the values of α in Table 4.2, the matrix mechanism has a greater depen-
dence on  compared with the median, the multiplicative weights and the iterative
database construction methods. In addition, since the matrix mechanism is data-
independent, it cannot take advantage of the input dataset so that it always assumes
n = N . However, when N is sufficiently large (Θ(n)) andm = O(n), the SVD bound is
smaller than the error of the Boosting method and can outperform other competitors
when m = Ω(exp(t/)).
4.4.3 Data-dependency and the matrix mechanism
Although the techniques of the matrix mechanism are data-independent, they can
be deployed in a data-dependent way, blurring the distinction between mechanism
types. The differentially private domain compression technique [49] may be applied
to reduce the domain size n to Θ(N) with an additional O(logn) noise, which suggests
a method for improving the error dependency of the matrix mechanism on n.
Further, the optimal strategy matrix used in the matrix mechanism represents the
fundamental building blocks of the workload and the matrix mechanism reduces error
by using the strategy queries as differentially private observations, instead of the work-
load queries. Recent data-dependent approaches can benefit from the same approach.
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In fact, [38] selects Fourier basis vectors adaptively in a data dependent manner, but
could benefit from selecting from a more efficient strategy matrix. Therefore, the
SVDB bound can serve as a baseline accuracy measure, which may be improved by
data-dependent query selection.
4.5 Complexity of random workloads
The tightness of the SVD bound on different workloads has already been demon-
strated experimentally in Tab. 4.1 and theoretically in Sec. 4.3.1. Most of those
analyses focus on all queries from one certain category, such as all range queries or
all marginal queries on some attributes. However, many realistic workloads may not
contain all but only a subset of queries from one category and it is hence important
to discuss the complexity and the quality of the SVD bound on a sampled subset
of a workload. In this section, we focus on the complexity sets of random sampled
queries of a given workload. In particular, we compare the SVD bound and the error
of strategies generated by the Eigen Design algorithm[46] on different subsets of all
1-dimensional range queries and marginal queries.
4.5.1 The cell simplified SVD bound
Recall the workload matrix in Example 4.1
W =
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
1 0 . . . 0
t t . . . t
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
.
In this query matrix, the second to the last cell of the domain are in the same query
with the same weight. Now let us consider an alternative group of cells which contains
two cells: x1 and x2 + . . . + xn and an alternative workload
W′ =
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
1 0
t t
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
.
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Answers to the workloadW′ on the new group of cells are exactly the same as answers
to the workload W on the original group of cells. Furthermore, it is clear that add
cells that are not participated in any queries will not impact the answers to the
workload as well. Hence we propose the following enhancement of the SVD bound.
Definition 4.10 (Cell Simplified SVD Bound). Given a workloadW, let the workload
matrix W′ be its minimized workload. The cell simplified SVD bound of W, denoted
as svdb+(W), is computed by
svdb+(W) = svdb(W′).
The cell simplified SVD bound is not guaranteed to be larger than the SVD bound,
as the following example.
Example 4.4. Given the workload
W =
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
1 1 1
0 1 1
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
.
svdb(W) = 2.61 and svdb+(W) = 2.5.
However, the cell simplified SVD bound can still benefit when the workload con-
sists of small number of randomly sampled range queries or marginal queries, which
will be shown in the experiments in the next section.
4.5.2 An empirical study on the complexity of random workloads
In this section, we use some experimental results to present the complexity of ran-
dom workloads with different sizes. We generate workloads of random range queries
on 1-dimensional domain of size 1024 (524800 different queries) and random marginal
queries on 10-dimensional domain 2 × 2 × . . . × 2 (59049 different queries). For each
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Figure 4.1. Per query error on random range workloads on 1d domain [1024] and
random marginal workloads on 10d domain [2, . . . ,2]
sampled workload, we compare the error of the Eigen Design algorithm, the SVD
bound and the cell simplified SVD bound. Since the number of queries are different
among different sampled workloads, we record the average per query error to draw a
fair comparison among different workloads.
Fig. 4.1 contains the experimental results on both random range queries and ran-
dom marginal queries. The x-axis is the percentage of the queries that are sampled
and the y-axis is the average per query error, both of which are in logarithm scale.
One observes that the average per query error converges very fast in both cases. Fur-
thermore, estimated error from the SVD bound is almost identical to the error from
the Eigen Design algorithm when the average per query error converges. Therefore,
it indicates that a relatively small subset of queries (1% for range queries and 10%
for marginal queries) has almost the same complexity as the entire query set.
In addition, the cell simplified SVD bound estimates error better than the SVD
bound on both random range queries and random marginal workloads when the num-
ber of queries is small. On workloads of random range queries (Fig. 5.1(a)), the
simplified SVD bound is significantly better than the SVD bound up to about 100
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queries. On workloads of random marginal queries (Fig. 5.2(a)), the simplified SVD
bound is significantly better than the SVD bound up to about 1000 queries. Since
most of the marginal queries cover small number of cells, there are lots of 0 columns
in the workload matrix that the cell simplified SVD bound can take the advantage
of. In general, the cell simplified SVD bound provides error bounds that is close to
the error from the Eigen Design algorithm for most cases.
4.6 An algebra for workloads
In this section we briefly discuss the relationship between workload operations
and the SVD bound. We define basic operators of negation-free relational algebra,
union and crossproduct, on workloads and show how our error measure behaves in
the presence of these operators. Many common workloads are the result of combining
simpler workloads using these operators. Thus, the following results can be used to
save computation of the SVD bound. In particular, for the crossproduct operation,
the computation time for the SVD bound of the crossproduct of two workloads with
size m1 × n1 and m2 × n2 can be reduced from O(min(m1m2, n1n2)m1m2n1n2) to
O(min(m1, n1)m1n1 +min(m2, n2)m2n2).
4.6.1 Union
The union operation on workloads has the standard meaning for rows of the
workload matrix:
Definition 4.11 (Union). Given an m1 × n workload W1 and an m2 × n workload
W2 over the same n cell conditions. W1 ∪W2 is the union of W1 and W2, the
workload consisting of the rows of both W1 and W2, without duplicates.
The relationship between the SVD bounds of workloads and their unions can be
bounded:
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Theorem 4.12. Given an m1 × n workload W1 and an m2 × n workload W2 on the
same set of n cell conditions.
√
svdb(W1) +√svdb(W2) ≥√svdb(W1 ∪W2);√
svdb(W1) +√svdb(W2) ≥√svdb(W1 ∪W2).
The proofs of union is related to the relationship between singular values of ma-
trices and their sum, as stated in the proposition below.
Proposition 4.4 ([30]). Given two n × n matrices W1 and W2 with singular values
µ1, µ2, . . . , µn and λ1, λ2, . . . , λn respectively. Let φ1, φ2, . . . , φn be the singular values
of W1 +W2, then
n
∑
i=1
µi +
n
∑
i=1
λi ≥ n∑
i=1
φi.
For any m × n matrix W, there always exists an n × n matrix W′ such that the
nonzero singular values of W and W′ are all the same. Theorem 4.4 holds even if
both W1 and W2 are m × n matrices, which leads to the relationship between the
SVD bounds of two workloads and their sum.
Proof. LetW =W1∪W2. ExpandW1,W2 to two (m1+m2)×n matrices as follows:
W′1 =
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
W1
0
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
, W′2 =
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
0
W2
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
.
Since W′1 and W
′
2 have the same singular values as W1 and W2, respectively,
svdb(W′1) = svdb(W1), svdb(W′2) = svdb(W2). Furthermore, since
W′1 +W
′
2 =
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
W1
W2
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
⊇W,
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svdb svdb
W1 ∪W2
√
svdb(W1) +
√
svdb(W2) ≥
√
svdb(W1 ∪W2)
√
svdb(W1) +
√
svdb(W2) ≥
√
svdb(W1 ∪W2)
W1 ×W2 svdb(W1)svdb(W2) = svdb(W1 ×W2) svdb(W1)svdb(W2) ≤ svdb(W1 ×W2)
Predicate Workloads
W1 ∧W2 svdb(W1)svdb(W2) = svdb(W1 ∧W2) svdb(W1)svdb(W2) ≤ svdb(W1 ∧W2)
Table 4.3. Algebra operators and relations for the simple and supreme singular value
bounds.
according to Prop. 4.4, the sum of the singular values of W′1 and W
′
2 is larger than
or equal to the sum of singular values W. Therefore, with Thm. 4.3 and Prop. 4.4,
√
svdb(W1) +√svdb(W2)
= √svdb(W′1) +√svdb(W′2) ≥√svdb(W).
For the case of svdb, notice that for any projection µ,
√
svdb(µ(W1)) +√svdb(µ(W2)) ≥√µ(svdb(W)).
Consider all projections and we have the result proved.
4.6.2 Workload combination
Given two workloads over distinct sets of cell conditions, we can combine them to
form a workload over the crossproduct of the individual cell conditions. This is most
commonly used to combine workloads defined over distinct sets of attributes B1 and
B2 to get a workload defined over B1∪B2. When we pair individual predicate queries,
it is equivalent to pair them conjunctively.
Definition 4.12 (Workload combination). Given an m1 × n1 workload W1 defined
by cell conditions Φ = φ1 . . . φn1 and an m2 × n2 workload W2 defined by distinct
cell conditions Ψ = ψ1 . . . ψn2, a new combined workload W is defined over cell con-
ditions {φi ∧ ψj ∣ φi ∈ Φ, ψj ∈ Ψ}. For each w1 = (w1,1, . . . , wn1,1) ∈ W1 and w2 =
(w1,2, . . . , wn2,2) ∈W2, there is a query w ∈W accordingly:
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• (Crossproduct) If the entry of w related to each cell condition φi ∧ ψj is
w1,i ⋅w2,j, W is called the crossproduct of W1 and W2, denoted as W1 ×W2.
• (Conjunction) If both W1 and W2 consist of predicate queries and the entry
of w related to each cell condition φi ∧ ψj is w1,i ∧ w2,j, then W is called the
conjunction of W1 and W2, denoted as W1 ∧W2.
The next theorem describes the singular value bound for the crossproduct of work-
loads:
Theorem 4.13. Given an m1×n1 workload W1 and an m2×n2 workload W2 defined
on two distinct sets of cell conditions:
svdb(W1 ×W2) = svdb(W1)svdb(W2)
svdb(W1 ×W2) ≥ svdb(W1)svdb(W2)
Proof. The property of crossproduct can be proved by constructing a proper repre-
sentation to the resulting workload.
Let w1 and w2 be queries in W1 and W2, respectively and W = W1 ×W2.
Consider the vector representation of w1 and w2: w1 = [w11, w12, . . . , w1n1]T , w2 =
[w21, w22, . . . , w2n2]T . The crossproduct of w1 and w2, denoted as w can be rep-
resented as an n1 by n2 matrix, whose (i, j) entry is equal to w1iw2j. In another
word,
w =w1wT2 .
We can the represent w as a vector, denoted as w′, which is a 1 × n1n2 vector that
contains entries in w row by row. Therefore,
w′ = [w11w2, w12w2, . . . , w1nw2]T .
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More generally, usingW1ij to denote the (i, j) entry inW1, W can be represented as
the following matrix:
W =
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
w111W2 w
1
12W2 . . . w
1
1n1
W2
w121W2 w
1
22W2 . . . w
1
2n1
W2
⋮ ⋮ ⋱ ⋮
w1n1W2 w
1
n2W2 . . . w
1
m1n1
W2
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
.
Let v1, v2 be the eigenvectors ofWT1W1,W
T
2W2 with eigenvalues λ1, λ2, respectively.
Let the vector representation of v1 be v1 = [v1n, v2n, . . . , v1n]T . Consider the following
vector
v = [v11v2, v12v2, . . . , v1nv2]T ,
According to block matrix multiplication,
WTWv = WT
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
∑ni=1w11iv1iW2v2
∑ni=1w12iv1iW2v2
⋮
∑ni=1w1m1iv1iW2v2
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
=
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
λ1v11λ2v2
λ1v12λ2v2
⋮
λ1v1nλ2v2
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
= λ1λ2v.
Thus v is an eigenvector of WTW with eigenvalue λ1λ2. Since WT1W1 and W
T
2W
have n1 and n2 orthogonal eigenvectors, respectively, we can find n1n2 orthogonal
eigenvectors with this method. NoticingWTW only has n1n2 eigenvalues, the eigen-
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values of those n1n2 eigenvectors are all the eigenvalues of WTW. Let λ11, . . . , λ1n
be the eigenvalues of WT1W1 and λ21, . . . , λ2n be the eigenvalues of W
T
2W2.
svdb(W) = 1
n1n2
( ∑
1≤i≤n1,1≤j≤n2
√
λ1iλ2j)2
= 1
n1
( n1∑
i=1
√
λ1i)2 ⋅ 1
n2
( n2∑
i=1
√
λ2i)2
= svdb(W1)svdb(W2).
Though we use a specific rule above to represent the query cross products as query
vectors, according to Theorem 4.2, the SVD bound is independent of the rule of
representation. Thus we have the theorem proved in arbitrary cases.
For the case of svdb, since for any projection µ1 on W1 and µ2 on W2, µ1 × µ2
is a projection on W. On the another hand, there are projections on W that can
not be represented as a crossproduct of a projection on W1 and a projection on W2.
Therefore
svdb(W1)svdb(W2) =max
µ1
svdb(µ1(W1))max
µ2
svdb(µ2(W2))
=max
µ1,µ2
svdb((µ1 × µ2)(W))
≤max
µ
svdb(µ(W)) = svdb(W).
The conjunction of predicate queries is a special case of crossproduct, Thus, ap-
plying Theorem 4.13 to predicate workloads we have:
Corollary 4.5. Given an m1 × n1 workload W1 and an m2 × n2 workload W2, both
of which consist of predicate queries.
svdb(W1 ∧W2) = svdb(W1)svdb(W2);
svdb(W1 ∧W2) ≥ svdb(W1)svdb(W2).
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CHAPTER 5
AN EFFICIENT ALGORITHM UNDER THE MATRIX
MECHANISM
The matrix mechanism makes clear that nearly any set of strategy queries can be
used in this manner to answer a workload. Effective strategies have lower sensitivity
than the workload, and are such that the workload queries can be concisely repre-
sented in terms of the strategy queries. In this chapter, we continue this line of work
in order to create a truly adaptive mechanism that can answer a wide range of work-
loads with low error. The key to such a mechanism is strategy selection: the problem
of computing the set of strategy queries that minimizes error for a given workload.
Unfortunately, as it is discussed in Chapter 3, exact solutions to the strategy selection
problem are infeasible in practice. One of our main contributions is an approxima-
tion algorithm capable of efficiently computing a nearly optimal strategy in O(n4)
time (where n is the number of individual counting queries required to express the
workload). The result is a mechanism that adapts the noise distribution to the set of
queries of interest, relieving the user of the burden of choosing among mechanisms or
carefully analyzing their workload.
Our main algorithm focuses on (, δ)-differential privacy1 and is inspired by the
statistical problem of optimal experimental design [15, 57], we formulate the strat-
egy selection problem as a convex optimization problem which chooses n coefficients
to serve as weights for a fixed set of design queries. Moreover, we show that the
1Our algorithm can also be adapted to -differential privacy, but it is less efficient, appears to be
less effective, and is significantly harder to analyze. (Please see Sec. 5.1.5.)
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eigenvectors of the workload (when represented in matrix form) capture the essential
building blocks required for near-optimal strategies and are therefore a very effective
choice for the design queries underlying the above optimization problem.
Our mechanism is also significantly more general than prior work. It can be
applied to any workload of linear counting queries: a much larger class of queries
than marginals or range queries. In addition, the algorithm avoids a subtle limitation
of some previous approaches [40, 70, 19] in which achieving promised error rates
depends on finding a proper representation for the workload.
5.1 An algorithm for efficient strategy selection
In this section we present an approximation algorithm for the strategy selection
problem, prove its approximation rate and other properties, and discuss adapting the
algorithm to -differential privacy. Below, we denote the optimal strategy under the
matrix mechanism for a given workload W as OptStrat(W).
5.1.1 Optimal query weighting
The main difficulty in solving OptStrat(W) is computing (subject to complex
constraints) all n2 entries of a strategy matrix. To simplify the problem, we take
inspiration from the related problem of optimal experimental design [57].
Consider a scientist who wishes to estimate the value of n unknown variables
as accurately as possible. The variables cannot be observed directly, but only by
running one or more of a fixed set of feasible experiments, each of which returns a
linear combination of the variables. The experiments suffer from observational error,
but those errors are assumed independent, and it follows that the least square method
can be used to estimate the unknown variables once the results of the experiments are
collected. Each experiment has an associated cost (which may represent time, effort,
or financial expense) and the scientist has a fixed budget. The optimal experimental
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design is the subset (or weighted subset) of feasible experiments offering the best
estimate of the unknown variables and with a cost less than the budget constraint.
There is an immediate analogy to the problem of strategy selection: our strategy
queries are like experiments that provide partial information about the unknown
data vector x, and the final result will be computed using the least square method.
However, in our setting, we are permitted to ask any query, with a cost (arising from
the increase in sensitivity) which impacts the added noise. In addition, our goal is
to minimize the sum of variances of the given workload queries, while experimental
design always minimizes the error of the individual variables (i.e. the error metric in
experimental design is equivalent to our problem only if W is the identity matrix).
Despite these important differences, we adopt from experimental design the idea
to limit the selection of our strategy to weighted combinations of a set of design
queries that are fixed ahead of time. Naturally, design queries with a weight of
zero are omitted. For a set of design queries Q, the following problem, denoted
OptStratQ(W), selects the set of weights which minimizes the total error for W.
Problem 5.1 (Approximate Strategy Selection). Let W be a workload and Q =
{q1, . . .qk} the design queries. For weights Λ = (λ1 . . . λk) ∈ Rk, let matrix AΛ,Q =
[λ1q, . . . , λkqk]T . Choose weights Λ0 ∈ Rk such that:
ErrorK,AΛ0,Q(W) =minΛ∈RkErrorK,AΛ,Q(W). (5.1)
The solution to this problem only approximates the truly optimal strategy since it
is limited to selecting a strategy that is a weighted combination of the design queries.
But OptStratQ(W) can be computed much more efficiently than OptStrat(W).
To do so, we describe OptStratQ(W) as a semi-definite program [15], a special
form of convex optimization in which a linear objective function is minimized over
the cone of positive semidefinite matrices. Below, ○ is the Hadamard (entry-wise)
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product of two matrices, and for symmetric matrix Q, Q ⪰ 0 denotes that Q is
positive semidefinite, which means xTQx ≥ 0 for any vector x.
Program 5.1.1 Optimal Query Weighting
Given: c1, . . . , cn, Q = [q1, . . . ,qn].
Choose: u1, . . . , un, v1, . . . , vn.
Mimimize: c1v1 + . . . + cnvn.
Subject to: [ ui 1
1 vi
] ⪰ 0, i = 1, . . . , n.
(Q ○Q)Tu ≤ 1.
Theorem 5.1. Given a workload W and a set of design queries Q = {q1, . . .qn}, let
c1, . . . , cn be the squared L2 norms of the columns of matrixWQ+. If the output of Pro-
gram 5.1.1 is u1, . . . , un then setting Λ = {√u1 . . .√un} achieves OptStratQ(W).
Proof. (Sketch) To solve Problem 5.1, notice that applying a scalar to λ1, . . . , λn will
not change the value of ErrorK,A(Λ,Q)(W). Thus we can constrain the sensitivity of
the strategy to be 1. Then the problem is equivalent to minimizing c1/λ21 + . . .+ cn/λ2n
with the constraint that the sensitivity of the strategy is 1. In Program 5.1.1, uivi ≥ 1
and the smaller vi leads to smaller minimization goal. Thus the semidefinite con-
straints guarantee that vi = 1/ui and the inequality constraints require the sensitivity
to be 1 for any optimal solution.
Algorithms for efficiently solving semidefinite programs have received considerable
attention recently [15]. Using standard algorithms, Program 5.1.1 can be solved in
O(n∣Q∣3) time. Recall that the complexity of computing OptStrat(W) is O(n8).
Thus, Program 5.1.1 offers an efficiency improvement as long as ∣Q∣ = O(n2). This
provides a target size for selecting the design set, which we turn to next.
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5.1.2 Choosing the design queries
The potential of the above approach depends on finding a set of design queries,
Q, that is concise (containing no more than n2, and preferably n, queries) and also
expressive (so that near-optimal solutions can be expressed as weighted combinations
of its elements).
One straightforward idea is to adopt as the design queries one of the proposed
strategy matrices from prior work. These are good strategy matrices for specific
workloads such as the set of all range queries (wavelet or hierarchical strategy) or
sets of low order marginals (the Fourier strategy). Choosing one of these for Q would
guarantee that OptStratQ(W) produces a solution that improves upon the error
of using that strategy. Unfortunately these strategies are not sufficiently expressive
for workloads very different from their target workloads.
Another possibility is to use the workload itself as the set of design queries, but
there are two difficulties with this. First, there is no guarantee that a workload in-
cludes within it the components from which a high quality strategy may be formed,
especially if the workload only contains a small set of queries. The workloads of all
range and all predicate queries are in fact sufficiently expressive (e.g. both the hier-
archical strategy and a strategy equivalent to wavelet can be constructed by applying
weights to the set of all range queries). But this leads to the second issue: these
workloads, and others that serve important applications, are too large and fail to
meet our conciseness requirement.
To avoid these pitfalls, we will derive the design set from the given workload
W by applying tools of spectral analysis. Intuitively this is a good choice because
the eigenvectors of a matrix often capture its most important properties. We will
also show in the next section that this choice aids in the theoretical analysis of the
approximation ratio because it allows us to relate the output of OptStratQ(W) to
a lower bound on error that is a function of the workload eigenvalues.
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Recall that the key part of the expression for Eqn. (3.5) in Prop. 3.4 is ∣∣WA+∣∣2F ,
which can also be represented as
∣∣WA+∣∣2F = trace(WTW(ATA)+).
Notice that the workload occurs only in the form of WTW. It follows that there are
many workloads with equivalent total error because it is easy to construct a matrix
W0 such that WT0W0 =WTW by letting W0 = QW for any orthogonal matrix Q.
This suggests that, as far as total error under the matrix mechanism is concerned,
the essential properties of the workload are reflected by WTW. This motivates the
following definition of eigen-queries of a workload, which we will use as our design
set.
Definition 5.1 (Eigen-queries of a workload). Given a workload W, consider the
eigen-decomposition ofWTW intoWTW =QTDQ, where Q is an orthogonal matrix
and D is a diagonal matrix. The eigen-queries of W are the rows of Q (i.e. the
eigenvectors of WTW).
Choosing the eigen-queries of W as the design set meets our conciseness re-
quirement because there are never more than n eigen-queries. Thus Program 5.1.1,
OptStratQ(W), has complexity O(n4), which is O(n4) times faster than solving
OptStrat(W). We also find that the eigen-queries meet our expressiveness objec-
tive. We will show this next by proving a bound on the approximation ratio. In Sec.
5.2 we propose techniques that exploit the fact that using subsets of the eigen-queries
retain much of the expressiveness and increase efficiency. And in Section 5.3, we show
experimentally that weighted eigen-queries allow for near-optimal strategies, and also
that the eigen-queries outperform other natural alternatives for the design set.
5.1.3 The Eigen-Design algorithm
It remains to define the complete Eigen-Design algorithm, which is Program 5.1.2:
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Program 5.1.2 The Eigen-Design Algorithm
Input: Workload matrix W.
Output: Strategy matrix A.
1: Compute the eigenvalue decomposition of WTW = QTDQ, where D =
diag(σ1, . . . , σn) and set Q =Q.
2: Compute weights λ1, . . . , λn by solving Program 5.1.1 for above Q and with ci = σi,
i ∈ [1..n].
3: Construct matrix A′ = ΛQ where Λ = diag(λ1, . . . , λn).
4: Let m11, . . . ,mnn be the L2 norm of columns of A′ and define D′ =
diag(maxi{√m2ii −m211}, . . . ,maxi{√m2ii −m2nn}).
5: return A = [A′
D′
].
The algorithm performs the decomposition of WTW to derive the design queries
(Step 1), and solves OptStratQ(W) using the eigen-queries as the design set (Step
2). The matrix A′ that is constructed in Step 3 is a candidate strategy but may have
one or more columns whose norm is less than the sensitivity. In this case, it is possible
to add queries, completing columns, without raising the sensitivity (Step 4 and 5).
These additional queries can only provide more information about the database, and
hence reduce error.
5.1.4 Analysis of the Eigen-Design algorithm
We now consider the accuracy and generality of the eigen-design algorithm, show-
ing a bound on the worst-case approximation rate and that the accuracy of the algo-
rithm is robust with respect to the representation of the input workload.
Approximation Rate
To bound the approximation rate, we rely on the error bound presented in the
previous chapter. The existence of this bound does not imply an algorithm for achiev-
ing it, but it is a useful tool for understanding theoretically and experimentally the
quality of the strategies produced by OptStrat(W) using the eigenvalues of W.
Recall how the singular value bound is proved. Let Al be the strategy that is
defined by weighting the eigen queries of W by
√
σ1, . . . ,
√
σn. The singular value
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bound comes from underestimating the sensitivity of Al using
√
trace(ATl Al)/n. In
practice, though the singular value bound may not be achieved since there is a gap
between the sensitivity of Al and
√
trace(ATl Al)/n, the idea of weighting the eigen
queries can be combined with the experimental design method to find good strategies
to W.
Notice the strategy Al is contained in the possible solutions of Program 5.1.2.
Thus the approximation ratio of Program 5.1.2 can be estimated by using the tightness
and looseness results of the singular value bound.
Theorem 5.2. Program 5.1.2 achieves the optimal solution whenever the singular
value bound is tight. In addition, the strategy given by Program 5.1.2 approximates
MinErrorK(W) within a ratio of nd0/trace(√WTW), where d0 is the largest diag-
onal entry of the matrix
√
WTW.
This theorem shows that the approximation ratio of applying Program 5.1.2 to a
workload W can be bounded by analyzing the eigenvalues of matrix WTW.
In practice, the ratio between the error of the eigen strategies and the optimal
error is much smaller for a wide range of common workloads. In the experiments
in Sec. 5.3, the largest ratio is at most 1.6 and in a number of cases the ratio is
essentially equal to 1, modulo numerical imprecision.
Representation Independence
We say that the Eigen-Design algorithm is representation independent because
its output is invariant for semantically equivalent workloads and error equivalent
workloads. Recall that the logical semantics of a workload matrix W depends on its
cell conditions and the semantic equivalent workloads are defined as Definition 2.5.
Naturally, we hope for a mechanism with equal error for any two semantically-
equivalent representations of a workload. Some prior approaches do not have this
property. For example, the wavelet and hierarchical strategies exploit the locality
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present in the canonical representation of range queries. An alternative matrix rep-
resentation of the range queries may result in significantly larger error.
As it is pointed out in Proposition 2.1, semantic equivalent workloads can be
generated by different operations, including splitting a cell condition, and merging
cell conditions with same queries. Those two operations will impact the performance
of the Eigen-Design algorithm. However, if we run the Eigen-Design algorithm on the
minimized workload of the input workload W, it does not suffer from this pitfall:
Proposition 5.1 (Semantic equivalence). Let W1 and W2 be two semantically-
equivalent workloads whose minimized workloads are W′1 and W
′
2, respectively. Sup-
pose Prog. 5.1.2 computes strategy A1 on workload W′1 and A2 on workload W
′
2.
Then ErrorK,A1(W′1) = ErrorK,A2(W′2).
Proof. For any two semantically-equivalent workload matrices W1 and W2, there
exist transformation matrices T1 and T2 such that W′1 = T1W′2T2 where T1 per-
forms row swaps and T2 performs a sequence of column swaps, column duplica-
tions, or duplicate column elimination. Because T1 is actually an orthogonal matrix,
W′T2W
′
2 = (T1W′2)T (T1W′2). In addition, the operations on T2 do not change the
nonzero of eigenvalues of W′T2W and using QT2 instead of Q in Program 5.1.1 does
not change the inequality constraint w.r.t. those xi that have non-zero eigenval-
ues. Therefore, Program 5.1.1 computes semantically-equivalent strategies AT2 and
A for W′1 and W
′
2, respectively, and the final step in Program 5.1.2 will leave the
strategies semantically-equivalent as well. Thus A1 = A2T2 and ErrorK,A1(W′1) =
ErrorK,A2(W′2).
A related issue arises for two workloads that may be semantically different, but
can be shown to have equivalent error. Since W appears as WTW in the expression
for total error of a workload, it follows that, for any orthogonal matrix Q, workload
QW has error equal to W under any strategy. And in particular, any two such
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workloads have equal minimum error. The Eigen-Design algorithm always finds the
same strategies for any two error-equivalent workloads:
Proposition 5.2 (Error equivalence). Let W1 and W2 be two error-equivalent work-
loads (i.e. W1 =QW2 for some orthogonal Q) and suppose Program 5.1.2 computes
strategy A1 on workload W1 and A2 on workload W2. Then ErrorK,A1(W1) =
ErrorK,A2(W2)
This result follows from the fact that the input to Program 5.1.1 uses the eigen-
vectors of WTW, and therefore operates identically on equivalent workloads.
Optimizing for Relative Error
The discussion above is about workload error, an absolute measure of error. Our
adaptive approach can also be used to find strategies offering low relative error. How-
ever, these are two fundamentally different optimization objectives and a single strat-
egy matrix will not, in general, satisfy both.
One major difference between computing absolute error and relative error is the
impact of the L2 norm of a query vector. According to Proposition 3.4, the query error
of w under strategy A is proportional to the L2 norm of w. Therefore a scaled query
kw has k times larger query error compared with w, and thus a query with higher
L2 norm contributes more to workload error. But because the relative error does not
change with the L2 norm of the query, using strategies optimized for workload error
will not lead to optimal relative error.
Because the matrix mechanism is a data-independent mechanism, it is not possible
to optimize for relative error directly. If the distribution of the target dataset were
known, we could scale each query by its weighted L2 norm, where the weight on
each cell is proportional to the inverse of its probability. This scaling will optimize
towards relative error by neutralizing the fact that the designed strategies are biased
towards high norm queries. Since the underlying distribution is typically unknown, we
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introduce a heuristic scaling, prior to applying the Eigen-Design algorithm, in which
each query is normalized to make its L2 norm 1. This is equivalent to assuming a
uniform distribution over the cells. In Sec 5.3, we show that, for two real datasets,
this approach results in significantly lower relative error than competing techniques.
5.1.5 Application to -differential privacy
There are a number of challenges to applying the optimally weighted design ap-
proach under -differential privacy. Recall, once again, the formula for total error from
Prop. 3.4: P (K)∆2A∣∣WA+∣∣2F . To move to -differential privacy, only the sensitivity
term changes, from L2 to L1: P (K)∆¯2A∣∣WA+∣∣2F . In the former case, the sensitivity
term ∆¯A is uniquely determined by ATA. But in the latter case, computing a near-
optimal ATA is not enough, because ∆¯A remains undetermined and is itself hard to
optimize. As a result, it is more challenging to represent the optimal query weighting
as a convex optimization problem. Below we present its formal encoding in a special
case that Q contains no more than n queries, but note that the resulting problem is
also less efficient because we can no longer rely on second order cone programming.
Program 5.1.3 Optimal Query Weighting under -Differential Privacy
Given: c1, . . . , cn, Q = [q1, . . . ,qn].
Choose: u1, . . . , un, v1, . . . , vn.
Mimimize: c1v1 + . . . + cnvn.
Subject to: − log(u2ivi) ≤ 0, i = 1, . . . , n.(Q ○Q)Tu ≤ 1.
Theorem 5.3. Given a workload W and a set of design queries Q = {q1, . . .qn}, let
c1, . . . , cn be the squared L2 norms of the columns of matrix WQ+. If the output of
Program 5.1.3 is u1, . . . , un then setting Λ = {u1 . . . un} achieves OptStratQ(W).
Theorem 5.3 can be proved in exactly the same way as Theorem 5.1.
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Furthermore, there does not seem to be a universally good design set: the eigen-
queries do not outperform other bases, in general, because they characterize only the
properties of WTW but do not account for the L1 sensitivity. We can nevertheless
still use our algorithm to improve existing strategies. For example, using the Wavelet
basis in the algorithm can improve its performance on all range and random range
queries by a factor of 1.2 and 2.3, respectively; using the Fourier basis can improve
its performance on low order marginals by a factor of 2.7.
Lastly, we do not know of an analogue of Theorem 4.1 providing a guaranteed
error bound for the -differential privacy to verify the quality of the output.
These challenges motivate our choice to focus on (, δ)-differential privacy. While
the two privacy guarantees are strictly-speaking incomparable, for conservative set-
tings of δ, a user may be indifferent between the two. It is then possible to show that
the asymptotic error rates for many workloads are roughly comparable between the
two models.
5.2 Complexity and optimizations
We focus next on methods to further reduce the complexity of approximate strat-
egy selection. We first analyze the complexity of the strategy selection algorithm and
show that it can be solved more efficiently for low rank workloads, with no impact
on the quality of the solution. Then we propose two approaches which can signifi-
cantly speed up strategy selection by reducing the size of the input to Program 5.1.2.
Intuitively, both approaches perform strategy selection over a summary of the work-
load that is constructed from its most significant eigenvectors, potentially sacrificing
fidelity of the solution. We evaluate the latter two techniques in Sec 5.3.4.
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5.2.1 Complexity analysis
The rank of workload matrix W, denoted by rank(W), is the size of the largest
linearly-independent subset of the rows (or, equivalently, columns). When rank(W)
equals its maximum value, n, we say thatW has full rank, which implies that accurate
answers to the workload queries in W uniquely determine every cell count in x. The
complexity of the strategy selection algorithm can be broken into three parts: com-
puting the eigenvectors and eigenvalues of matrix WTW, solving the optimization
problem, and constructing the strategy. If an eigenvalue is equal to zero, the eigen-
value and its corresponding eigenvectors are not actually involved the optimization
and strategy construction, so they can be omitted in practice. Since the number of
nonzero eigenvalues ofWTW is equal to rank(W), the complexity of Programs 5.1.2
is O(nm rank(W) + n rank(W)3).
The complexity analysis above indicates that its efficiency can be significantly
improved when rank(W)≪ n. For example, the rank of low order marginal workloads
can be bounded by the number of queries in the workload. Suppose a low-order
marginal workload is defined on a k-dimensional space of cell conditions, each of
which has size d. If the workload only contains one-way marginals, the complexity of
solving Program 5.1.2 over this workload is bounded by O(k3d3+k). If the workload
consists of one and two-way marginals the complexity is O(k6dk+6). Both of these
bounds are much smaller than O(d4k).
5.2.2 Workload reduction approaches
Next we propose two approaches which allow us to reduce the number of variables
in the optimization problem. Both are inspired by principal component analysis
(PCA), in which a matrix is characterized by the so-called principal eigenvectors,
which are the eigenvectors associated with the largest eigenvalues.
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In our case, recall that we cannot ignore the non-principal eigenvectors since the
rank of the strategy matrix A cannot be lower than the workload matrixW. Instead,
we either compute separately the weights for the principal and remaining eigenvectors,
or we choose the same weights for all the remaining eigenvectors.
5.2.2.1 Eigen-Query separation
In eigen-query separation, we partition the eigen-queries into groups of a speci-
fied size according to their corresponding eigenvalues. Treating one group at a time,
Program 5.1.1 is executed to determine the optimal weights just for the eigenvectors
of that group. After the individual group optimizations are finished, another opti-
mization can be used to calculate the best factor to be applied to all queries in each
group. If the group size is large, all of the principal eigenvectors may be contained in
one group, in which case the most important weights will be computed precisely.
The complexity of eigen-query separation depends on the group division. No-
tice that during the optimization of each group, the convex optimization problem is
equivalent to setting all eigenvalues of excluded eigenvectors to zero. Analogous to
the discussion of low rank workloads, letting the size of group be ng, the complexity of
solving the optimization problem over each group is O(nn3g). Similarly, the time com-
plexity to combine all the groups is O(n(n/ng)3), and therefore O(n2n3g + n(n/ng)3)
in total. Asymptotically, the complexity of eigen-query separation is minimized when
ng = O(n1/3). Then the complexity of the entire process is O(n3), the same as the
cost of standard matrix multiplication.
5.2.2.2 Principal vector optimization
In the principal vector optimization we use a subset of the k most important
eigenvectors as the design set, computing the optimal weights as usual. Instead
of ignoring the less important eigenvectors (as is typical in PCA) we simply use a
single common weight for each of the excluded vectors that have non-zero eigenvalues.
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The number of variables in the convex optimization is reduced to k + 1 so that the
time complexity is reduced to O(nk3). Experimentally we find that good results are
possible with as few as 10% of the eigenvectors.
In Sec. 5.3.4 we show that both of the above approaches can improve execution
time by two orders of magnitude with modest impact on solution quality. Extending
our theoretical bound on the approximation rate to these approaches is an interesting
direction for future work.
5.3 Experimental evaluation
The empirical evaluation of our mechanism has three objectives: (i.) to measure
solution quality of the Eigen-Design algorithm using both absolute and relative error;
(ii.) to measure the trade-off between speed-up and solution quality of our two perfor-
mance optimizations; and (iii.) to measure the effectiveness of using the eigen-queries
as the design set. Experimental conclusions are presented in Sec. 5.3.6.
5.3.1 Experimental setup
Recall that total error is an absolute error measure based on root mean square
error. Total error can be analytically computed using Prop. 3.4, and this is precisely
the error that will be witnessed when running repeated trials and computing the
mean deviation. Further, total error is independent of the true counts in data vector
x. That is, it is independent of the input data. These facts hold for all instances
of the matrix mechanism, and therefore for each of the competing techniques we
consider below. Therefore, when evaluating this absolute error measure, we do not
perform repeated trials with samples of random noise nor do we use any datasets.
In addition, all measures of workload error include the same factor P (, δ), so that
changing the privacy parameters impacts each method with the same factor, leaving
112
the ratio of their error the same. Consequently, for total error, we simply fix  = 0.5
and δ = 0.0001.
For total error, all error measurements are purely a function of the workload,
reflecting the hardness of simultaneously answering a set of queries under differential
privacy. In addition, these error rates can be compared directly with the lower bound
as Theorem 4.1, reflecting a bound on the approximation rate. (This lower bound is
not known to be achievable for all workloads, but nevertheless informs the quality of
the eigen-strategy and its competitors.)
We also evaluate the relative error rates achievable using our algorithm by com-
puting the strategy that minimizes absolute error on a scaled workload, as described
in Sec. 5.1.4. Of course, the relative error rates reported in experiments are always
for the original input workload. In these experiments we vary the value of , for a
fixed δ = 0.0001, and consider two real datasets. The first dataset is the US individual
census data in the past five years[62], which are aggregated on age, occupation and
income. The second is the Adult dataset[8], in which tuples are weight-aggregated
on age, work, education and income. The size and dimensions of the datasets are:
Dataset Dimension # Tuples
US Census 8 × 16 × 16 15M
Adult 8 × 8 × 16 × 2 33K
Table 5.1. The size and dimensions of the datasets
All experiments are executed on a quad-core 3.16GHz Intel CPU with 8 GB mem-
ory. Our Python implementation extends publicly-available code for the matrix mech-
anism [2] and also uses the dsdp solver [5] in the cvxopt [1] package. In addition, in
order to present a more straightforward comparison between the total error and the
relative error. Throughout the experiments, we present the square root of the total
error, called the workload error instead of the total error.
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5.3.2 Competing approaches
We compare the Eigen-Design strategy with the following four alternatives. Al-
though originally proposed in the context of -differential privacy, each is easily
adapted to (, δ)-differential privacy and the shift generally improves the relationship
to the optimal error rate (with the exception of the Fourier strategy, noted below).
- Fourier is designed for workloads consisting of all k-way marginals, for given k [9].
The strategy transforms the cell counts with the Fourier transformation and
computes the marginals from the Fourier parameters. When the workload is
not full rank, the unnecessary queries of the Fourier basis are removed from
the strategy to reduce sensitivity. The effectiveness of the Fourier strategy is
somewhat reduced under (, δ)-differential privacy because dropping unneces-
sary queries results in a smaller sensitivity reduction using L2.
- DataCube is an adaptive method that supports marginal workloads [19]. We
implemented the BMAX algorithm, which chooses a subset of input marginals
so as to minimize the maximum error when answering the input workload. To
adapt the algorithm to (, δ)-differential privacy, sensitivity is measured under
L2 instead of L1.
- Wavelet supports multi-dimensional range workloads by applying the Haar wavelet
transformation to each dimension [70]. When using -differential privacy, Xiao
et al. also introduced a hybrid algorithm that uses the identity strategy on
dimensions with small size. This optimization is unnecessary under (, δ)-
differential privacy: the hybrid algorithm does not lead to smaller error when
sensitivity is measured under L2.
- Hierarchical aims to answer workloads of range queries using a binary tree struc-
ture of queries: the first query is the sum of all cells and the rest of the queries
recursively divide the first query into parts [40]. We test binary hierarchical
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strategies (although higher orders are possible). The strategy in [40] supports
one dimensional range workloads, but is adapted to multiple dimensions in a
manner analogous to Wavelet [70].
We do not compare with the error of the standard Gaussian mechanism, which, for
the workloads considered, is far worse than all alternatives. Prior works [40, 70, 19]
compared the error rates of their approaches with the identity strategy. We omit this
explicit comparison, since the identity is always within the space of possible strategies
the Eigen-Design could choose, but is not competitive.
5.3.3 Error of the Eigen-Design Algorithm
We now measure the improvement in absolute and relative error offered by the
Eigen-Design algorithm along with its approximation to optimal absolute error. Be-
low we refer to the strategy produced by the Eigen-Design algorithm, for a given
workload, as the eigen-strategy. We consider three classes of workloads, beginning
with workloads of range queries, then workloads of marginals, and then some alter-
native workloads designed to test the adaptivity of the mechanism.
5.3.3.1 Workloads of range queries
Figure 5.1 contain experiments on workloads of all range queries and random
range queries. The random ranges are sampled with the two-step sampling method in
[70]. Here the eigen-strategies are compared with Hierarchical and Wavelet strategy.
The figures are in log scale, except Figure. 5.1(a) on all range queries. The results
show that the eigen-design strategies reduce error by a factor of 1.2 to 2.1 in workload
error and 1.3 to 1.5 in relative error compared to the best competing strategies. In
addition, for workload error, the eigen-design strategy is within a factor of 1.3 to the
lower bound.
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(b) Relative errors on range queries
Figure 5.1. Absolute and relative error for the Eigen-Design algorithm and com-
petitors, for range workloads, on 2048 cells. “Lower Bound” is a bound on the best
possible error achievable by any strategy.
5.3.3.2 Workloads of marginals
Figure 5.2 contain experiments on workloads of 2-way marginal queries and ran-
dom marginal queries, in which the random marginals are sampled with the sampling
method in [19]. Here the eigen-strategies are compared with Fourier and DataCube.
The figures are in linear scale for workload error and log scale for relative error. The
results show that the eigen-design strategies reduce error by a factor of 1.3 to 2.2 com-
pared to the best competing strategies in workload error, and by a factor of 1.1 to
2.7 in relative error. In addition, the error of eigen-design strategies match the lower
bound of workload error, indicating that our algorithm found an optimal strategy
with respect to workload error.
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(b) Relative errors on marginal queries
Figure 5.2. Absolute and relative error for the Eigen-Design algorithm and com-
petitors, for marginal workloads, on 2048 cells. “Lower Bound” is a bound on the best
possible error achievable by any strategy.
5.3.3.3 Alternative workloads
To demonstrate that our mechanism is adaptive over a variety of workloads, we
also include other workloads that have not been studied in prior work. First we show
that our mechanism adapts to semantically equivalent workloads, in which we repeat
the experiment on range workload but randomly permute the order of cell conditions.
The justification for this experiment comes from the fact that the user may wish
to answer queries in which the order of the cell conditions is not obvious, such as
predicate queries over categorial attributes.
In addition, we run experiments on three other workloads: the range marginals
workload, the cumulative distribution (CDF) workload, and uniformly sampled pred-
icate queries. The range marginals workload is important because most data analyses
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Workload
Error Ratio
Best/Worst Competitor
Err Type Best/Worst Bound
1D Range (Permuted)
workload 9.62/13.16 0.99 Wav./Hier.
relative 1.51/2.43 - Wav./Hier.
1Way Range Marginal
workload 1.30/7.69 0.98 D.Cube/Four.
relative 1.36/4.93 - D.Cube/Four.
2Way Range Marginal
workload 1.63/3.23 0.95 Hier./Four.
relative 1.81/2.38 - Wav./D.Cube
1D CDF
workload 1.01/1.01 0.80 Wav./Hier.
relative 0.46/0.54 - Wav./Hier.
Predicate
workload 1.39/1.94 1.00 Wav./Four.
relative 1.42/3.55 - Four./Hier.
Table 5.2. The factor of error reduced for the Eigen-Design algorithm w.r.t. the
best/worst competitors strategies and the theoretical bound, for alternative work-
loads, on 2048 cells.
using marginals do not simply use individual counts, but also aggregate counts. If
this is the case, simply computing the marginals workload privately is the wrong
approach because error accumulates for aggregations. Last, the CDF workload is a
highly-skewed set of one-dimensional range queries where the sensitivity in the first
cell is n, decreasing linearly to 1 for the last cell.
We summarize the experimental results on alternative workloads in Table 5.2.
For relative errors, due to space constraints, we only present results on US census
data with  = 0.5 and δ = 0.0001. We present, for each workload, the error reduction
factor achieved by our algorithm compared to the best and worst competing approach,
whose name is shown in the last column of the table. (Datacube is only considered
for range marginals and Fourier is not considered on permuted range and CDF.) In
addition, for workload error, we also include the ratio to the error lower bound.
The results show that the eigen-strategy can reduce workload error by as much
as 13 times (on permuted range queries) and relative error by as much as 5 times
(on one-way range marginals). The workload error of competing strategies is heavily
impacted by the permutation but the relative errors are not as bad since queries
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Figure 5.3. Quality and efficiency of approximation methods on 8192 cell conditions
of individual cells and small ranges dominate the workload, which do not change
too much under permutation. On all workloads but one, the eigen-strategy beats
every competitor by at least a factor of 1.3, and is very close to—or achieves—the
theoretical error lower bound. The only exception is the CDF workload, in which the
eigen-strategy is only a bit better than the competitor for workload error and worse
(than Hierarchical and Wavelet) for relative error. Overall, the results for workload
and relative error are largely similar for range marginals and the predicate workload.
5.3.4 Performance optimizations
Figure 5.3 illustrates the trade-off between computational speed-up and solution
quality for the eigen-separation and principal vector performance optimizations de-
scribed in Section 5.2. We only present results with workload errors here (the results
with relative error are similar or even better). Error and computation time are plot-
ted together using two y-axes: the left axis measures average per query error and the
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Figure 5.4. Comparison of design queries
right axis measures execution time in seconds. The baselines for error are the lower
bound and the best competing technique.
The running time of using the standard Eigen-Design algorithm can be estimated
from the running time of the principal vector method, which is more than an order
of magnitude larger than the principal vector method with 25% of the eigenvectors.
Both methods can reduce the running time by two orders of magnitude while the
error they introduced is less than 12% over the lower bound. For the eigen-separation
method, the computation in each group takes more time with larger group sizes
while the computation of merging groups takes more time with smaller group sizes.
Theoretically, the best choice for group size of the eigen-separation method is n1/3,
which is closest to 16 in this case. Using eigen-query separation with a group size of
16, the error is 5% higher on all range queries and 11% higher on all marginal queries.
Using the principal vectors optimization with 6% of the eigenvectors, the error is 10%
higher on all range queries and the same as the optimal on all marginal queries.
According to the results, the eigen-separation performs better on range queries
while the principal vectors method is better on marginals. In either case, the perfor-
mance improvements still produce results that are significantly better than competing
techniques.
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5.3.5 The Choice of design queries
To evaluate our claim in Section 5.1.2 that eigen-queries are an effective choice for
the design queries we compare strategies computed by Program 5.1.1 using the eigen-
queries, the Wavelet matrix and Fourier matrix as the design queries. Since using the
eigen-queries introduces the same error to semantically equivalent workloads, we also
empirically verify this property on other sets of designed queries. Figure 5.4 shows
the results of those comparisons over two structured workloads considered above, as
well as the same workloads with the order of the cell conditions permuted.
The results show that using the Fourier or the Wavelet strategy as the set of
design queries introduces 20% more error over all one dimensional range queries and
achieves the same error on two-way marginals. However these design queries cannot
maintain their performance for workloads represented under a permutation of the
cell conditions: they are worse than the eigen-queries by more than 4 times over the
permuted one-dimensional range queries.
5.3.6 Experimental conclusions
The experimental results show that, for the workloads specifically targeted by
competing techniques, those techniques achieve error that is not too far from optimal
(usually a factor of about 1.2 to 3.4 times the lower bound on error). But for broader
classes or workloads, or ad hoc subsets of structured workloads, existing techniques
are limited and the adaptivity of the Eigen-Design can improve relative or absolute
error by a larger factor. We have confirmed the versatility of our algorithm, as it
improves on all competing techniques for virtually every workload considered. The
one exception is the highly skewed CDF workload. The lowest error strategy we
are aware of for this workload is produced by our design algorithm, but with an
alternative basis.
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CHAPTER 6
COMBINING THE MATRIX MECHANISM WITH
DATA-AWARE MECHANISMS
Existing approaches for batch query answering broadly fall into two categories:
data-independent mechanisms and data-dependent mechanisms. Data-independent
mechanisms achieve the privacy condition by adding random noise that is independent
of the input database. In previous chapters, we focus on the matrix mechanism
with data-independent differentially private mechanisms. In this case, the matrix
mechanism exploits properties of the workload to achieve greater accuracy, but the
noise distribution (and therefore the error) is always fixed for all input databases.
Data-dependent mechanisms add noise that is customized to properties of the
input database, producing different error rates on different input databases. In some
cases, this can result in significantly lower error than data-independent approaches.
These mechanisms typically need to use a portion of the privacy budget to learn
about the data or the quality of a current estimate of the data. They then use the
remaining privacy budget to privately answer the desired queries. In most cases, these
approaches do not exploit workload.
A comparison of state-of-the-art mechanisms in each category reveals that each
has advantages, depending on the “complexity” or “hardness” of the input database.
If the database is viewed as a histogram, databases with large uniformly-distributed
regions can be exploited by these algorithms allowing the data-dependent mechanisms
to outperform data-independent competitors. But on more complex datasets, e.g.
those with many regions of density, data-dependent mechanisms break down.
122
Consider a workload of random range queries and a dataset derived from an IP-
level network trace. The state-of-the-art data-dependent mechanism Multiplicative
Weights and Exponential Mechanism (MWEM) [38] can achieve 60.12 average per-
query error when  = 0.1. The matrix mechanism using the wavelet basis as its query
strategy offers per-query error of 196.6, for the same , a factor of 3.27 worse. But
other datasets have properties that are difficult to exploit. On a dataset based on the
HEP-PH citation network, the same workload evaluated by the MWEM algorithm has
average per-query error of 722.3 with  = 0.1, while the error of the matrix mechanism
with the same query strategy is still 196.6 for this workload, a factor of 3.67 better.
Such a large variation in the relative performance of mechanisms across data sets
is a major limitation of current approaches. This is especially true because it is
typically necessary to select a mechanism without seeing the data.
As described in Chapter 3, the matrix mechanism can be applied to any differ-
entially private mechanism. However, applying the matrix mechanism to a data-
dependent algorithm leads to much more complicated error analysis and our results
in previous chapters are no longer be valid. In this chapter, we seek an alternative
way to combine the matrix mechanism with a novel data-dependent algorithm, to
form a novel 2-stage mechanism:
- The error of our mechanism is better by a factor up to 6.86 compared with
the best state-of-art mechanisms on databases with large uniformly-distributed
regions, and is comparable with state-of-art data-independent mechanisms on
datasets that have properties that are difficult to exploit.
- We present an efficient algorithm in the first stage that partitions the domain
into uniform regions. Compared with other differentially private partitioning
algorithms, our algorithm generates much better partitions and runs in time
that is only quasilinear in the size of the domain.
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- We design a new, efficient algorithm in the second stage that adaptively dis-
tributes a privacy budget to ask a hierarchy of range queries of varying granu-
larity. Unlike existing hierarchical strategies, our method allows a non-uniform
budget distribution across queries of the same granularity, which we show leads
to a strategy that is more finely tuned to the workload, and thus more accurate,
than existing techniques.
To our knowledge, our mechanism is the first data-aware mechanism that provides
significant improvement on databases with easy-to-exploit properties yet does not
break-down on databases with complex distributions. Such property indicates that
our mechanism can be successfully deployed without guessing about properties of the
input database.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. We review notations in Sec. 6.1.
An overview of the algorithm is presented in Sec. 6.2. The partitioning algorithm is
presented in Sec. 6.3, and the bucket count estimating algorithm is included in Sec 6.4.
We extensively compare our algorithm with state-of-the-art competing mechanisms
in Sec. 6.5.
6.1 Histogram
In this section we review the concept of histogram. A histogram on x is a partition
of [1, n] into non-overlapping intervals, called buckets, along with a summary statistic
for each bucket. We denote a histogram by (B, s) with B a set of buckets B =
{b1 . . . bk} and s a set of corresponding statistics s = s1 . . . sk. Each bi is described by
an interval [j1, j2] and the set of intervals covers [1, n] and all intervals are disjoint.
We define the length ∣bi∣ of bucket bi to be j2 − j1 + 1.
We associate a summary statistic with each of the k buckets in a histogram. One
way to do this is to treat the bucket intervals as range queries and evaluate them on
x. We denote this true statistic for bucket bi by bi(x) and we use B(x) to denote
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the vector for true bucket counts. In other cases, the summary statistics are noisy
estimates of B(x), denoted s = s1 . . . sk.
Throughout the paper we use the uniform expansion of a histogram B with k
buckets. It is a data vector of length n derived from B by assuming uniformity for
counts that fall within bucket ranges.
Definition 6.1. Let expand be a function that takes a histogram H = (B, s) with
buckets B = {b1 . . . bk} and statistics s = s1 . . . sk, and uniformly expands it. Thus,
expand(B, s) outputs an n-length vector y defined as:
yj = st(j)∣bt(j)∣
where t(j) is the function that maps position j to the index of the unique bucket in
B that contains position j for j ∈ [1, n].
In our algorithms, both the choice of a histogram and the value of the histogram
statistics have the potential to leak sensitive information about x. Both must be
computed by a differentially private algorithm. Suppose that a differentially private
algorithm returns histogram H = (B, s) where the statistics have noise added for
privacy. We use xˆ to denote the uniform expansion of H, i.e., xˆ = expand(B, s).
Since the vector xˆ is a differentially private estimate for x, we can use it to estimate
answer any query w as w(xˆ).
We are interested in how accurately xˆ approximates x. The absolute error of
xˆ is defined as ∥x − xˆ∥1. We are primarily interested in measuring the accuracy in
terms of the answers to the workload queries. We define average error as the average
L1 error in the workload answers:
1
m
∥W(x) −W(xˆ)∥1. Our theoretical analysis
considers expected error, where the expectation is taken over the randomness of xˆ.
For instance, E ∥x − xˆ∥1 denotes expected absolute error.
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Figure 6.1. Overview and example execution for the DAWA mechanism.
6.2 Algorithm overview
We give an overview to our new mechanism and an example below.
TheData-Aware/Workload-Aware (DAWA) mechanism is an -differentially-private
algorithm that takes as input a workload of range queries, W, and a database, x,
represented as a vector of counts. The output is an estimate xˆ of x, where the noise
added to achieve privacy is adapted to the input data and to the workload. The
DAWA algorithm consists of the following three steps, the first two of which require
private interactions with the database. To ensure that the overall algorithm satisfies
-differential privacy, we split the total  budget into 1 and 2 such that 1 + 2 = 
and use these two portions of the budget on the respective stages of the algorithm.
Step 1: private partitioning
The first step selects a partition of the domain that fits the input database. We
describe (in Sec. 6.3) a novel differentially private algorithm that uses 1 budget to
select a partition such that within each partition bucket, the dataset is approximately
uniform. This notion of uniformity is later formalized as a cost function but the basic
intuition is that if a region is uniform, then there is no benefit in using a limited
privacy budget to ask queries at a finer granularity than these regions—the signal is
126
too small to overcome the noise. The output of this step is B, a partition of x into k
buckets, without counts for the buckets.
Step 2: private bucket count estimation
Given the partitionB, the second step derives noisy estimates of the bucket counts.
Rather than simply adding Laplace noise to the bucket counts, we use a workload-
aware method. Conceptually, we re-express the workload over the new domain defined
by the partition B, with the buckets in the partition taking the place of x. Then we
have a well-studied problem of selecting unbiased measurements (i.e. linear functions
of the bucket counts) in a manner that is optimized for the workload. This problem
has received considerable attention in past work [45, 19, 17, 46, 76, 75]. We use
the basic framework of the matrix mechanism [45], but we propose a new algorithm
(described in Sec. 6.4) for efficiently approximating the optimal measurements for
the workload.
Given the selected measurements, we then use the 2 privacy budget and Laplace
noise to privately answer the measurement queries, followed by least-squares inference
to derive the output of this step, a noisy estimate s for the buckets in B.
Step 3: uniform expansion
In the last step we derive an estimate for the n components of x from the k
components of the histogram (B, s). This is done by assuming uniformity: the count
si for each bucket bi is spread uniformly amongst each position of x that is contained
in bi. The result is the estimate xˆ for x. Strictly speaking, any range query can be
computed from xˆ, but the noise is tuned to provide accuracy for precisely the queries
in the workload.
The following example illustrates a sample execution of the DAWA algorithm.
Example 6.1. For n = 10, Fig. 6.1 shows graphically a sample data vector x =
(2,3,8,1,0,2,0,4,2,4).
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• A possible output of Step 1 is B = {b1, b2, b3, b4} where b1 = [1,2], b2 = [3,3],
b3 = [4,7], and b4 = [8,10]. This need not be the optimal partition, as defined in
Sec. 6.3, because the partition selection is randomized. For the sample database
x in the figure, the true bucket counts for the partition would be (5,8,3,10).
• The result from Step 2 is a set of noisy bucket counts, s = (6.3,7.1,3.6,8.4).
• Step 3 then constructs xˆ by assuming a uniform distribution for values within
each bucket. The final output,
xˆ = (3.15,3.15,7.1, .9, .9, .9, .9,2.8,2.8,2.8)
is shown graphically in Fig. 6.1(c).
The novelty of our approach consists of splitting the overall private estimation
problem into two phases: Step 1, which is data-dependent, and Step 2, which is
workload-aware. Our main technical contributions are an effective and efficient private
solution to the optimization problem underlying Step 1, and an effective and efficient
solution to the optimization problem underlying Step 2. We also extend our methods
to two-dimensional workloads using spatial decomposition techniques.
A number of recently-proposed methods [6, 71, 17, 74] share commonalities with
one or more parts of our mechanism. But each omits or simplifies an important step
and/or they use sub-optimal methods for solving related subproblems. In Sec. 6.5,
an extensive experimental evaluation shows that the DAWA algorithm achieves lower
error than all competitors on nearly every database and setting of  tested, often by
a significant margin.
6.3 Private partitioning
This section describes the partitioning phase of our algorithm. The output of this
stage of the algorithm is a partition B. In Section 6.3.1, we motivate the problem
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and argue that the quality of a partition depends on the data. We then describe our
differentially private algorithm for finding a good partition in Section 6.3.2.
This stage of the algorithm is not tuned to the workload of queries and instead
tries to select buckets such that after statistics have been computed for the buckets
and the histogram is uniformly expanded, the resulting xˆ is as close to x as possible.
6.3.1 Cost of a partition
Recall that after the partition B = {b1 . . . bk} has been selected, statistics are
computed for each bucket. The statistic is the total count for that bucket plus random
noise to ensure privacy; thus, si = bi(x)+Zi where Zi is a random variable representing
the noise. Once the statistics have been computed, they are uniformly expanded into
xˆ = expand(B, s), which is an estimate for x. If bucket bi spans the interval [j1, j2]
we use j ∈ bi to denote j ∈ [j1, j2]. After applying uniform expansion, the resulting
estimate for xj for any j ∈ bi is:
xˆj = bi(x)∣bi∣ + Zi∣bi∣ (6.1)
Equation (6.1) reveals that the accuracy of this estimate depends on two factors.
First, the bucket size determines the scale of the noise. A fixed amount of noise is
added to the bucket, so larger buckets have less noise per individual xˆj. The second
factor is the degree of uniformity within the bucket—i.e., how close each xj is to the
mean value of the bucket bi(x)
∣bi∣
. The more uniform the data values in the bucket, the
more accurate the estimate xˆj.
We can translate these observations about xˆj into a bound on the expected error
of xˆ. The bound depends on the amount the bucket deviates from being perfectly
uniform. For a given bucket bi, let dev be a function that measures the total absolute
deviation:
dev(x, bi) = ∑
j∈bi
∣xj − bi(x)∣bi∣ ∣ (6.2)
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The bound on the expected error of xˆ is in terms of deviation and the error due
to added noise.
Proposition 6.1. Given histogram H = (B, s) where ∣B∣ = k and for i = 1 . . . k, si =
bi(x) +Zi where Zi is a random variable. The uniform expansion, xˆ = expand(B, s),
has expected error of at most,
E ∥xˆ − x∥1 ≤ k∑
i=1
dev(x, bi) + k∑
i=1
E∣Zi∣ (6.3)
The proof of this bound follows from (6.1) and the fact that ∣a+ b∣ ≤ ∣a∣+ ∣b∣. Proof
of a similar result is given in Acs et al. [6].
Proposition 6.1 reveals that the expected error of a histogram can be decomposed
into two components: (a) approximation error due to approximating each xj in the
interval by the mean value bi(x)
∣bi∣
and (b) perturbation error due to the addition of
random noise. The perturbation component is phrased in terms of random variables
Zi, which are not fully determined until the second stage of our algorithm. For
the moment, let’s make the simplifying assumption that Zi ∼ Laplace(1/2). Then,
∑ki=1E∣Zi∣ would simplify to k/2. Thus, to decrease perturbation error, we want as
few buckets as possible; to decrease approximation error, we want buckets that are as
close to uniform as possible. The optimal choice is going to depend on the uniformity
of the particular dataset x. (It also depends on 2 as smaller 2 increases perturbation
error and makes deviation within the bucket relatively more tolerable.)
This analysis motivates our strategy for selecting a partition we will use Proposi-
tion 6.1 as the basis for a cost function and then find the partition with least cost.
Definition 6.2 (Cost of partition). Given a partition of the domain into buckets
B = {b1, . . . , bk}, the cost of this partition is
pcost(x,B) = k∑
i=1
dev(x, bi) + k/2 (6.4)
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This cost function is based on the simplifying assumption that Zi ∼ Laplace(1/2).
In fact, in our algorithm, the random variable Zi is a weighted combination of Laplace
random variables, where the weights are tuned to the workload in the second stage of
the algorithm. Although we do not know the weights until the second stage completes,
we do know that the weights are selected in such a way that E∣Zi∣ ≥ 1/2. The
implication is that our choice of cost function is conservative in the sense that it will
lead to a partition that is more fine grained than the partition that would have been
selected with full knowledge of the noise distribution selected in the second stage.
Example 6.2. Recall the partition B = {b1, b2, b3, b4} in Fig. 6.1 and assume 2 = 1.0.
• b1 = [1,2], b1(x)∣b1∣ = 52 , dev(x, b1) = 12 + 12 = 1
• b2 = [3,3], b2(x)∣b2∣ = 81 , dev(x, b2) = 0
• b3 = [4,7], b3(x)∣b3∣ = 34 , dev(x, b3) = 14 + 34 + 54 + 34 = 3
• b4 = [8,10], b4(x)∣b4∣ = 103 , dev(x, b4) = 23 + 43 + 23 = 223
Therefore, pcost(x,B) = 62
3
+ 4/2 = 1023 . In comparison, the cost of partitioning x
as a single bucket [1,10] leads to a deviation of 17.2 and total pcost of 18.2. Thus
B is a lower cost partition and intuitively it captures the structure of x which has
four regions of roughly uniform density. But note that with a more stringent privacy
budget of 2 = 0.1, the single-bucket partition would have lower cost. When 2 = 0.1,
the amount of noise added to the statistics will be on the order of ±10. With this much
noise, differences between the counts in x is too small to make it worth partitioning.
Given this cost function, we can now formally state the problem that the first
stage of the algorithm aims to solve.
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Problem 6.1 (Least Cost Partition Problem). The least cost partition problem is to
find the partition that minimizes the following objective:
minimize
B⊆B
pcost(I,B)
subject to ∀ b, b′ ∈ B, b ∩ b′ = ∅
⋃
b∈B
b = [1, n]
where B is the set of all possible intervals B = {[i, j] ∣ 1 ≤ i ≤ j ≤ n} and the constraints
ensure that the collection of buckets B partitions [1,n].
The next section describes our algorithm for solving this optimization problem in
a differentially private manner.
6.3.2 Finding a least cost partition
Since partition cost is data-dependent, we cannot solve Problem 6.1 exactly with-
out violating privacy. Instead, we must introduce sufficient randomness to ensure
differential privacy. Although it is theoretically possible to solve this problem using
the exponential mechanism, in which a partition is sampled with probability propor-
tional to − 
2∆pcost
pcost(I,B), this approach is impractical as it requires enumerating
all 2n−1 possible partitions.
Our approach is much more efficient and almost as simple. Our main contribution
is in showing that this simple approach is in fact differentially private. In terms of
computational efficiency, the main bottleneck is computing the partition cost. By
storing intermediate results in a balanced tree, we show that we can achieve a runtime
of O(n2 logn). We can even further reduce the runtime to O(n log2 n) by considering
only partitions whose interval lengths are a power a two. Experiments in Section 6.5
suggest that this approximation has very little cost in terms of solution quality.
Our approach is based on the observation that the cost of a partition decomposes
into a cost per bucket.
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Definition 6.3. Let bcost ∶ Zn
≥0×℘([1, n])→ R≥0 be a function that measures the cost
of an individual bucket. For bucket b, the bucket cost is
bcost(x, b) = dev(x, b) + 1/2.
For any B, the partition cost is simply the sum of the bucket costs: pcost(x,B) =
∑b∈B bcost(x, b). Since the partition cost is a sum of individual bucket costs, to solve
Problem 6.1, the only interaction with the private database necessary is in computing
the cost of each individual bucket.
Our algorithm, which is shown in Algorithm 6.3.1, has three simple steps. First,
it computes the cost for all possible buckets. There are at most O(n2) buckets and at
most O(n logn) buckets if we restrict to buckets whose length is a power of two. The
most obvious way to do this would require O(n) time per bucket but, as described
later, AllCosts is more efficient requiring only O(logn) time per bucket. Second,
the algorithm adds noise to these costs. In the third and final step, it finds the
partition with the least noisy cost. The LeastCostPartition takes the noisy costs
and computes the least cost partition using dynamic programming, much like classical
algorithms for v-optimal histograms [41].
We analyze the algorithm along three key dimensions: privacy, accuracy, and
computational efficiency.
6.3.2.1 Privacy
The proof of privacy is a main challenge. Analyzing the privacy requires some
subtlety in the sense that the noise by itself is not enough to guarantee privacy. To
be precise, publishing the noisy costs of all buckets would violate differential privacy
(unless the scale of the noise was inflated to be Ω(n)). However, when the actual
noisy costs are kept secret and the only published output is the partition with the least
(noisy) cost, then a small amount of noise is sufficient to ensure privacy. The noise
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Program 6.3.1 Private partition for intervals and L1 cost function
procedure Private Partition(I, 1, 2)
// Let B be the set of all intervals on [1, n]
// Compute cost bcost(x, b) for all b ∈ B
cost←AllCosts(I, 2)
// Add noise to each bucket cost
for b ∈ B do
cost[b]← cost[b] + Laplace(2∆bcost/1)
end for
// Find B with lowest total cost based on noisy bucket costs
// stored in cost
B← LeastCostPartition(B, cost)
return B
end procedure
is proportional to the sensitivity of computing bucket cost, but it is straightforward
to show that ∆¯bcost ≤ 2.
Theorem 6.1. Algorithm 6.3.1 is 1-differentially private.
The intuition behind the privacy guarantee is similar to the intuition behind the
exponential mechanism’s privacy. The exponential mechanism secretly scores each
item in a set of items, and then publishes the “best” item, where the best is selected
in a noisy way. Our algorithm publishes the “best” partition, but keeps secret the
noisy scores that were used to determine the best. In both cases, what matters is
the the probability that a particular item is selected as the best, and this probability
changes only slightly when the database changes by a tuple. Although the intuition
is the same, the analysis in the proof is quite different.
Before giving the proof of Theorem 6.1, we first state two lemmas.
Lemma 4. Let Z be a Laplace random variable with scale λ. For any z and any
constant c > 0, we have
P (Z < z − c) ≥ e−c/λP (Z < z)
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Lemma 5. For any neighboring databases I0, I1 and any H, the cost of H can differ
by at most ∆¯c:
∆¯c +∑
j∈H
c(I1,Bj) ≥ +∑
j∈H
c(I0,Bj)
Proof. I1 and I0 differ by one record. There is exactly one bucket Bi in H that covers
that record and the score of that bucket can increase by at most ∆¯c.
Proof of Theorem 6.1. For convenience of the proof, we change the notation slightly.
First, we index the set B. Let B = {B1, . . . ,BM} where M = ∣B∣. We can think of
a histogram H as simply a subset of [1,M], corresponding to a selection of buckets
from B. Formally, H = {i1, . . . , ik} is a histogram if for all i, i′ ∈H, we have Bi∩Bi′ = ∅
and ⋃i∈H Bi = Nn. Let H be the set of all possible histograms that can be formed
from B.
Second, let Z = (Z1, . . . , ZM) where for each i ∈ [1,M], the random variable
Zi ∼ Laplace(λ) represents the noise added to the bucket cost for bucket Bi. Let
z = (z1, . . . , zM) ∈ RM denote a possible outcome (an assignment of Z). We use z−i as
shorthand for (z1, . . . , zi−1, zi+1, . . . , zn).
Using this new notation, we observe that Algorithm 6.3.1, when run on input I,
will output histogram H if and only if it is the histogram with the lowest noisy cost:
∑
j∈H
c(I,Bj) +Zj < min
H′∈H−{H}
{∑
k∈H′
c(I,Bk) +Zk}
Let I0, I1 be any pair of neighboring databases and let H ∈ H be any output of
the algorithm. It suffices to prove
P (A(I0) =H)
P (A(I1) =H) ≤ e
where A(I) denotes the algorithm running on input I and the probability distribution
is over random variables Z.
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Since H defines a collection of disjoint buckets, there must be at most one i ∈ H
where c(I0,Bi) ≠ c(I1,Bi). (If the cost of H is the same on both databases, let i be
any i ∈ H.) We will now derive an expression for the probability that H is selected
that focuses on the effect of Zi, the random noise added to the cost of bucket Bi. To
focus on Bi, it will be convenient to partition the space of possible histograms into
those that include bucket Bi and those that do not. Let H+ = {H ∣H ∈H and i ∈H}
and let H− =H −H+.
We wish to define the set of outcomes z ∈ RM that cause H to be selected. H will
be selected if and only if (a) H is the least cost histogram in H+ and (b) H has lower
cost than any histogram in H−. We examine these two conditions in turn.
For condition (a), observe that all histograms in H+ use bucket Bi, thus whether
(a) holds is independent of the outcome of Zi since it has the same effect on the scores
of all H ′ ∈ H+. Let φ ∶ Zn
≥0 × R
M−1 → {true, false} be a predicate that is true if and
only if the assignment of z−i makes H the least cost histogram among H+.
φ(I,z−i)
= ∑
j∈H−{i}
c(I,Bj) + zj < min
H′∈H+−{H}
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩ ∑k∈H′−{i} c(I,Bk) + zk
⎫⎪⎪⎬⎪⎪⎭
Since I0 and I1 only differ in the score assigned to bucket Bi, φ(I0,z−i) = φ(I1,z−i)
for all z−i ∈ RM−1.
For condition (b), let ψ ∶ Zn
≥0 × R
M → {true, false} be a predicate that is true if
and only if the assignment of z makes H a lower cost histogram than any histogram
in H−. A key insight is that if we fix z−i, then H will have lower cost provided that
zi is small enough.
136
ψ(I,z)
= ∑
j∈H
c(I,Bj) + zj < min
H′∈H−
{∑
k∈H′
c(I,Bk) + zk}
= zi < min
H′∈H−
{∑
k∈H′
c(I,Bk) + zk} −∑
j∈H
c(I,Bj) − ∑
`∈H−{i}
z`
= zi < C(I,z−i)
The upper bound C(I,z−i) depends on the database. Given Lemma 5, we can say
that for neighboring databases I0 and I1,
C(I1,z−i) ≥ C(I0,z−i) −∆c
because the score of the minimum cost histogram in H− could decrease by at most
∆c and the cost of H could increase by at most ∆c.
We can now express the probability that the algorithm on input I outputs H
in terms of φ and ψ. Let fZ (respectively fZ) denote the density function for a
multivariate (respectively univariate) Laplace random variable.
P (A(I) =H) = P (φ(I,Z−i) ∧ψ(I,Z))
= ∫ I [φ(I,z−i) ∧ψ(I,z)]fZ(z)dz
= ∫ I [φ(I,z−i)]fZ−i(z−i) (∫ I [ψ(I,z)]fZi(zi)dzi)dz−i
= ∫ I [φ(I,z−i)]fZ−i(z−i)P (Zi < C(I,z−i))dz−i
Since P (Zi < C) decreases with decreasing C, we have for neighboring databases I0
and I1 and any z−i ∈ RM−1 that
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P (Zi < C(I1,z−i))
≥ P (Zi < C(I0,z−i) − 2∆¯c)
≥ e−2∆¯c/λP (Zi < C(I0,z−i)) (by Lemma 4)
In addition, we observed earlier that φ(I0,z−i) = φ(I1,z−i) for all z−i ∈ RM−1. There-
fore, we can express a lower bound for P (A(I1) =H) strictly in terms of I0:
P (A(I1) =H)
≥ ∫ I [φ(I0,z−i)]fZ−i(z−i)e−2∆¯c/λP (Zi < C(I0,z−i))dz−i
which implies that
P (A(I0) =H)
P (A(I1) =H) ≤ e2∆¯c/λ = e
since, according the algorithm description, λ = 2∆¯c/.
Remark In Algorithm 6.3.1 we can reduce the noise from 2∆bcost to ∆bcost plus
the sensitivity of the particular bucket. The benefit is a reduction in noise (by at
most a factor of 2) for some buckets. This optimization is used in the experiments.
6.3.2.2 Accuracy
Accuracy is measured in terms of the difference in cost between the selected par-
tition and the optimal choice (ignoring privacy).
Definition 6.4 (Useful approximation). A randomized algorithm is a (t, δ)-approximation
if with probability at least 1 − δ, the algorithm returns a solution with cost at most
OPT + t where OPT is the cost of the least cost solution.
We give the following bound on the accuracy of this algorithm.
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Theorem 6.2. Algorithm 6.3.1 is a (t, δ)-approximation with
t = 4∆c n log(∣B∣/δ)

In addition to a theoretical analysis, we do an extensive empirical evaluation in
Section 6.5.
6.3.2.3 Efficiency
The runtime of Algorithm 6.3.1 is O(n2 logn). The runtime can be reduced to
O(n log2 n) by considering only buckets whose lengths are a power of 2.
The dynamic program that computes the least cost partition is efficient, requiring
time linear in n and the number of buckets. The computationally challenging part
is computing bucket costs (Definition 6.2). When compared to computing costs for
a v-optimal histogram (which is based on an L2 metric), computing the costs for the
L1 metric used in this paper is more complicated because the cost can not be easily
decomposed into sum and sum of squares terms.
To simplify the computation, the key idea is to remove the absolute values so
that the computation can be decomposed to partial sums of xj. For bucket bi, let
I+ = {j ∣ j ∈ bi and xj ≥ bi(x)∣bi∣ } and I− = bi − I+. We can simplify dev(x, bi) as follows:
dev(x, bi) = ∑
j∈bi
∣xj − bi(x)∣bi∣ ∣
= ∑
j∈I+
(xj − bi(x)∣bi∣ ) + ∑j∈I− (
bi(x)∣bi∣ − xj)
= 2∑
j∈I+
(xj − bi(x)∣bi∣ )
= 2∑
j∈I+
xj − ∣I+∣ ⋅ bi(x)∣bi∣
For bucket bi, the total deviation can be computed knowing only ∣I+∣, the number
of xj who are larger than
bi(x)
∣bi∣
, and the sum of xj for j ∈ I+. Those quantities can
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be efficiently computed using a binary search tree of xj1 , . . . , xj2 . Each node t in the
tree records a value (xt). In addition, each node t stores the sum of all values in its
subtree (Σt), and the number of nodes in its subtree (ct). For any constant a, we can
then compute ∑t∈T,xt≥a(xt − a) via binary search.
To compute the bucket costs for all intervals with length `, we can dynamically
update the search tree. After the cost for interval [j, j + `] has been computed, we
can update the tree to compute interval [j + 1, j + `+ 1] by removing xj from the tree
and adding xj+`+1. By using a balanced binary search tree, computing all intervals
of size ` requires only O(n logn) time. If we want to compute all intervals, then the
total runtime is O(n2 logn), but if we restrict to intervals whose length is a power of
two, then the total runtime is O(n log2 n).
This restriction on the length of the intervals is an approximation that has the
potential to exclude the optimal solution. Empirically, we find that the big gain in
efficiency does not lead to significant losses in accuracy: the algorithm remains almost
as accurate as when it uses all intervals, and is always more accurate than competing
techniques (Section 6.5.3). Furthermore, reducing the runtime to O(n log2 n) makes
it feasible to run on larger datasets.
6.4 Private bucket count estimation
Given the partition B = {b1, . . . , bk} determined by Step 1, it remains to privately
estimate counts for each bucket, using budget 2. Thus the goal of this stage is to
produce s = s1 . . . sk. Naive solutions like adding Laplace noise to each bucket count
result in high error for many workloads. In this section, we show how to adapt
the existing framework of the matrix mechanism [45] to create a workload-adaptive
algorithm for computing the bucket counts. Within this framework, we describe a
novel greedy algorithm for minimizing error of the workload queries.
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6.4.1 Transformation to the bucket domain
The first challenge in adapting to the workload is thatW is expressed as queries on
x whereas we ultimately must answer these queries using only the k statistics for the
buckets in B. Recall that the statistics will be uniformly expanded into an estimate
xˆ, thus, any query can be answered after applying uniform expansion. However, we
can equivalently transform the workload W into a new workload Wˆ that consists of
queries on s. We describe this next.
Given a vector of statistics s = s1 . . . sk for the corresponding buckets B, an esti-
mate for the data vector x can be constructed by uniform expansion xˆ = expand(B, s):
xˆi = sj∣bj ∣ , i ∈ bj.
Given a query q = (q1, . . . , qn) on x, an estimated answer to q, q(xˆ), is computed as
q(xˆ) = k∑
j=1
∑
i∈bj
qi
sj∣bj ∣ =
k
∑
j=1
⎛⎝∑i∈bj
qi∣bj ∣
⎞⎠ sj. (6.5)
According to equation (6.5), query q on xˆ can be converted to a query on s, as
described in the following proposition.
Proposition 6.2. Let qˆ = (qˆ1, . . . , qˆk) where
qˆj =∑
i∈bj
qi∣bj ∣ .
Evaluating the q on the uniform expansion of s is the same as evaluating the qˆ over
s directly—i.e., q(xˆ) = qˆ(s).
According to Proposition 6.2, given a workload W on x, each of its queries can
be converted to a query of s. We can then have a workload Wˆ on s such that the
answers to W on the uniform expansion of s is the same as answer to Wˆ over s. The
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perturbation error of answering W is equivalent to the L1 error of answering Wˆ on
s. Therefore, instead of working on W and x, this stage of the algorithm focuses on
estimating Wˆ over s with the least error. In addition, since s is constructed by a
data-aware histogram, this stage of the algorithm is data-independent.
Our approach relies on the matrix mechanism [45], which provides a framework to
answer a batch of linear queries (i.e. a workload). Instead of answering the workload
directly, the matrix mechanism poses another set of queries, called the query strategy,
and uses the Laplace mechanism to obtain noisy answers. These noisy answers can
then be used to derive an estimated data vector using ordinary least squares. The
answers to the workload can then be computed form the estimated data vector. Key
to the matrix mechanism is to find a query strategy, which is not necessarily the same
as the workload, so as to minimize the mean square error of answering the workload.
In general, finding the query strategy that minimizes the error under the matrix
mechanisms yields high complexity optimization problems [45, 76]. Hence we adapt an
idea from prior work [46, 75]: fix the strategy to one that is well-suited for anticipated
workloads, but then adjust the privacy budget so as to maximize accuracy on the
specific workload. Essentially, queries in the strategy that play a significant role
in answering the workload are given more weight. Since our anticipated workload is
range queries, we adopt a hierarchical query strategy, similar to prior work [17, 40, 70].
The given query strategy is a hierarchy of queries, denoted as Y , which is a tree
with branching factor t on s. Each node in the tree represents an interval query on
s. Each leaf is a query of the respective entry in s. For each level of the tree, interval
queries of every t nodes in the level are aggregated, and the aggregated query becomes
their parent node in the upper level. Noticing that the number of nodes in each level
may not be a multiple of t, the last nodes of each level is allowed to have less than t
children. This aggregating process is repeated to create more levels until the topmost
level only has one node, whose interval is the entire domain.
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Figure 6.2. Budget allocation for the third level with  = 1. λ = 0.3 at the top left
node, and λ = 0.5 at the top right node.
Our goal is to minimize the mean squared error of answering the workload by
answering queries in Y with different privacy budgets. Although this goal is similar
the goal of prior work [46, 75], their methods impose additional constraints that do
not apply in our setting: either requiring the number of queries in the strategy to be
no more than the size of the domain [46], or requiring the privacy budget to be equal
for all queries on the same level [75].
6.4.2 Privacy budget allocation on the hierarchy
Let the privacy budget assigned to each interval query q in Y is represented by
q. We say a budget allocation satisfies privacy constraints if
∑
q(i)≠0,q∈Y
q ≤ 2, i = 1, . . . , k, (6.6)
which means the accumulated privacy budget on any path from on Y from a leaf to
the root is bounded by 2.
Since the answer of each query qˆ(s) is a linear combination of entries in s, qˆ can
also be written as a vector qˆ such that qˆ(s) = qˆsT . Similarly, we can write a workload
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Wˆ as a matrix Wˆ, and the query hierarchy Y as a matrix Y, where each row of
Wˆ and Y is the vector form of a query in Wˆ and Y , respectively. Given a budget
distribution,DY, is the diagonal matrix whose diagonal entries are the privacy budget
of each query in Y .
According to the matrix mechanism, the mean squared error of answering Wˆ using
Y is
∣∣Wˆ(D2Y,YT )+∣∣2F = trace(WˆTWˆ(YTD2Y,Y)−1). (6.7)
The goal of this stage of our algorithm, the optimal budget allocation problem, is
defined as below.
Problem 6.2 (Optimal Budget Allocation Problem). The optimal budget allocation
problem is to find an q for each query q ∈ Y so as to minimize the following objective
function:
minimize trace(WˆTWˆ(YTD2Y,Y)−1)
subject to ∑
q(i)≠0,q∈Y
q ≤ 2, i = 1, . . . , k.
Computing the optimal solution to Problem 6.2 appears difficult since equa-
tion (6.7) is non-convex. Instead of pursuing an optimal solution, we solve the problem
approximately using the following greedy algorithm. The algorithm initially assigns
all privacy budget to the leaves of Y , and determines the privacy budget of other
queries in Y in a bottom-up manner. For each level of the tree, the algorithm chooses
a λq ∈ [0,1] for each query q at this level. The privacy budget is then reallocated as
follows: for each query q at this level, the privacy budget on each of its descendent q′
is reduced from q′ to (1 − λq)q′ and the privacy budget on q is q = λq2. The value
of λq is chosen to minimize Equation (6.7) after the budget reallocation. Notice that
the new budget allocation still satisfies the privacy constraint in equation (6.6).
Example 6.3. An example of the budget reallocation is shown in Figure 6.2, in which
two different λ are chosen for two nodes (queries) at the third level.
144
When the algorithm terminates, every query has been assigned a privacy budget.
Then each query in the tree is asked using the Laplace mechanism with that query’s
allocated budget. After that, any inconsistencies among those noisy query answers
are resolved using the ordinary least squares.
6.4.3 Efficient algorithm for budget allocation
In this section, we present how to efficiently perform the budget allocation de-
scribed in the previous section. To simplify the presentation, we always assume the
branching factor t = 2, though the discussion is valid for any branching factor.
For each interval query q ∈ Y , let [i, j] be the corresponding interval of q. Use Wˆq
to denote the matrix consisting of the ith to jth column of Wˆ, and Yq to denote the
matrix consisting of the ith to jth column of the matrix of queries in the subtree of
rooted at q. Let Dq, be the diagonal matrix whose diagonal entries are ′q for all q
′
in the subtree rooted at q. For each query q ∈ Y that is not on a leaf of Y , let q1, q2
be queries of its child nodes.
For each query q ∈ Y that is not on a leaf of Y , according to the construction of
Y , q = q1 + q2. Hence Wˆq = [Wˆq1 Wˆq2]. Furthermore, since the queries in the subtree
of q are the union of queries in the subtree of q1, q2, as well as query q itself, for a
given λq,
Dq, = [ λq (1−λq)Dq1,
(1−λq)Dq2,
] .
When choosing a λq, due to the fact that the privacy budgets on all ancestors of
q in Y are 0 at this moment, the matrix YTD2Y,Y becomes a block diagonal matrix,
and YTq D
2
q,Yq is one of its blocks. Therefore, the choice of λq only depends on Wˆq
and Yq, which means λq can be determined locally, by minimizing
trace(WˆTq Wˆq(YTq D2q,Yq)−1). (6.8)
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One of the problems of choosing λq using equation (6.8) is that it is biased towards
q and λq is larger than required. When deciding the privacy budget on a query q ∈ Y ,
the privacy budgets on all the ancestors of q are 0. Hence the budget distribution is
based on the assumption that all queries that contain q are answered by q, which is
not true after some of ancestors of q are assigned non-zero budget allocations.
In order to reduce this bias, a heuristic decay factor µ is introduced to control the
impact of q on queries that need to be answered with q. The following matrix is used
in equation (6.8) to take the place of WˆTq Wˆq:
µWˆTq Wˆq + (1 − µ) [ WˆTq1Wˆq1 WˆTq2Wˆq2 ] . (6.9)
As it is mentioned above, the bias of equation (6.8) comes from the assumption that
the privacy budgets on all the ancestors of q are 0. Hence there will be less bias when
q is more close to the root of Y . In our implementation, µ is set to be t−
l
2 where t
is the branching factor of Y and l is the depth of q in Y . Our algorithm is then to
minimize the following quantity instead of equation (6.8).
trace((t− l2WˆTq Wˆq + (1 − t− l2 ) [ WˆTq1Wˆq1 WˆTq2Wˆq2 ]) (YTq D2q,Yq)−1) . (6.10)
In equation (6.10), (YTq D2q,Yq)−1 needs to be recomputed for each λq. Hence
it is important to compute (YTq D2q,Yq)−1 efficiently. Let Mq, = YTq D2q,Yq, and its
inverse can be computed incrementally from M−1q1, and M
−1
q2,
:
M−1q, = 1(1 − λq)2 ([M
−1
q1,
M−1q2,
]
−
λ2q(1 − λq)2 + λ2q1T (M−1q1, +M−1q2,)1 [
M−1q1,
M−1q2,
]11T [M−1q1,
M−1q2,
]T) .
Here 1 is the column vector with all entries equal to 1. Therefore, with the following
quantities given,
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Program 6.4.1 Estimating bucket counts s.
procedure BucketCountEstimator(B, W , x, 2)
Given workload W and buckets B, transform workload to Wˆ
Let Y be a tree of queries over buckets
Allocate all privacy budget 2 to leaves of Y .
for all q ∈ Y , from bottom to top do
Compute eq, aq, a′q, dq.
Numerically find λq that minimizing Equation (6.11).
Compute Dq, according to λq.
Compute M−1q, and trace(WˆTq WˆqM−1q,) according to λq.
end for
For each q ∈ Y , let q be the corresponding entry of Dq,.
Let y be the vector of q(B(x)) + Laplace(1/q) for all q ∈ Y .
return s =M−1q,(DY,Y)Ty
end procedure
eq = trace(WˆTq Wˆq [M−1q1, M−1q2, ])
= trace(WˆTq1Wˆq1M−1q1,) + trace(WˆTq2Wˆq2M−1q2,),
aq = ∥Wˆq [M−1q1,M−1q2, ]1∥
2
2
,
a′q = ∣∣Wˆq1M−1q1,1∣∣22 + ∣∣Wˆq2M−1q2,1∣∣22,
dq = 1T (M−1q1, +M−1q2,)1,
Equation (6.10) can be computed as:
trace((t− l2WˆTq Wˆq + (1 − t− l2 ) [ WˆTq1Wˆq1 WˆTq2Wˆq2 ])M−1q,)
= 1(1 − λq)2
⎛⎝eq − t
− l
2aq + (1 − t− l2 )a′q(1 − λq)2 + λ2qdq λ2q
⎞⎠ , (6.11)
for any λq in O(1) time.
The entire process of computing bucket statistics is summarized in Algorithm 6.4.1.
Theorem 6.3. Algorithm 6.4.1 is 2-differentially private.
Proof. Since the only step in Algorithm 6.4.1 is computing y, it is sufficient to prove
that the computation of y satisfies 2-differential privacy. Recall the budget distribu-
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tion in each loop of Algorithm 6.4.1 satisfies the constraint in equation (6.6). Hence,
after the budget allocation, the maximum sum of the privacy budget in a path from
a leaf of Y to the root of Y is at most 2. Moreover, for any queries in q ∈ Y , ∆(q) = 1
since each q queries the sum over some entries of B(x). Given the parallel and the
sequential composition properties of differential privacy, a simple inductive argument
shows that the tree of Laplace mechanism invocations is 2-differentially private.
Theorem 6.4. Algorithm 6.4.1 takes O(mk log k + k2) time. In the worst case, k =
O(n), and Algorithm 6.4.1 takes O(mn logn + n2) time.
Proof. Recall [i, j] is used to denote the interval that corresponding to q. Incremen-
tally computing eq, aq, a′q, dq,M
−1
q, and tr(WsqTWsqM−1q,) takes O(1), O(m(j− i+1)+
(j − i + 1)2), O((j − i + 1)2), O((j − i + 1)2), O((j − i + 1)2) and O(1), respectively.
The intermediate results in Algorithm 6.4.1 can also accelerate the least square
process. Since we have already computedM−1q, in the loop of Algorithm 6.4.1, applying
the ordinary least square method (the last step of Algorithm 6.4.1) only takes O(k2)
time instead of O(k3) time in general cases. Summing the costs together proves the
theorem.
6.5 Experimental evaluation
The performance of DAWA is evaluated in this section. We start with a com-
parison to recently-proposed algorithms and evaluate each on multiple datasets and
workloads (Section 6.5.2). We then examine the effectiveness of each of the two main
steps of our algorithm (Sections 6.5.3 & 6.5.4). Finally, we also consider an exten-
sion of our technique to two-dimensional spatial data and compare it against the
state-of-the-art for that setting (Section 6.5.5).
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6.5.1 Experimental setup
In the experiments that follow, the primary metric for evaluation is the average
L1 error per query for answering the given workload queries1. Most workloads we
use are generated randomly (as described below). Each experimental configuration is
repeated on 5 random workloads with 3 trials for each workload. The results reported
are the average across workloads and trials. The random workloads are generated once
and used for all experiments.
The privacy budget in DAWA is set as 1 = 0.25 and 2 = 0.75. Unless otherwise
specified, the first step of DAWA constructs a partition using intervals whose lengths
must be a power of 2, an approximation that is described in Section 6.3. For the
second step of the algorithm, the branching factor of the query tree is set to 2.
6.5.1.1 Datasets
There are seven different 1-dimensional datasets considered in our experiments.
Although these datasets are publicly available, many of them describe a kind of data
that could be potentially sensitive, including financial, medical, social, and search
data. Adult is derived from U.S. Census data [8]: the histogram is built on the
“capital loss” attribute, which is the same attribute used in [38]. Income is based
on the IPUMS American community survey data from 2001-2011; the histogram
attribute is personal income [62]. Medical Cost is a histogram of personal medical
expenses based on a national home and hospice care survey from 2007 [65]. Nettrace
is derived from an IP-level network trace collected at the gateway router of a major
university. The histogram attribute is the IP address of internal hosts and so the
histogram reports the number of external connections made by each internal host
during the trace [40]. Search Logs is a dataset extracted from search query logs that
1This error measurement is different with previous chapters, since the algorithms are no longer
instances of the matrix mechanism and are tuned to have better performance with L1 error.
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reports the frequency of the search term “Obama” over time (from 2004 to 2010) [40].
Furthermore, we consider two temporal datasets derived from two different kinds of
network data. HepPh is a citation network among high energy physics pre-prints on
arXiv and Patent is a citation network among a subset of US patents [3]. These last
datasets describe public data but serve as a proxy for social network data, which
can be highly sensitive. For both datasets, the histogram reports the number of
new incoming links at each time stamp. To eliminate the impact of domain size in
comparing the “hardness” of different datasets, all datasets above are aggregated so
that the domain size n is 4096.
6.5.1.2 Query workloads
We run experiments on four different kinds of workloads. The identity workload
consists of all unit-length intervals [1,1], [2,2], . . . , [n,n]. The uniform interval work-
load samples 2000 interval queries uniformly at random. In addition, workloads that
are not uniformly distributed over the domain are also included. The clustered inter-
val workload first samples five numbers uniformly from [1, n] to represent five cluster
centers. For each cluster, 400 interval queries are sampled as follows: the left and
right boundaries of each interval are sampled from the left and right halves, respec-
tively, of a normal distribution with a standard deviation 256. The large clustered
interval workload is generated in the same way but the standard deviation is 1024.
6.5.1.3 Competing algorithms
We compare DAWA with six competing algorithms. The following two are data-
independent:
- Identity [26] uses the Laplace mechanism to release noisy counts for the individual
unit-length intervals.
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- Privelet [70] applies the Haar wavelet transform to the original data, adds Laplace
noise to the wavelet coefficients and transforms the noisy coefficients back.
When compared to identity, Privelet has been shown to achieve lower error
on large interval queries.
We also compare with the following four data-dependent algorithms.
- MWEM [38] uses the exponential mechanism and multiplicative weights to iter-
atively refine an estimate of the data. A key parameter in the algorithm is the
number of iterations T , which controls the number of measurements taken and
has a significant impact on performance. Since an optimal strategy for selecting
T is unknown, we empirically search for the best T on each dataset. We set
T to the value in {10,20, . . . ,190,200} that achieves the lowest error when the
workload is uniform intervals and  = 0.1. We use that T for all experiments on
that dataset. Tuning T to the dataset benefits MWEM and results in higher
accuracy than if T were fixed or set by a differentially private procedure.
- EFPA [6] is a method that applies a Fourier transform and then selects a subset
of the Fourier coefficients using the exponential mechanism. Noisy coefficients
are obtained and an estimate for the original dataset is computed via an inverse
Fourier transformation.
- P-HP [6] uses the exponential mechanism to recursively bisect the domain into
subintervals. The algorithm is designed to find a partition with minimal cost,
where cost is defined exactly as in this paper (Definition 6.2).
StructureFirst [74] is motivated by classical work in V-optimal histograms. It is
designed to construct a partition of the domain into k bins (where k is fixed)
such that the variance within each bin is minimized. Rather than compute a
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Nettrace Adult Medical Cost Search Logs Income Patents HepPh
22 29 20 500 1537 1870 2168
Table 6.1. Number of buckets in the optimal partition for each dataset when  = 0.1.
(a) Smallest ratio across datasets
 Identity Privelet MWEM EFPA P-HP S. First
0.01 2.04 1.00 2.65 0.88 2.20 0.86
0.05 2.27 1.11 3.00 3.20 1.98 1.01
0.1 2.00 0.98 2.54 3.84 1.81 0.82
0.5 2.06 1.01 3.39 3.60 1.25 0.89
(b) Largest ratio across datasets
 Identity Privelet MWEM EFPA P-HP S.First
0.01 26.42 12.93 17.00 18.94 7.09 10.85
0.05 22.97 11.24 19.14 43.58 17.57 9.77
0.1 20.85 10.20 22.54 41.09 31.41 8.32
0.5 25.47 12.46 68.75 43.69 138.14 10.89
Table 6.2. Ratio of algorithm error to DAWA error, for each competing algorithm
and  setting on uniform intervals : (a) smallest ratio observed across datasets; (b)
largest ratio across datasets.
single statistic for each bin, it instead takes multiple measurements at varying
granularity, using a hierarchical strategy.2
Among the algorithms introduced above, MWEM is the only algorithm that is also
workload-aware. We use code from the original authors for EFPA, P-HP, and Struc-
tureFirst; we implemented the other algorithms based on the pseudocode described
in the paper.
6.5.2 Accuracy on interval workloads
Figure 6.3 presents the main error comparison of all algorithms on workloads of
uniform intervals across a range of datasets and settings of . The y-axis is the
2The other algorithms from Xu et al. [74] take more than 20 hours to complete a single trial.
Therefore, they are not included.
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Figure 6.3. Average absolute error on the uniform intervals workload across
multiple datasets. The privacy budget ranges from  = 0.01 (top) to  = 0.5 (bottom).
average error per query presented on a logarithmic scale. The datasets appear along
the x-axis (in an order discussed below).
While data-independent algorithms like Privelet and Identity offer constant error
across datasets, the error of data-dependent algorithms can vary significantly.3 For
3StructureFirst is an exception to this trend, as its observed performance is almost totally in-
dependent of the dataset. The reason is that the algorithm chooses a partition based on a scoring
function that has high sensitivity. Thus, the partition selection phase of its algorithm is very noisy
and its choice of partition is close to random.
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some datasets, data-dependent algorithms can be much more accurate. For example,
on Nettrace with  = 0.01, all of the data-dependent algorithms have lower error
than the best data-independent algorithm (Privelet). For this dataset, the error of
DAWA is at least an order of magnitude lower than Privelet. These results suggest
the potential power of data-dependence.
There are other datasets, however, where the competing data-dependent algo-
rithms appear to break down. In the figure, the datasets are ordered by the cost of an
optimal partition (i.e., an optimal solution to Step 1 of our algorithm) when 2 = 0.1.
This order appears to correlate with “hardness.” Datasets on the left have low par-
tition cost and appear to be relatively “easy,” presumably because data-dependent
algorithms are able to exploit uniformities in the data. However, as one moves to
the right, the optimal partition cost increases and the datasets appear to get more
difficult. It is on many of the “harder” datasets where competing data-dependent
algorithms suffer: their error is larger than even a simple baseline approach like Iden-
tity.
In contrast, DAWA does not break down when the dataset is no longer “easy.”
On the moderately difficult dataset Search Logs, DAWA is the only data-dependent
algorithm that outperforms data-independent algorithms. On the “hardest” datasets,
its performance is comparable to data independent techniques like Privelet. DAWA
comes close to achieving the best of both worlds: it offers very significant improvement
on easier datasets, but even on hard datasets achieves roughly the same performance
as data-independent techniques.
For the same workload, datasets, and algorithms, Table 6.2 reports the perfor-
mance of DAWA relative to other algorithms. Each cell in the table reports the ratio
of algorithm error to DAWA error. Table 6.2(a) reports the smallest ratio achieved
over all datasets—i.e., how close the competing algorithm comes to matching, or in
some cases beating, the performance of DAWA . Table 6.2(b) reports the largest ra-
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Figure 6.4. Cost of partitions selected by various algorithms with  = 0.1.
tio achieved—i.e., how much worse the competing algorithm can be on some dataset.
Table 6.2(b) reveals that the error of every competing algorithm is at least 7.09 times
larger than that DAWA on one dataset.
Table 6.2(a) reveals that DAWA is sometimes less accurate than another algo-
rithm, but only moderately so. This occurs on the “hardest” datasets, Patents and
HepPh, where DAWA has error that is at most 1
0.82
≈ 22% higher than other ap-
proaches. On these hard datasets, the optimal partition has thousands of buckets
(see Table 6.1), indicating that it is highly non-uniform. On non-uniform data, the
first stage of the DAWA algorithm spends 1 of the privacy budget only to select a
partition that is similar to the base buckets. Despite the fact that the first stage of
the algorithm does not help much on “hard” datasets, DAWA is still able to perform
almost as well as the best data-independent technique, in contrast to the other data
dependent strategies which perform poorly on such “hard” datasets.
In addition to uniform interval workload, we also ran experiments on the other
three types of workloads. The performance of DAWA relative to its competitors is
qualitatively similar to the performance on uniform interval workload shown above.
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6.5.3 Effectiveness of partition selection
In addition to the strong performance of DAWA shown above, we would like to
verify the effectiveness of our solutions in each of the main steps of the algorithm.
Recall that the first step of DAWA is to generate a differentially private partition
of the domain using Algorithm 6.3.1. Here we evaluate the effectiveness of this first
step by comparing the cost of the partition found by the algorithm to the cost of the
optimal solution. The optimal solution is computed by solving Problem 6.1 directly,
ignoring privacy considerations. In addition, we compare our algorithm to P-HP,
which is also designed to solve Problem 6.1. To facilitate a fair comparison, for this
experiment each algorithm spends all of its privacy budget on selecting the partition.
The results are shown in Figure 6.4 for  = 0.1. DAWA-all is the DAWA algorithm
in which the partition is selected by considering all possible intervals. DAWA-subset
computes the partition using the subset of intervals whose lengths are a power of two.
As the figure shows, the partition of DAWA-all is close to optimal. The cost of the
partition of DAWA-subset is sometimes higher than that of DAWA-all especially on
“easier” datasets. Generally, however, DAWA-subset performs similarly to DAWA-all
. This suggests that the gain in efficiency that comes from only considering a subset
of the intervals does not come at the expense of lost utility.
The cost of the partition selected by P-HP, is almost as low as the cost of the
DAWA-subset partition on the Adult and Medical Cost datasets, but is orders of
magnitude larger on other datasets (on Income and Patents it is at least 1.6×106). This
provides empirical evidence that Algorithm 6.3.1 is a much more accurate algorithm
than the recursive bisection approach of P-HP. The results with  ∈ {0.01,0.05,0.5}
are similar and hence omitted.
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Figure 6.5. A comparison of alternative algorithms for the second step of DAWA
across different workloads, with  = 0.1.
6.5.4 Effectiveness of adapting to workload
The second stage of DAWA designs a query strategy that is tuned to the workload,
as described by Algorithm 6.4.1. Here we evaluate the effectiveness of this algorithm
by comparing its performance with some alternative strategies. Two alternative ways
to allocate the privacy budget on Y are considered: all queries have the same privacy
budget (Uniform); the privacy budget decreases geometrically from leaves to root
(Geometric) based on the approach described in [17]. The Laplace mechanism is
also included as an alternative choice for the second stage. Among the alternative
algorithms, Geometric Y is designed to answer uniform interval workloads, and the
Laplace mechanism is known to be the optimal data-independent mechanism for the
identity workload.
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Figure 6.6. Average error answering query workloads on spatial data. Each workload
is a batch of random rectangle queries of a given (x, y) shape.
The results are shown in Figure 6.5. Average error is measured across three
datasets that span the range of difficulty: Nettrace (“easy” with the lowest partition
cost), Search Logs (“moderate”), and HepPh (“hard”). In these experiments,  =
0.1. The original DAWA performs very well on all cases. In particular, it always
outperforms Geometric on uniform interval workload and performs exactly same as
the Laplace mechanism on identity workload. In the later case, we witness that the
greedy algorithm in the second step outputs the initial budget allocation, which is
exactly same as the Laplace mechanism.
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6.5.5 Case study: spatial data workloads
Lastly, we evaluate an extension to our main algorithm to compute histograms over
two dimensional spatial data. We use an experimental setup that is almost identical
to previous work [17]; differences are highlighted below. The dataset describes the
geographic coordinates (latitude and longitude) of road intersections across a wide
region in the western U.S [4]. The frequency of road intersections serves as a proxy
for human population. Over this region, we generate a workload of random rectangle
queries of four different shapes: (1,1), (5,5), (10,10), and (15,0.2) where shape (x, y)
is a rectangle that covers x degrees of longitude and y degrees of latitude.
We compare with algorithms from [17] and other recently published techniques.
- QuadTree [17] is a quadtree created over the domain where the privacy budget
is allocated with weights that decrease geometrically from leaf to root.
- HybridTree [17] is a hybrid strategy that combines a differentially private kd-
tree and at higher levels with a quadtree on lower levels with parameters set as
described in [17].
- DPCube [72] obtains bin counts using the Laplace mechanism and then con-
structs a kd-tree based on those noisy counts.
For the above algorithms, we use code obtained from the authors. Also included in the
study is MWEM (previously described). Among these algorithms, only QuadTree is
data-independent and only MWEM is workload-aware. Since some algorithms expect
discrete domains as input, we discretize the domain by partitioning the space into
the finest granularity used by the QuadTree, whose height is 10 [17]. Thus, both
longitude and latitude are split evenly into 210 bins.
To extend the DAWA algorithm to two dimensional data, we use a Hilbert curve
of order 20 to convert the 210 × 210 grid into a 1-dimensional domain with size 220. In
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case the query region only partially covers some bins in the discretized domain, the
query answer is estimated by assuming uniformity within each bin.
Figure 6.6 shows the results. Although DAWA is designed for interval workloads
on 1-dimensional data, it performs as well or better than algorithms that were specif-
ically designed to support rectangular range queries on 2-dimensional data. The
performance gap between DAWA and its competitors increases as  decreases. These
results suggest that DAWA can work well even when the workload does not consist
of interval queries. It may be possible to achieve even greater accuracy by extending
the DAWA algorithm to operate directly on two-dimensional data. We leave this as
future work.
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CHAPTER 7
RELATED WORK
7.1 Private data analysis
The most straightforward idea in private data analysis is to remove the attributes
that can directly identify each individual from each table, which was used in several
releases of sensitive data. Barbaro et al. proposed an attack to the published AOL
search log [10], where the partial information in search logs is used to re-identify an
individual. Further, Narayanan et al. successfully identified an individual from the
Netflix contest dataset [55] by joining the released information of Netflix users to the
public accessible IMDB database.
To prevent linkage attacks, Sweeney et al. [63] presented k-anonymity, which
divides the attributes into two groups: quasi-identifiers and sensitive information.
Quasi-identifiers are defined as attributes that might be publicly available and can be
used to partially identify one individual. The idea of k-anonymity is to guarantee that
each quasi-identifier is shared by at least k tuples. However, there are cases that k-
anonymized datasets leak private information. Many followup works on k-anonymity
pointed out potential privacy leaks in previous works and proposed more sophisti-
cated solutions. Machanavajjhala et al. presented l-diversity [50], which enforces the
sensitive attributes in each of the k-anonymized group has at least l different values.
M -invariance [68] and t-closeness [48], presented by Xiao et al. and Li. et al, respec-
tively improve l-diversity by imposing more constraints to the distribution of values
of sensitive attributes within each k-anonymized group. In addition, Xiao et al also
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introduced a new algorithm, Anatomy [69], that can be used to create a published
database that satisfies any variation of k-anonymity.
Though there is no theoretical privacy guarantee with k-anonymity, the idea is
widely accepted in many applications. Ganta et al. proposed an attack with auxiliary
information that can be applied to all variation of k-anonymous above [31]. However,
there are still more attempts to further improve k-anonymity and provide stronger
privacy guarantee, such as β-likeness [16].
Other privacy definitions rely on the randomness of the output of algorithms.
Dinur and Nissim [20] studied the least amount of perturbation to be added to query
answers to avoid blatant non-privacy. Evfimievski et al. defined privacy by bound-
ing the difference between the prior and posterior belief of adversaries. Blum et al.
presented the SuLQ framework, which provides a privacy definition that can work
against adversaries with arbitrary amount of auxiliary information. Differential pri-
vacy is presented in [26, 25] and draws lots of attentions since it has been introduced.
Several systems are designed [54, 61, 52] to convert non-private programs into differ-
entially private ones. A summary of recent theoretical works under differential privacy
can be found in [24]. Recently, criticisms on differential privacy are also emerging
[36, 43]. Kifer and Machanavajjhala also proposed a more general privacy framework
in [44].
7.2 Linear query answering under differential privacy
There are two different types of approaches that answers linear queries under
differential privacy. One is data-independent approaches, where the entire query
answering process does not change with different input datasets. The existing data-
independent approaches are either instances of the matrix mechanism or the matrix
mechanism with some variation. Furthermore, we are not aware any data-independent
approaches that work interactively with the database. The other one is data-aware
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approaches, where the query answering process is determined by the underlying
database. Such approaches including both batch processing approaches, where all
queries are answered at once and interactive approaches, where further queries can
depends on answers of previous queries.
7.2.1 Data-independent approaches
The original work on the matrix mechanism is first introduced in [45]. It presents
the error formula as well as the optimization problems. Originally, the matrix mech-
anism focuses mainly on -differential privacy, although (, δ)-differential privacy was
also considered briefly. In addition, the original work also analyzes two prior tech-
niques specifically tailored to range queries. The first uses a wavelet transformation
[70]; the second uses a hierarchical set of queries followed by inference [40]. The anal-
yses via the matrix mechanism indicate that those two techniques, though seemingly
different, are actually very similar to each other. Further analyses also demonstrate
that even though those techniques have much lower noise than the Laplace mecha-
nism, none of them minimizes the amount of noise needed.
Meanwhile, other works that designed algorithms that answer marginal queries can
also be considered as instances of the matrix mechanism. Each of those works designs
special strategies for a specific class of workloads. Barak et al.[9] studied answering
low order marginal queries using subsets of Fourier basis; Ding et al.[19] considered
a special collection of marginal queries, called data cubes, which are answered by a
subset of all data cube queries selected via a greedy algorithm. The algorithm adapts
a known approximation algorithm for the subset sum problem and cannot be applied
to general linear queries.
As follow up works to the matrix mechanism, we presented an adaptive algorithm
that generates strategies for any workload under (, δ)-differential privacy in [46].
The algorithm generates different strategies by weighting queries that consist of the
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singular vectors of the query workload. An empirical study demonstrates that the
strategies produced by this algorithm outperform previously designed algorithms on
various workloads [70, 40, 9, 19]. The case of supporting low-rank workloads under
-differential privacy are discussed by Yuan et al. in [76], which introduces lower
error than [70, 40] when the number of queries is much smaller than the size of the
domain. In order to avoid the hardness of solving the optimization problem under
the matrix mechanism, [75] demonstrated an approach that has the similar form of
the matrix mechanism, but relies on a fixed “recovery” matrix instead of the least
square inference as the last step of the matrix mechanism. Such simplification leads
to a much easier optimization formulation, though inference with the recovery matrix
introduces more noise than inference with the least squares.
7.2.2 Data-aware approaches
Other works discuss algorithms whose query answering process is related to the
underlying databases. Many of practical data-aware approaches are compared with
DAWA in Chapter 6, which are all non-interactive approaches. Close to our work in
Chapter 6, the P-HP [6] algorithm uses the same score function to choose a partition
of the 1-dimensional domain. The algorithm differentially privately and recursively
bisects the domain into small regions, which leads to an accumulated privacy budget
cost from all levels of the recursion. In addition, the greedy bisection may lead to a
suboptimal partition, and the algorithm is hence outperformed by our approach in
experiments. Xu et al. [74] proposes an alternative approach (StructureFirst) where
the number of partitions, k, is fixed and the algorithm aims to select a partition with
minimum expected squared error (L2), as opposed to the approach used here which is
based on absolute error (L1). We find that fixing k is disadvantageous as the optimal
k is data-dependent, varying by orders of magnitude across different datasets. In
addition, squared error has very high sensitivity, requiring a large amount noise to
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guarantee privacy and therefore resulting partitions do not capture the structure of
the data very well. In addition, neither P-HP nor StrucureFirst tries to combine
the dynamic strategy selection as our algorithm. There is another algorithm in [6]
that dynamically chooses the granularity in a Fourier transformation based on the
underlying database. Beyond 1-dimensional databases, linear query answering on
2-dimensional databases is studied in [17, 72], which create differentially private KD-
trees. An alternative approach is presented in [13, 49], which, instead of perturbing
the query answers, output a noisy compression of the database so as to support any
kind of queries.
Further, there are more data-aware approaches from the theory community. Those
approaches are both data-aware and interactive, and lead to smaller error than the
matrix mechanism over sparse databases by analyzing the properties of the underlying
database. Many of those theoretical approaches have been compared to the bound
on the matrix mechanism in Chapter 4.4. The median mechanism [59] maintained a
set of database instances that consist with historical query answers. The new query
is either answered by the maintained set of the databases or by the original database,
determined in a differentially private method. Dwork et al. [27] samples linear queries
in each step and modifies the sample distribution with the new query answers. In
[37, 35], the authors recursively update the estimated data vector to reduce the error
on linear queries. In each of those algorithms, asymptotical error bounds are provided.
More generally, Dwork et al. provide an error bound using an arbitrary differentially
private mechanism [21] but not specifically for linear counting queries. Theoretically,
those approaches have better dependency on privacy parameters and many not be
applicable in practical.
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7.2.3 Error bounds
The general error lower bound under the matrix mechanism was introduced in [47].
In recent work, Nikolov et al. [56] propose an algorithm whose error is within a ratio
of O(log2 rank(W) log(1/δ)) to the optimal error under any data-independent (, δ)-
differentially private mechanism (not limited to instances of the matrix mechanism).
Their algorithm is in fact a special case of the matrix mechanism, so this approxi-
mation ratio also bounds the ratio between the error lower bound under the matrix
mechanism and the minimum achievable error of all possible data-independent (, δ)-
differential private mechanisms. On -differential privacy, Hardt et al. [39] present
a lower bound on error for low rank workloads. Similar to the SVD bound, this
geometric bound can also be represented as a function of the singular values of the
workload. The authors also provide a mechanism that is close to the lower bound on
random matrices with high probability. Since the mechanism in the paper is a special
case of the matrix mechanism, the result also indicates that the matrix mechanism
can provide small enough error on such random matrices. In addition, this bound is
not directly comparable with the SVD bound since it bounds the mean absolute error
rather than mean squared error in the SVD bound.
Blum et al. [14] describe a very general mechanism for synthetic data release, in
which error rates are related to the VC dimension of the workload. However, for
many workloads of linear queries, VC dimension is too coarse-grained to provide a
useful measure of workload error complexity. For example, the VC dimension for
any workload of d-dimensional range queries that can not be embedded into (d − 1)-
dimensional spaces is always d + 1, despite the fact that such workloads could have
very different achievable error rates. Lower and upper bounds on answering all k-way
marginals with a data dependent mechanism are discussed in [42]. Though it is clear
that the SVD bound is tight in the case of all k-way marginals (since it is a special
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case of data cube) comparison with [42] requires a careful analysis of the singular
values of workloads of k-way marginals and is a direction for future investigation.
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CHAPTER 8
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Differential privacy draws a great amount of interest since it provides a promising
privacy guarantee in theory. However, the original literature of differential privacy
only provides high level ideas of the mechanism design and a mechanism (Laplace
mechanism) that only works well for single query answering. With the query workload
and the query strategy separated, the matrix mechanism takes the advantages of
the correlation between queries to generate high quality query answers with limited
privacy budget. In addition, the theoretical error analysis in the matrix mechanism
makes it is possible to compare quality of different query strategies accurately without
running experiments on concrete databases. As many proposed techniques [29, 47, 46,
76, 9, 70, 40, 19] can be formulated as instances of matrix mechanism with specific
query strategies, the matrix mechanism allows a uniform analysis and comparison
between all of those techniques.
We also discuss the optimal strategy that supports a certain workload under the
matrix mechanism and show it can be computed by iteratively solving a pair of
semidefinite programs. In order to cope with the high complexity of the original opti-
mization formulation, we further proposed an approximated algorithm that generates
strategies by weighting a set of designing queries, which produces strategies that
outperform state-of-art mechanisms under (, δ)-differential privacy. Moreover, we
present an error lower bound under the matrix mechanism, which characteristics the
hardness of a workload using its spectral properties. Our error bound is proven to be
tight in many cases under (, δ)-differential privacy and is shown empirically close to
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tight on many other commonly studied workloads. In addition, we design a data- and
workload-aware algorithm for answering range queries under differential privacy. The
algorithm first partitions the domain into approximately uniform regions and then
estimates counts in each region using measurements of varying granularity that are
tuned to the workload queries. Experimental results indicate our algorithm outper-
forms state-of-arts data-dependent algorithms, and is no worse than data-independent
algorithms when other data-dependent algorithms yield to high error.
However, many questions are still open under the matrix mechanism and its data-
dependent generalization. The first important direction is better algorithms and
further analyses to the matrix mechanism under -differential privacy. Under (, δ)-
differential privacy, past works have already designed an efficient workload adaptive
algorithm [46], presented an almost tight error lower bound [47], and connected the
error of the matrix mechanism to the error of any data-independent differentially
private algorithms [56]. But there are no such general results under -differential
privacy: the existing algorithms only work for specific workloads, the lower bound
on the matrix mechanism is not as tight, and the connection to the general data-
independent algorithms only existing on random matrices [39].
In addition, more researches on data-dependent algorithms under differential pri-
vacy is also an very important future direction. The power of data-dependent al-
gorithms under differential privacy has already been shown in our experiments, but
our current algorithm only works for 1-dimensional range queries. Existing algo-
rithms for more general cases (e.g. MWEM) is shown to be not as good on many
cases. Moreover, our experimental results indicate that some databases are signifi-
cantly “easier” than other databases according to the performance of data-dependent
algorithms. Formulate a measurement on the hardness of datasets or the hardness
of datasets under a given workload is crucial for us understand the effectiveness of
future differentially private algorithms.
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